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ABSTRACT 
Although there exists a large volume of literature on the theory and 
practice of LDC exchange rate regimes in the post-Bretton Woods era, it is mostly 
of a general nature treating LDCs as a whole, There are very few studies which 
examine in depth the special features of individual exchange rate regimes. 
Moreover. the issue of exchange rate instability that characterized the 
generalized floating of world's major currencies since the early 1970s. has so 
far received only superficial treatment as far as LDCs are concerned. The thesis 
attempts to fill these gaps by examining the Indian case in detail. 
An exchange rate policy in fact has two aspects. First. it involves the 
establishment of an optimal exchange rate regime which lays the framework 
for the day-to-day determination of the nominal exchange rate. Second, the 
exchange rate policy is concerned with the operation of the exchange rate 
regime in such a way as to promote given policy objectives. In the context of 
generalized floating, the decision regarding exchange rate regime for an LDC 
has to be made on the grounds of "internal balance". i.e .. with a view to 
protecting the domestic economy from disturbances arising from day-to-day 
third currency fluctuations. This 1,\'ould require a multi-currency peg based on 
balance of trade elasticities. Once an exchange rate regime is established. it has 
to be managed on considerations of "external balance". This in turn wt)uld 
require adjustments in the value of the peg, either to compensate for the 
xi 
inflation differential between the home country and its trading partners, or in 
order to bring about a balance of payments adjustment. 
India adopted a basket peg since September 197). However, India's basket 
system does not appear to be optimal, firstly because of the major role given in 
it to sterling as the currency of intervention, designation and valuation, and 
more importantly, because the official currency basket does not seem to be 
representative enough and also is not based on elasticity weights. Concerning 
the management o~he basket peg, it appears that the authorities have been 
guided by a number of alternative considerations which came into conflict with 
the objective of external balance. Particularly, considerations such as the 
minimization of speCUlation and inflation, and the stabilization of the rupee-
doUar rate seemed to have considerably influenced India's exchange rate policy. 
An important result of the promotion of the above alternative objectives has 
been high exchange rate volatility. 
Exchange rate instability depresses trade by generating exchange risk. In 
the context of LDCs with quantitative restrictions on private imports and direct 
government imports, the impact of exchange risk is felt much more on exports 
than imports. Previous studies on the impact of exchange rate instability on 
LDC exports have suffered from specification mistakes of export functions as 
well as inaccuracy of the exchange risk proxies employed. 
We developed a fully specified exchange risk-augmented demand-supply 
Iii 
model of eIports for India. We used this model to estimate the impact of changes 
in exchange rate and exchange risk on exports in the aggregate as ,yell as for 
the two disaggregated groups, namely, manufactured and non-fuel primary 
products. The separate effects on the volume and price of exports 'Were 
estimated. We also demonstrated that the signs of the exchange risk elasticity 
coefficients in export price equations are consistent with the invoicing pattern 
of India's exports. 
We simulated the results of the export model under reasonable assumptions 
for the medium term, and demonstrated the possibility of much gains on current 
account through a policy of reducing exchange rate instability in real terms. 
They also tend to show that an eqUilibrium exchange rate cannot be defined 
independent of the short-term fluctuations of the exchange rate. The results of 
the study have profound implications also for other LDCs which are subject to 
chronic balance payment deficits. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods par value system and the ~\lbsequent 
floating of major currencies in the early 1970s. offered a spectrum (If options to 
world's less developed countries (LDCs) with regard to the choice of an exchange 
rate regime. There have been a number of theoretical and empiric~ studies on 
the theme of the post-Bretton Woods LDC exchange rate policy. but they 'Were 
mostly of a general nature and there exists very few in-depth studies on any 
specific LDC case. The existing studies.although could bring (Jut some common 
features of LDC experiences. have generally lost sight of the more unique 
features of each LDC experience the understanding of which entails a much 
deeper and more concentrated study. In this thesis, we attempt to fjJJ the gap 
by concentrating on the Indian case. We critically examine the Indian 
exchange rate policy with respect to the adoption of an exchange rate regime 
after the demise of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg regime and its operati(ln 
ever since. 
India is not a typical less developed country (LOC) due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the country has a balanced economy in the sense that the 
primary, secondary, and services sectors contribute almost an equal one-third 
to the national income. Secondly, India has a relatively closed economy v.rith 
the total of exports and imports constituting only less than 15 per cent of the 
GDP. Thirdly, the country has a fairly diversified industrial base and the 
manufacturing products constitute over t.wo-thirds of her total exports. Yet. 
another notable feature of the Indian economy is that. it is now food self-
2 
sufficient, and the country could manage even the worst harvest failure 
without any foodgrains imports. 
While the above characteristics distinguish India from a typical LOC. she is 
still a low-income country with over one-third of the population lying beloW' 
the officially defined poverty line. As regards the financial system. although 
the country has a reasonably developed banking sector with extensive rural 
network. it is mostly government-owned and the deposit and lending rates are 
centrally administered. On the external sector. the country retains one of the 
most rigid trade and exchan'ge control regimes· which makes the domestic 
currency inconvertible both on the current and capital accounts. This is 
particularly due to the fact that the country has been running balance of 
payments deficits ever since the mid-fifties. ignoring the brief period of 1975-
79. It is this persistent balance of payments problem which makes the study of 
India's exchange rate policy particularly interesting. 
The thesis is divided into four main parts. Part I examines the theQry and 
practice of LDC exchange rate regimes. The different exchange rate practices 
adopted by LDCs since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system are described in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3. these practices are critinUy examined through a 
synthesis of the massive literature on LDC exchange rate regimes which 
emerged since t.he middle of 1970s. 
Part 11 discusses the Indian exchange rate regime. The theory could only 
pa.rUy explain the actual LDC exchange rate systems as the latter are also 
influenced by institutional factors. This is particularly true of the Indian 
3 
exchange rate regime 'With an institutional framew(lrk produced by the l(lng 
history of the dominant-dependent relationship between Britain and India. In 
Chapter 4. 'We examine the Indian exchange rate system in historical 
perspective as it evolved from a silver standard of the early 19th century t(l a 
flexible multi-currency peg of the present time. The present Indian exchange 
rate regime, 'While bearing the mark of the long historical a.t;;S(lciati(ln between 
Britain and India. also exhibits many new additional interesting characteristics. 
In Chapter 5. 'We take a close look at the mechanics and salient features (If the 
Indian exchange rate system. 'Which is broadly termed as a basket peg. 
A particular problem associated 'With the generalized fl(lating (If 'World's 
major currencies has been the rise in short-term exchange rate instabjJjty. 
Exchange rate volatility introduces yet another element (If uncertainty into the 
decision-making process of international trading firms. In developed c(luntries 
'Which generally follow a market-determined exchange rate system2. the 
exchange rate instability is largely end(lgen(lus and, to some eltent. that 
compensates for the instability in other parts of the economy. In ills 'Which 
generally follow a pegged regime, the resulting exchange rale instabiHly is 
largely exogenous and could have detrimental effects particularly (In their 
exports. The limited availability of forward market facilities in foreign 
exchange, and the system of foreign-currency export inv(licing. are other 
factors aggravating the adverse impact of volatility in exchange rates on LDC 
exports. While the empirical 'Work on the impact (If short-term elchange rate 
instability on developed countries has been proliferating, un f(lrtunately • 
despite the greater seriousness (If the pnlblem in LOCs, there have been (Inly a 
few LDC studies in this regard. Moreover, the existing studies (In specific ill:S 
suffer from a number of difHculties relating to the specification (If export 
functions and the accuracy of exchange risk proxies. Part III (If the thesis 
addresses this problem from the angle LDCs as a 'Wh(.le and n.r India in 
particular. through Chapters 6 to 9. 
Chapter 6 develops the concept of exchange risk arising from short-t.erm 
exchange rate fluctuations as a cost on both the supply and demand ~jde, of 
trade, and also examines critically the commonly employed mea.~ure, of 
exchange risk. Chapter 7 constructs alternative exchange risk mea.",ures 
relevant to India and, 'With the help of these mea.~ures, examines the Indian 
basket peg for its contribution to'Wards moderating exchange risk. Chapter 8 
surveys the major empirical studies (.f the impact of exchange risk (.n trade 
flo'Ws, separately for developed and developing countries. Chapter 9 develops 
an export model for India, and empirically estimates t.he impact. (If exchange 
rate and exchange rate risk on India's exports for the period 1968-86. 
Chapter 9 constitutes the major empirical 'Work (.f the the~is. It employs a 
fuJJy specified exchange risk-augmented demand-~JPpJy model f('r India', 
exports, and uses it to estimate India's exports in the aggregate and ~pa.rately 
for the manufactured and non-fuel primary products. This is in cont.ra.o;t t.o the 
existing studies 'Which have assumed a'Way either the supply side or the demand 
side of the export market. Moreover, the present study distinguishes bet'Ween 
the price and volume effects of both exchange rate and exchange risk. It also 
brings out ~e role of currency invoicing of India's exports in explaining the 
signs of the price elasticities of exchange risk. finally, this chapter also 
estimates the domestic price effect of a nominal depreciation of the n.pee. 
The analyses of India's exchange rate regime, its operation since the 
introduction of the basket peg, and the empirical study (If the impact (If 
exchange rate and its instability on India's exports have important impJicauons 
for policy. We examine the main policy implications of our study in Part IV (If 
the thesis, which also makes up Chapter 10 of the thesis. 
Chapter 11 sets out a summary of the major conclusions (If the thesis. 
Footnotes 
1. Although the rigours of controls are being reduced in India with the 
introduction of a number of liberalization measures since 1985. the process 
is slow and the basic framework of contfl)ls remains essentially the same so 
far. 
2. It may. however. be noted that the exchange rates of deveit>ped countries 
are not fully market-determined as there are different degrees of central 
bank intervention in these countries. Nevertheless, those exchange rates 
are much more freely determined than those of most LDCs. 
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Chapter Z 
LDC EIperience of EIchaDle Rate Reli.es 
2.1 Introduction 
The choice of exchange rate regime is an important issue for any country. 
The Bretton Woods agreement at the close of World War 11 provided for a· 
uniform 'adjustable peg' exchange rate regime for all member countries. A3 
the BreUon Woods system broke down in the early 1970s, developed countries 
generally adopted a flexible exchange rate regime.l With the advent (If the 
generalized floating of major currencies, LDCs "Were faced "With a number (If 
choices ranging from pegging to a single major currency to independent 
floating. We examine in this chapter hoy LDCs have tackled the issue (If the 
choice of exchange rate regime after the collapse (If the Bretton Woods 
adjustable peg system. 
2.2 Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes 
We foHo"W the IMF classification of exchange rate regimes into three broad 
groups, namely, (1) pegged to a single currency; (2) pegged to currency 
composite; and (3) flexible arrangements. The first category js further 
subdivided by the IMF into three sub-categories, namely, (a) pegged to U.S. 
dollar, (b) pegged to French franc, and (c) pegged to other currency .. The 
second category is the basket peg Yhich is sub-categorized into SDR peg and 
self-chosen basket peg, the latter abo called sometimes 'oyn-currency basket 
peg' or 'tailor-made basket peg'. With regard to the third category (If flexible 
exchange rate regimes, the IMF introduced a four-fold subcategorization since 
1982. They are (a) adjusted according to a set (If indicators "Which is usually 
7 
caUed 'the crawling peg'; (b) limited flexibility against U.S. dollar; (d other 
ma.naged floating; and (d) independent floating. There is need to extend that 
classification backwards in order to get a better idea of the trends in the lOC 
exchange rate regimes. We constructed a table <Table 2.1) which gives a 
synoptic view of the evolution of the exchange rate regimes of LOCs fr(lm J973 
to 1988. The review in this chapter closely follows this table. 
2.3 The Immediate Post-Bretton Woods Developments 
The initial reaction of LDCs to the generalized floating of the worJd's major 
currencies has been to tie their currencies to one of the major currencies. 
Thus. as seen in Table 2.1. during March-July 1973 • 86 out (If 97 lJ)(:S (ie .. 89 
per cent) pegged their currencies to one of the major currencies. This parallels 
the experience of the 19305 when the international gold standard broke down 
and the world got divided into several currency blocs. In the early 1970s. 
however. t.ruly reflecting the much diminished role of the pound sterling and 
the enlarged role of the U.S. dollar. only t 1 countries of the 32 overseas sterling 
area countries linked their currencies with sterling whereas 58 countries 
adopted the doJJar peg. For some of the countries which instituted a sterling peg 
(e.g .. Barbados. the Gambia. Guyana. Malawi, Mauritius and Sierra Leone), the 
U.K. still was the largest trade partner, accounting for 20 to 45 per cent of their 
trade (Osunsade. 1976a. p. 38). for others in this group. such as India and 
Sri Lanka, the sterling peg with the steady depreciation of sterling, 
brought about depreciation against their major trading partners and 
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Tablo Z.I Evolution of LDC Exchan,o Rate Ro,iaos. 1973-SS (W •• 'OI' 
of Countrios) 
Exchange Rate Regime March- july june june june Marcb 
1973 1975 1980 1985 1988 
1. Pegged to a single currency 
(a.b.c) ~ Z1 ~ 0(9 ~ 
a) U.S. dollar 58 0(9 .. 0 31 39 
b) French franc 16 13 H H 10( 
c) Other currency 12 9 0( 0( 5 
Of which: 
Pound Sterling 11 8 1 1 
2. Pegged to currency composite 
..1 17 3Z 0(0 3Z (a. b) 
a) SDR 7 15 12 7 
b) Other composite 3 10 17 28 25 
3. Flexible arrangements 3. 1fl (a·b+c+d) Z£ .11 ~ 
a) Adjusted according to a 
set of indicators 6 6 3 6 
b) limited flexibility, vis-a-
vis US dollar 8 6 0( 
c) Other managed floating 20 18 20 
d) Independent floating 2 .. 5 s 11 
Total 97a 98 118 IZ7 130 
a. Excludes Guinea which was pegged to gold. 
Source: Constructed from: 
(1) IMf Survey, 2 February, 1976, pp. 35-39 
(2) IMF Annual Report of the Executive Board. various issues 
(3) IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. various issues. 
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competitors.2 Of 16 countries which followed a fixed link with the french 
franc during March -July 1973, aU except Algeria, Mauritania, Mad41gascar, 
Mali3 and Tunisia belonged to the historical French franc area with a 
common currency called the CF A franc which the French treasury guarantees 
convertibility into French franc at a fixed rate of SO CFA francs : 1 french 
franc." 
During March-July 1973, three countries (Malta, Morocco and Cyprus) 
pegged their currencies to a basket of currencies, a relatively unknl),'n 
practice at that time. Of the eight countries which followed a flexible 
exchange rate regime, six (Brazil. Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and 
Vietnam) adjusted their exchange rates (against the U.S. dollar> frequently and 
in small steps according to certain objective criteria. i.e. the 'cralf"ling peg' 
which antedates the collapse of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg. Only tWI) 
lDCs (lebanon and Philippines) were on independent floating during March-
July 1973 but, as in the case of the crawling peg countries. their pmctice too 
preceded the generalized floating of major currencies and, therefore. cannot be 
considered a reaction to that. 
Another practice which appears to have arisen from the inadequate 
knowledge of the working of the exchange markets in a generalized floating 
system is the 'cross pegging'.' This is not reflected in Table 2.1. We have at 
least two cases (Nepal and Guinea) where the authorities, in spite of the 
breakdown of the fixed exchange rate regime among major currencies, 
wanted to maintain a fixed relationship with more than one currency (see 
Osunsade, 1976b,p.70). Nepal though was officially pegged to the U.S. dollar, 
maintained a fixed parity with the Indian rupee (which at that time was linked 
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to sterling) because of the traditional economic and financial ties between the 
two countries. Similarly. Guinea maintained a fixed link with the U.S. dollar 
and certain European currencies based on their gold value during the period. 
March 1973-May 1975. which with the collapse of the par value system implied 
broken cross rates. 
2.4 Subsequent Developments up to 1985 
The subsequent developments in the exchange rate arrangements of LDf..s up 
to 1985 indicated a general move away from single currency pegs to bask.et 
pegs including the peg to the SDR and also to more flexible arrangements. 
particularly what is termed as 'other managed floating' and. to a lesser extent. 
to independent floating. Thus. the number of LDCs pegged to a single currency 
decreased from 86 during March-July 1973 to 49 in June 1985. which represents 
a decline by more than half in percentage terms. Le .. from 89 per cent of all 
LDCs in March-July 1973 to 39 per cent in June 1985. In contrast. countries 
pegged to currency baskets grew from just three during March-July 1973 t.) 40 
in June 1985 and those practicing flexible arrangements grew from eight in 
the earlier period to 38 in June 1985. Thus by June 1985. the basket pegging 
together with the flexible exchange rate regimes were practiced by about 61 per 
centofLDCs. 
The evolution within each major group is noteworthy. Within the category 
of single-currency pegging. we note a decline by nearly half in the number of 
nations practicing the dollar peg. i.e .. from 58 during March-July 1973 to 31 
in June 1985 and a drastic reduction in countries belonging to the sterling peg 
from eight to one over the same period and a more or less stable number of 
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countries following a fixed relationship with the French franc. While 
countries outside the Cf A franc system (j,e,. Algeria. Tunisia. Mauritania and 
Madagascar) dropped the peg with the French franc. there have been 
newcomers to accept the fixed relationship with the French franc. namely. 
Comoros. £quitorial Guinea and MaJi.6 , 
Within the group of basket peggers. the number of countries adopting o,'n-
currency baskets grew from 3 during March-july 1973 to 28 in june 1985. This 
growth has been much larger than that of countries following the SDR peg 
which rose from nil to 12 in the same period with a faU from 15 to 12 from June 
1980 to june 198). This relative unattractiveness of the SDR peg needs to be 
explained in the light of the academic advice in favour of it. This will be taun 
up later. 
Another interesting development has been the increasing trend toward 
managed floating and independent floating among LDCs. By June 198~, 18 
countries (a faH from 20 in June 1980) were foHowing some kind of 
administratively managed floating and eight countries somewhat unrestricted 
floating. Floating by LDCs is a new development which is rather surprising 
in the Hght of the academic literature which is examined in the nelt chapter. 
Before mating further comments on this development we need to foUoli the 
more recent trends in LDC exchange rate regimes which are examined below. 
2.5 Post-I985 Developments 
Table 2.1 also allows us to view the very recent developments in the 
exchange rate regimes of LOCs. Firstly, we find a new favour for the dollar 
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peg since 1985 with the number of countries with such an arrangement 
increasing from 31 in June 1985 to 39 in March 1988. Note also that presently no 
., I' 7 country matntaIns aster tng peg and the number of countries with a fixed 
link with the French franc remained at 14 since 1980. In March 1988 lDr..s with 
single currency pegs constituted 45 per cent of total. a rise from 39 per cent in 
June 1985. Secondly, there is a movement away from the basket peg with a 
decline in lDCs following such an exchange rate regime from 40 in June 1985 to 
32 in March 1988. Note here that the switch is much more evident from the SDR 
peg with a large drop in the number of countries following such a system from 
12 to 7 in t.he last three years whereas t.he number of countries foUI)\Ving 
'tailor-made' basket pegs declined only marginally, i.e., from 28 in June 1985 to 
25 in March 1988. Thirdly. there has been a rise in interest for floating both 
of the managed and the unrestricted type, the former rising from 18 to 20 and 
the laUer from 8 to 11 during June 1985-March 1988. Finally, there are 
currently four countries. nan\ely .. Bahrain. Qatar. Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates. all belonging to the Middle East. which among the LIX'..s adopting 
flexible exchange rate arrangements. permit only limited flexibility against. 
t.he U.S" dollar. Note that these countries are officially SDR peggers with! 7.25 
margins but in practice do not follow these margins strictJy in (Irder to 
mainwn a stable relationship with the U.S. doJJar. We shaH make C(Imments on 
each of these developments in the paragraphs below. 
2.:>.1 Erratic Shifts in Exchange Rate Arrangements 
We may explain the recent recovery of interest jn doJJar pegging as the 
effect of the end of the long period appreciation of the U.S. doJJar and its 
subsequent depreciation against other currencies since March 1985. When the 
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dollar had been appreciating over the previous five years. countries could 
maintain the fixed dollar peg only at the cost of severe appreciation (If their 
effective exchange rate which could be detrimental to their external balance. 
Hence a number of countries depegged from the dollar during 1980-85. We may 
then ask. why several LlX~s shifted out of the dollar peg during 1975-SO when 
dolJar showed a trend depreciation? (See Table 2.1). In fact. there had been 
no significant move away from the dollar peg during 1975-80 when we take 
into account the number of countries which kept limited flexibility vis-a-vis 
dollar during that period as indicated in row 3 (b) of Table 2.1. After the initial 
shift away from dollar pegs to mainly basket pegs during 1973-75. the ma..~ive 
departure from the dollar peg took place only during the period of doJJar 
appreciation. i.e .• during 1980-85. After 1985. the turn-around in the value of 
the dollar along with the continued pre-eminent position of the dollar as a 
vehicle currency and invoicing currency attracted a number of countries hack 
to dollar pegging. The additional dollar peggers since 1985 include some earlier 
SDR peggers (Sierra Leone8 and Vietnam), own-currency basket. peggef8 
(Guyana. and Mozambique), managed floaters (Ecuador and El Salvador> as well 
as short time free floaters (Uganda and Zambia)9. 
We note in the above instances how the choice of exchange rate regime is 
influenced by the cyclical behaviour of the U.S. doJJar. Apart from these ca.~s 
which pertain to very recent experience. we could also find a number of (,ther 
cases where the authorities changed from one exchange rate regime to another 
with shifts in the value of the dollar. Take the example of the Middle Ea..<!1.ern 
countries of Bahrain. Qatar. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates which we 
briefly mentioned earlier. These countries are mainly oil producers and their 
exports are priced in U.S. dollars whereas their imports are diversified and 
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priced mostly in non-dollar currencies. They initially shifted from the dollar 
peg to the SDR peg which was prompted by the depreciation of the dollar 
which had an inflationary effect on their economies through the import 
prices. However. later when the dollar appreciated. these countries in 
practice kept a· stable relation with the dollar and thereby became de facto 
dollar peggers again.1° 
Malawi is yet another example where the exchange rate regime had to 
undergo erratic shifts in early 1970s which was predicated by the use of 
exchange rate regime for the domestic price objective. Wsunsade. op.cit. p. 70). 
The country was initiaJJy on a sterling peg. The Jarge and steady depreciation 
of sterling made the authorities to switch to a basket consisting (If just two 
currencies. namely. sterling and the doHar. in November 1973. 
time this heJped in the stabilization of domestic price as the elchange rates of 
sterHng and the doUar generaHy moved in opposite directions. Later. however. 
both the currencies began to depreciate. thereby worsening the domestic 
inflation. This prompted the MaJawian authorities to move to the SDR peg. 
2.5.2 SDR Pegs Out of Favour? 
We noted earlier that although basket pegs became increasingly popular up 
to 1985. there has been a decting interest in such a system. particularly the 
SDR peg. thereafter. looking more closely we understand that. while there 
has been a number of switches from own-currency baskets to more flexible 
arrangements after 1985 (China. Madagascar. Maldives. Mauritania, 
Singapore and Tunisia>, the shifts from SDR pegs have been towards own-
currency basket pegs (Kenya. Sao Tome & Principe and Vanuatu) and doUar 
1~ 
pegs (Sierra Leone and Vietnam). As a result, whereas the 'tailor-made' baskets 
reduced their importance only marginally with 25 countries still holding on to 
such a system in March 1988, the SDR pegs dropped to just 7 by March 1988 from 
15 in June 1980 and 12 in June 1985. 
There has been a number of studies showing that the SDR basket vt)uld 
broadly stabjJjze the effective exchange rate (If majority of LOCs and is. 
therefore. superior to single currency pegs with the exception (If some 
Caribbean countries for which the doUar peg is superior and the fn.ncophone 
African countries for which the existing tie with the french franc is superior. 
(See e.g .. Crockett and NsouH, 19n: Helleiner, 1981: Williamson, 1981a: and 
Brodsky and Sampson, 1984). further, a uniform SDR peg by several natil)fls 
has the advantage of stabilizing the cross rates between the currencies of these 
nations which. in turn, would encourage intra-lOC trade. lastly, since the 
SDR itself is a basket of major currencies with weights roughly reflecting their 
importance in world trade, they could be particularly relevant for countries 
exporting homogeneous primary commodities the world prices of which are 
determined by the distribution of world imports rather than the direction DC 
trade of the country's own exports. lt (See WHHamson.1982. pp. 55-59). 
In spite (If the above merits (If the SDR peg. it appears that such an 
exchange rate system is on the wane. As noted by Black (J976) and Cr(Ic1:ett and 
Nsouli U9n), the SDR peg has the drawback common to any basket peg of not. 
being able to use the peg-unit as the intervention medium. That is. the SDR 
being not a medium of exchange but a unit of account cannot be used by 
authorities for the purpose of intervention in exchange markets. Williamson 
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(1982, p. 59) did point out that unless the SDR becomes attractive as an 
intervention and vehicle currency, the balance of advantages of the SUR over 
an own-currency basket would not look convincing for countries tt) make 8· 
widespread spontaneous move toward SUR pegging. 
2.5.3 Swit.ch to More flexible Exchange Rate Regimes 
Among the different types of LDC flexible exchange rate arrangements, it is 
interesting to compare the sub-category, 'adjusted according to a· set of 
indicators' with the 'other managed floating'. Williamson <t981b) distinguishes 
between two types of crawling pegs: the 'rule-based crawling peg' and the 
'decision-variant crawling peg'. It is the former that is represented by our sub-
category 'adjusted according to a set of indicators'. It is further felt appropriate 
to designate the 'other managed floating' as the 'decision-variant crawling peg' 
or t.he 'discretionary crawling peg'. This is explained below. 
A number of countries in the category of 'other managed floating' generally 
follow a basket peg which is made to crawl on the basis of several unannounced 
considerations. For example, China followed a basket. peg up to 1985 and in 
January 1986, shifted to a system whereby the exchange rate is adjusted 
presumably according to developments in balance of payments and also costs 
and exchange rates of major competitors. Guinea-Bissau although operating I. 
SDR basket. adjusts exchange rates based on domestic price movements. India. 
also has a discretionary crawiing basket peg.12 South Korea too manages I. 
crawling basket peg with the basket based on a combination of trade weights 
and SDR weights. Other examples of the discretionary crawling bask.et peg are 
Mauritania which followed a publicly announced own-currency bask.et peg 
till recently, Morocco and Tunisia.13 The remaining countries in the 'other 
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managed floating' category do not operate any basket system but alter their 
exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, the intervention currency, based on a· 
number of considerations gradually and in frequent intervals. Some examples 
are Argentina, Costa. Rica. Mexico. Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. 
Another interesting development has been the recent adoption oC Cree 
floating by a number of lDCs. The number of LDCs which allowed market-
determination of exchange rates moved up from 5 in June 1980 to 8 in June 1985 
and were as high as 14 in March 1987 before declining to 11 in March 1988. The 
IMF have recently conducted a study of the LDe experience of fhlaHng (see 
Ouirk etaL 1987). 
Among the LDCs which adopted floating. most did so as the only feasible 
solution to the severe protracted balances of payments difficulties and as a part. 
of the Fund-supported adjustment programmes. 14 A major reason advanced for 
the decision to float in these countries is that the other alternative oC large 
discrete adjustment of exchange rate was considered politically intoJerabJe. It 
was also thought in some of these countries that fJoating exchange rates would 
bring into the fold of the official sector the large illegal or unofficial paralJeJ 
markets in which exchange rates have heavily depreciated. 
The fJoating exchange rate system adopted in these c(Juntries t(l(lt two 
. different forms. The {jrst is similar to the type that is invariably prevalent in 
developed countries with fJoating exchange rates. i.e. the one which (.perales 
through the private inter-bank system. Such an arrangement was opted for in 
countries such as Dominican Republic. the Gambia. lebanon. the Philippines. 
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Sierra Leone. South Africa. Uruguay and Zaire. In those countries without. 
sufficient financial infrastructure. the autborities chose a second form. 
namely. an auction system in which the central bank itself organizes the 
market and which necessarily involves the surrender of foreign exchange 
receipts to the central bank. The countries that have been conducting the 
auction process are Bolivia. Ghana. Guinea. Jamaica. Uganda and Zambia. 
Nigeria introduced a composite of both forms. i.e .. an auction system for 
allocation of foreign exchange receipts from oil to an interbank market 
It is too early to pronounce a judgement on the floating experience of LDf...s. 
However. tbe development is significant as it challenges the conventional 
wisdom that floating is infeasible in most LDCs due to the absence in these 
countries of mature financial markets and their lack of integration with 
foreign markets and also because of the highly open nature (If these 
...,h·le" 
. 15 
countnes. But it is also significant that a few countriesA,gave up the 
experiment. namely. Ja.maica. Uganda and Zambia. belonged tl) the category 
with relatively underdeveloped financial infrastructure and which adopted an 
auction system rather than the inter-bank markets for the determination of 
exchange rate. 
The IMF study cited earlier indicates that the floating rate system recently 
adopted in LDCs did not lead to a free fall of the exchange rate thereby leading 
to a spiralling of inflation in these countries. Moreover. the exchange rate 
instability during the floating period has been generally less than that in the 
immediate pre-float period. Three major factors are reported in this 
connection: first, there has been central bank intervention to stabilize the 
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rates: second. the reduced instability of the underlying economic conditions, 
particularly in primary commodity prices: and third. the possible absence of 
destabilizing speculation activities normally found in an 'adjustable peg' 
system. 
We need to stress that the recent adoption of floating in LDCs had been rather 
controlled experiments which might not fully qualify as free floating. In those 
countries which allowed interbank markets thereby creating an atmosphere 
favourable to free floating. limits 'Were put on the foreign exchange pm;jti(lns 
of commercial banks and other dealers admittedly to avoid monopoly ~ituati(lns. 
In countries 'Which adopted the auction system. the authorities kept a high 
controlling position through the elchange surrendering procedure and the 
setting aside of a large portion of foreign exchange for extra-market allocation 
on government account. The relatively stable behaviour of exchange rates 
reported during the floating period must have been aided greatly by the 
'bridging' finance many countries obtained from official and commercial bank 
sources and also due to the financial support from the Fund. Above aU. it 
should be noted that whereas the countries which introduced floating although 
undertook liberalization on current account transactions. there stHJ remained 
current account restrictions. particularly import licensing. in most (If these 
countries and more importantly. most of these countries did not undertake any 
Hberaiization at all on capital transactions. This factor might have been a major 
one behind the relatively stable elchange rate behaviour during the (Joating 
period. 
2.6 Empirical Studies 
A number of factors are advanced in theoretical literature as the possible 
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determinants of a country's choice of the exchange rate regime. Studies have 
been undertaken to lest whether considerations noted in theoretical analysis 
have actually influenced the choice of exchange rate system. Wickham (1985) 
gives a brief survey of the results of the early empirical studies by Holden 
and Holden (1976) and HeHer (1978) both of which used the discriminant 
analysisl6 and also by Dreyer (1978) which used the probit analysisl7. These 
are pure cross-section studies. which may be criticized for relying on data for 
just one particular year. Bosco (1987). however. avoids that problem by pOl>ling 
both cross-section and time series data and he studied the issue by using the 
J • J' h 18 Oglt ana YS15 approac . . 
Irrespective of the alternative techniques employed by the various authors. 
the evidence that emerged from these studies has been broadly suppl>rtive of 
the theoretical literature on the subject. i.e .• on the one hand. the degree of 
openness. financial integration, and differential inflation influence the 
general choice of a country between pegging and floating, and, on the other 
hand, t.he decision between a single currency peg and a· basket peg is affected 
largely by the degree of geographical concentration of trade. 
While the above studies empirically tested the choice of exchange rate 
regime by LDCsl9 on the basis of the several criteria advanced in the literature, 
Wei! (1987) concentrated on just one criterion, namely, the degree of 
geographical concentration of trade. For countries with different exchange 
rate regimes.the author conducted simple tests for the difference in the mean 
percentage of trade done with major currency area. and reported a number of 
interesting results as noted below. 
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Weil, as expected, found that basket-pegging nations have a higher degree of 
geographical t.rade diversification than that for the single currency peggers. 
However, the LDCs in general experienced an improved trade diversification 
since 1976. But what really mattered in the switching away from the single 
currency pegging was the initial degree of trade diversification rather than 
the changes in trade pattern over the period. This indicates the possibility that 
countries went through a learning process before they finally abandoned 
their traditional single currency pegs. But what. Wei! saw as the learning 
process could. in fact. conceal the deliberate decisions of authorities stemming 
from reasons such as the potential depreciation of the effective exchange rate 
when the peg-currency has been undergoing a depreciation. We sa,,' such a 
possibility in the initial reluctance of India and Sri Lanka to depart. from the 
traditional sterling peg. Another point emerging from Weirs study is that a. 
number of switches away from the dollar peg that occurred in the first half of 
the 1980s have been in reaction to the 'over-valuation' of the dollar and not. in 
response to increased geographical trade diversification. This conclusion is 
consistent with the rise in dollar pegs observed after 1985 following the 
reversaJ of doUar's appreciation. 
2.7 Summary 
We may now summarize the post-Bretton Woods LDC experience of varil)us 
exchange rate regimes. firstly, there has been a general move a,,"ay from 
single currency pegs to basket pegs and to more flexible exchange rdte 
arrangements. However, the SDR peg is on the decline. Among the remaining 
single currency pegs, dollar pegs are the most common, the french franc 
pegs are the most stable and there exists no sterling peg any more. By March 
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1988 about'(S per cent of LOCs followed a single currency peg down from 89 per 
cent during March-July 1973. 
Secondly. a lack of stability is observed in exchange rate regimes of a 
number of LDCs which is largely associated with the cyclical fluctuations in the 
value of the U.S. dollar. leading to erratic switches from and toward dollar pegs. 
Another reason for the sudden changes in exchange rate regimes appears to be 
associated with the use of the exchange rate as an anti-inflationary v,·eapon. 
Thirdly. among the flexible exchange rate regimes of LOCs. the most 
interesting appears to be the discretionary crawling peg where the authorities 
a.ct to bring about gradual adjustments in exchange rate against either a. given 
basket of currencies or against a single major currency without any pre-
announced rules. There has also been a number of cautious experiments in free 
floating by LDCs in the 1980s. most of them with the support (If the IMf 
adjustment programmes. It js too early to assess the full implications (If this 
development but there is evidence to state that they are not strictly pure 
noating and they do not constitute a repudiation of the existing theory (If LDC 
exchange rate regime. 
Finally. the empirical studies of the LDC exchange rate regimes have 
generally supported the arguments raised in theoretical literature regarding 
the various determinants of an exchange rate regime. Concentrating on the 
major factor of geographical trade diversification. it has been noled that LOCs 
as a whole have undergone improvements in the paUern of trade. In that 
context. switches from single currency pegs are explained more by the 
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previous degree of t.rade diversification rather than the existin g pattern. 
Although this is explained by an underlying learning process in the $Witch 
from single currency peg, one could also detect. other considerati(lns such as 
the likely depreciation of effective exchange rate that the existing single 
currency peg could involve. Another factor which is not related t.o trade 
diversification behind the $Witches from the single currency peg is the d(IIJar 
'over-valuation' in the first half of the 1980s and this influence is confirmed by 
the rise in dollar pegs with t.he depreciation of t.he dolJar after 1985. 
Thus, we have seen in this chapter that there are a number of exchange rate 
systems that are in operation in LDCs. Although we described the vari(l\ls LOC 
exchange rate regimes. we did not examine t.hem for t.heir econ(lmic grounds. 
In order to examine the economic rationale of alternative exchange rate 
regimes we t.urn t.o the next. chapter. 
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footnotes: Chapter 2 
1. It may be noted that the floating exchange rate system adopted by developed 
countries since the early 1970s has not been completely free floating but 
rather managed floating with varying degrees of central bank intervention. 
2. for India, a more detailed analysis of the introduction of the sterling peg is 
given in Chapter .f. 
3. Mali joined the CFA franc system in June 198.f by becoming a member of 
the West African Monetary Union (WAMlD. 
4. See African Department Study Group (1969) for a detailed study (If the ffA 
franc system. 
5. The 'cross-pegging' is the practice of pegging the value of the domestic 
currency simultaneously to more than one foreign currency at rates which 
are inconsistent with the cross rates between the foreign currencies. The 
cross pegging results in broken cross rates leaving the scope for arbitrage. 
6. Comoros has an independent currency caJJed Comorin franc but its value 
is kept the same as that ofCfA franc and is linked to the french franc at 50 
to one. Equitorial Guinea's currency is (FA franc. Mali joined the (FA franc 
system in June 1984 although she kept a filed relationship with the (,IA 
franc and therefore the French franc even earlier. 
7. The only country on the sterling peg for the previous several years. viz .. 
the Gambia. abolished it in January 1986 in fav(lur of a floating exchange 
rate system. 
8. Sierra Leone floated its currency during an intermediate period from June 
1986 to August 1987. 
9. There are, however, three countries which switched away from the dollar 
peg during 1985-88. viz .. Egypt which adopted a managed floating. l;hana 
which floated independently. and libya which pegged to the SDR with large 
margins of!. 7.25 per cent. 
10.See Gerakis (1976) for a study of the exchange rate practices of some Middle 
Eastern countries during 1975. 
11. WHHamson quotes the in stan ce of Sudanese cotton whose export price. 
although set in world markets in terms of the dollar. could go up by an 
appreciation of the DM against the dollar via a rise in the German doUar 
demand price for cotton. lIere. the influence of Germany on the price of the 
homogeneous commodity. cotton. depends not upon the share of that country 
in Sudan's exports of cotton but rather on her share in world trade in cotton. 
12.See chapter 4 for the detailed study on the Indian basket system. 
13.1t may also be noted that Burundi and Jordan which are officially-designated 
SDR peggers have recently started adjusting gradually against. the SDR 
basket. 
14.Exceptions are Lebanon, South Africa and Uruguay. Of the three. lebanon 
has highly developed financial markets which are integr.lted 
internationally and the country has had extensive experience in 
independent floating ever since 1952. 
15.See the more detailed analysis in Chapter 3. 
16.The discriminant analysis belf)ngs to a class of regression techniques 
where the model is estimated with the dependent variable as a dummy 
variable. The alternative approaches under this broad group of meth.)ds 
are the logit. probit and the tobit analyses. See MaddaJa (1988) PI'. 267-289 
for a good exposition of these techniques. See also Bosco (1987) for a 
comparison of the studies by HeUer (J978) and Dreyer (J978). 
J 7. See F (I(Itn ote 16. 
IS.See FO(ltnote 16. 
19.Heller (1978) had both lDCs and developed countries in the sample whereas 
other studies considered only LDCs. 
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. Chapter 3 
The Theory of LDC Exchan&e Rate Regimes 
3.1 Introduction 
The review in the previous chapter of the post-Bretton Woods LDC exchange 
rate practices has not shown an altogether satisfactory state of affairs. We 
noted a number of cases of erratic shifts in exchange rate regimes. There 
appears to be a general lack of clear understanding among LOCs (If what an 
elchange rate regime is expected to achieve. Can theory provide guidance for 
LDCs in the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime? 
There are broadly three main strands in the literature on exchange rate 
regimes. Of the three, the first has been initiated by Friedman (1953) as a 
critique of the orthodoxy of the Bretton Woods 'adjustabJe peg' system and the 
second is the theory of optimum currency areas which originated with the 'W(lrk 
of Mundell (1%1). The former proceeded as if the optimal exchange rate regime 
is universally applicable to aU countriesl , the latter mainly emphasiz.ed certain 
criteria the satisfaction of which varies from country to country (Jshiyama, 
1975). A significant aspect of the contributions under the above two streams 
has been that they were made largeJy in the context of developed countries and. 
therefore, abstracted from the spedal problems of the large number of LD<.:S. 
This gap, however, has been filled since the mid-1970s by the emergence of a 
third strand of literature on the issue of the optimal exchange rate regime for a 
typical LOC. This body of literature stresses the special characteristics (If LOCs 
and place the choice of exchange rate regime within the context (If the 
differe~ating features of those countries. 
There has been already two surveys of the extensive literature (In the LDC 
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exchange rate regime by Williamson (1982) and Wickham (198:)). The purpose 
of this chapter is. therefore. not exactly to undertake yet another survey. We 
propose, rather, to synthesize the existing literature on the subject with a view 
. . 
to brin~~9forth general principles that should guide LDCs in their choice of 
exchange rate regime. 
3.2 The Background 
The theory of exchange rate regimes for LDCs was developed in the context. 
of the generalized floating of world's major convertible currencies. The 
question was asked: what is the optimal exchange rate arrangement for an lOC 
given that the major currencies of the world are floating against one another? 
Three alternatives were foreseen: (1) to join the system of developed CI)untries 
by accepting an independent floatini; (2) to peg the home currency to the 
currency of the most predominant trading partner; and (3) to peg to a currency 
basket which can be either the SDR or a self-chosen basket. Professional 
opinion has been generally in favour of the third option. 
Two questions arise from the professional consensus on the optimal 
exchange rate regime for the LOC: first. why pegging is preferable to floating 
for the LDe? and second, why a multi-currency peg is considered superior to a 
single currency peg? At the time of the generalized move to'l\Tards a floating 
exchange rate system in the early 1970s, there existed a fairly consistent. corpus 
of literature in favour of floating3. We need to examine those arguments and 
ask why they are not quite relevant as far as the LOCs are concerned. In 
addition. we have to examine the arguments for the basket. peg and see why a 
single currency peg is not ideal for the LOC. 
3.3 Feasibility of Floating in LDCs 
The major argument put forward in the earlier literature for a floating 
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e1change rale syslem has been that it could resolve the policy dilemma between 
the objectives of external balance and internal balance by ensuring. on the one 
hand. automatic exlernal balance by appropriate movements in exc.hange rates 
a.nd. on the other hand. unconstrained freedom to use macroeconomic policies 
particularly the monetary policy for the attainment of internal balance. In 
addition. free floating was claimed to insulate the economy from external shocks 
not merely monetary but real as weU". The experience of floating in developed 
countries. however. proved that the above claims of floaters had been much 
exaggerated and the new asset-market approach to exchange rate determination 
provides fresh insight into why the reality turned out. to be different. from the 
earlier thinking (see Williamson. 19S5b). However. our concern for the 
moment. is not with regard to the applicability of the arguments of floaters for 
developed countries' but rather why a flexible exchange rate system is not. 
relevant to developing countries prima facie? 
The absence in most LDCs of a financial infrastructure which is well-
developed internally and well-integrated with the international financial 
markets has been stressed by a. number of authors (e.g. Black. 1976; Crockett and 
Nsouli. 19n; and Branson and Katseli. 1981). In these countries. the financial 
system consists of mainly the central bank and the commercial banks. the latter 
under the strict surveillance and control of the former; interest rates and 
exchange rates are administratively fixed and with rarely any relation between 
the two; forward markets in foreign exchange are virtually non-existent; and 
with an elaborate system of trade and exchange controls. private capital flows 
are strictly regulated. 
Branson and Katseli note. invoking the asset-mark.et. view. that the short-
term stability of the exchange rate depends upon the overall stability of the 
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financial markets, which in turn assumes a domestic financial system of certain 
depth and breadth and the absence of capital controls to ensure substitutability 
between domestic and foreign assets in private portfolios. The authors argue 
that., in absence of such asset market conditions for equilibrium, the exchange 
rate in those countries will be determined by current account flows, i.e .• by the 
supply and demand in foreign exchange market arising mainly from exports 
and imports. In that context, the short-run elchange rate stability requires the 
satisfaction of the Marshall-Lerner conditions on trade elasticities. 
Branson (1983) has made a four-fold classification of countries based on 
their trade structure. First is the "small country" case with perfectly elastic: 
demand and supply curves for exports and imports respectively. Here. 
exchange rate changes have no effect on the terms of trade and desirable 
effects on the trade balance which ensures stability in foreign exchange 
markets. The second is the "semismaU country" case which is small on the 
import side, i.e., with perfect import supply elasticity, but large on the export. 
side with some market power to influence prices. Here, a devaluation. fur 
instance, reduces the terms of trade and, with inadequate demand elasticity of 
exports and imports, can cause J-curve effects and thereby dynamic instability 
in exchange markets. The third is the "rigid country" similar to Crockett. and 
NsouH's (l9n. p.l26) case of very limited substitutability between traded lind 
non-traded goods resulting in inelastic export supply and import demand. Here, 
devaluation does not. affect. the terms of trade as both the export. and import. 
prices move up by t.he same proportion, but worsens an initial trade deficit. The 
last. is the "pure manufacturing country" case where imports are largely 
intermediate inputs with relatively inelastic demand and, exports are 
manufacturing output with a positive supply elasticity. With inelastic demand 
for exports, devaluation in this case worsens trade balance and also leads to 
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deterioration of the terms of trade. 
The conclusion from the above classification of countries is that the 
MarshaU-Lerner (M-U conditions for short-run exchange rate stabHity is 
likely to be satisfied only in the case of smaU countries and therefore 
surprisingly, such countries alone could float. H(lwever. Brans(ln and Kat.5eJi 
point out that the satisfaction of the M-L conditions is (IDly a necessary 
condition foJ' floating and not a sufficient condition. The feasibility (If floating 
also depends on the degree of openness of the economy concerned as explained 
below. 
The openness criterion is borrowed from the literature on optimum 
currency areas. McKinnon (1963) argued thal in the context of a smaUopen 
economy exchange rate flexibility could lead to price instability which could 
threaten the citizens' confidence in domestic currency, leading to substitution 
of foreign currency for domestic currency. Besides. the more open the 
economy the less effective is the exchange rate as an instrument of external 
adjustment, an argument stemming from the absence of money illusion. the 
existence of real wage rigidity and also inelastic domestic demand for imports 
(see Ishiyama. 197), pp.3:50-2). Therefore, although floating is feasible for a 
small country on the grounds of Marshall-Lerner conditions. it is not feasible 
for such a· country on the grounds of openness. 
Reverting to the relationship between financial structure and feasibility of 
floating. it has been argued by Lal (1980. p.33) that the absence in lDf..s of 8· 
full-blown financial system sufficiently integrated internationally per se is 
not an argument against the flexible exchange rate in these countries, but 
rather an argument in favour of carrying out financial reforms thereby 
enabling the floating rate system to operate more efficiently in these countries. 
32 
McKinnon (1979. pp.Z71-Z) also advocates such a deliberate refl>rm in 
developing countries so as to encourage currency convertibility in these 
countries. Crockett and Nsouli (op.cit .. p.l3S) particularly refer to the absence 
of forward markets in LDCs and suggest. that .. for the fast development. of such 
markets government has to give up once and for aU its exchange rate 
stabilization function through pegging the exchange rate. and instead allow the 
inevitable fluctuations for some time in order to offer sufficient. incentives to 
private operators to step in. Black (1976) also admits that free floating requires 
official commitment of considerable resources for "teveiopment of exchange 
markets and related financial markets in LDCs and alsl) the abandl)nment of 
exchange controls. 
There is a lot of merit in the above arguments. but the basic point. is "hether 
LDCs should straightaway encourage external capital mobility in the hope that. it. 
would make the floating exchange rate system feasible. The answer depends 
upon whether private speculation is stabilizing or destablizing. friedman 
(1953) argued that private speCUlation is destabilizing only if the market. is 
consistently dominated by amateurs who buy when price is high and sell when 
it is low. This is countered by saying that rational speculators can buy when 
price is high if they expect it to go further up and sell when it. is ll)w if they 
expect it to go further down and thereby destablize the market. (lIart and Kreps. 
1986. pp. 927-52. for a mathematical proof). 
Perhaps the best picture of the destabilizing effect. of capital mobility is 
provided by the "overshooting" of exchange rates. The overshooting 
phenomenon was originally presented by Dornbusch (1976) as resulting from 
the much slower adjustments to disturbances in goods and labour markets than 
those in financial markets. That is. as the prices in goods and labour markets 
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are sluggish in response to shocks. financial prices bear the brunt. of 
adjustment in the short run by responding much larger than needed in the 
long cun. The experience oC the last one and a half decades of floating has 
shown that overshooting of exchange rates from the levels indicated by 
Cundamentals is not just a. short run occurrence. but could last for several years 
at a. stret.ch leading to 'What is termed as "misalignment". Williamson 09S5a. 
ppA7-SS) points out that misalignments oC exchange rates have occurred not. 
just because of the macroeconomic stances of national authorities but. also 
because of the ineffjciency of fjnancial markets°. 
We may now summarize the arguments for the fea$ibiHty of floating in lDf.::' 
developed so far: the underdeveloped nature of the financial markets and the 
absence of capital mobility preclude the determination of short-run exchange 
rate equjJjbrium through asset markets in LDCs. But the stage of development of 
capital markets is a function of government policy and controls. no'Wever, even 
if LDC governments decide to promote the speedy development of these markets 
and allow freedom to private agents to exercise their portfolio choice including 
foreign assets, that need not provide a sufficient condition for stabHil.ation in 
euhan ge markets as private speculation could very weJl be destabilizin g as it 
could be stabilizing. If we ignore the asset markets. the euhange rate stability 
in the event of floating in these countries depends on whether the MarshaIJ-
Lerner conditions hold or not. We saw that they hold in the ca.~ of small 
countries but not in semi-small countries who possess some market power on 
the export side or any other types of developin g countries. In the case (If small 
countries although they are feasible floaters on the gr(lunds of Marshall-
Lerner conditions they are likely to be so open as to make floating an 
unworkable proposition. 
3.'f Desirability of Pegging in LDCs 
White Branson and KatseH were mainly c(lncerned with the fea!!ibjJity of 
floating in LDCs, other authors analysed the desirability of floating f(lr this 
group of c(luntrie!l. The question addressed in this connection ha!! been, which 
exchange rate regime is best suited for macroeconomic stabHity given the 
origin and nature of shocks the economy i!l frequently subject to? .This is, in 
fact, an extension of the debate on the insulation advantages of alternative 
exchange rate regimes started by Friedman (1953). 
New studies on developed countries have shown how floating exchange rates 
cannotinsulate the domestic economy from aJJ types of stochastic dhturbance!l 
as claimed earlier. (See I.M.F., 1984b. for a brief survey). In the presence (If 
high international capital mobility, it is pointed out, that floating rates cannot 
protect individual countries from foreign macroeconomic poJjcy shifts. for 
example, a foreign monetary expansion could lead to appreciation of d(lmestic 
currency through the channel of capital inflows prompted by a decline in 
foreign interest rate. This would cause a faJl in domestic output through trade 
account. Similarly, a foreign fiscal poHcy change could affect domestic output 
(See Mussa, 1979, for details). Although floating rates have potentiality for 
providing insulation against world price level shocks through appropriate 
changes in exchange rates, they cannot offer effective insulation against 
relative price changes of different classes of traded goods (e.g., oil or food). 
There has been a number of empirical sludies showing that the floating period 
has been characterized by a greater transmission of disturbances among 
industrial countries (see e.g. Swoboda, 1983; De Grauwe and Fralianni, J985; and 
Obstfeld.198j). 
The analysis of short-term macroeconomic stabilization in an open eCI)Qomy 
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has generally been conducted within the frame~·ork. of the Mundell-fleming 
model which in turn is the open economy version of the Keynesian IS-LM 
model. The appropriateness of such a framework. in analysing LDC stabilizatil)n 
problems is questioned. Basically, the lS-LM framework represents demand-
constrained models whereas the typical LDC is supply-constrained. The studies 
on LDCs naturally abstracts from external capital mobility and also assume 
exogenous supply conditions, and within this framework., examine the relative 
performance of fixed and flexible exchange rates in the presence of various 
types of exogenous disturbances. 
There is, however, a· major difference among the various LOC studies which 
relates to the definition of internal balance employed by the different. authors. 
Black (1976) considers the domestic price as the strategic variable to be stablized 
in a· t.wo-good model of traded and nontraded goods. Black demonstr-c1ted that 
flexible exchange rate could insulate the economy from fluctuations in world 
prices of tradables. for example, if there is a. rise in world price relative to 
domestic price, the resulting appreciation of the exchange rate would keep the 
domestic price of tradables intact.. If the exchange rate were pegged, that. "ould 
raise the domestic price of tradables and thereby produce a balance of payments 
surplus leading to reserve growth and monetary expansion. 
However, it was shown by Black that, in the presence of domestic supply 
shock.s for example. a. crop failure, macroeconomic stability couM be preserved 
better under a· fixed exchange rate than under a flexible euhange rate. A fixed 
exchange rate, by holding down the domestic price of tradables~diverts demand 
to tbe tradables sector <including imports) and helps to contain the rise in the 
price of nontradables. If the elC'hange rate were flexible, the resulting 
depreciation, . while raising the price of tradables, would not help in 
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c.ontaining the rise in the price of nontradables. It. may. however. be noted 
here that the effectiveness of the filed exchange rale in preserving internal 
balance presupposes adequate stock of external reserves or the possibility of 
external borrowing. 
Another type of exogenous shock which is of crucial importance to LDf..s is 
adverse shifts in the terms of trade arising from either a decline in expl)rt. 
prices or a rise in import prices. The relevant case is when import demand is 
inelastic. In such a case. Black showed that a pegged exchange rate regime is 
superior in the face of sudden movements in the terms of trade. It. minimizes 
the effect on domestic prices by keeping the exchange rate stable. Under 
flexible exchange rates a fall in the terms of trade. for instance. through a rise 
in import prices. would be translated into a rise in domestic prices via. exchange 
rale depreciation. 
Lipschitz (1978) treats real absorption. assumed to be a function of real 
output and excess real money balances. as the crucial variable to be stabilized. 
He does not. however. make a distinction between tradables and nontradables as 
Black did. but considers a simple tradable good model in which output is 
exogenously determined. The author examines two types of transitory shocks 
facing the economy: domestic supply and domestic money demand shocks. 
Lipschitz finds that in the face of output shocks. a pegged exchange rate regime 
is superior in stabilizing real absorption. The argument is that in a fixed rate 
regime. real absorption can be maintained through a trade deficit financed by 
foreign reserves changes whereas under a flelible rate regime. absorptil)Q wilt 
be limited to the level of output. A shock from the demand for money side. on 
the other hand. needs a· flexible exchange rate to preserve domestic absorption. 
for example. a rise in real demand for money brings out an appreciation of the 
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exchange rate which raises the supply of real money balances through a 
vllluation effect on the foreign elchllnge component. of money supply. and 
thereby eliminates the initial monetary disequilibrium (see lipschitz op. cit .• 
pp. 653-6. for details). 
flanders and Helpman (1978) are concerned with the determination of the 
choice between the two polar alternatives of a rigidly pegged exchange rate and 
a. perfectly flexible exchange rate for a small open country producing both 
tradables and nontradables. Take the case when wages and prices of 
nontradables are flexible. Then. if there are external disturbances in the form 
of changes in foreign prices of traded goods, a flexible exchange rate could 
maintain domestic price stability and thereby enhance the "moneyness" of the 
domestic currency whereas a fixed exchange rate results in price instability. It. 
may be noted. however. that this conclusion runs counter to what Md:innon 
and Branson & Kalseli stated? But this result is consistent with that of Black. 
Now let us consider the more interesting case where money ,rages and 
nontraded goods prices are rigid downwards. Here as well. Flanders and 
Helpman demonstrate that a flexible exchange rate ensures the preservation of 
price stability in the face of changes in foreign prices, up,rard or downward. 
and in that. sense exchange rate flexibility compensates for the absence of 
wage-price flexibility. If the exchange rate is pegged, the results depend upon 
the direction of the foreign price change. If the foreign prices rL~ they are 
transmitted home. If the foreign prices fall. under fixed exchange rate. the 
price of traded goods falls but the price of nontraded goods and money ,rages 
remain constant. If monetary policy is directed toward preserving balance of 
payments eqUilibrium. that will result in unemployment. If monetary policy is 
directed toward maintaining full employment. that would adversely affect. 
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balance of payments. This is the familiar dilemma situation of conflict between 
internal and external balance. 
The above theoretical discussion indicates that the nature of transitory 
shocks fa.cing the economy is an important determinant. of the optimal 
exchange rate regime. Shocks are generally categorized as either real or 
monetary. If real shocks (e.g., shocks originating from domestic supply I)r 
external terms of trade) predominate, a· pegged exchange rate regime is 
superior; if monetary shocks (e.g., shocks arising from foreign price level. 
domestic demand for or supply of money) predominate, a flexible exchange rate 
regime is superior8. The desirability of a pegged exchange rate regime as 
opposed to a flexible regime in LDCs stems from the fact that. these countries are 
characterized by the predominance of real shocks, particularly arising from 
domestic supply and the terms of trade. 
Domestic supply shocks occur in LDCs mainly due to harvest failures. A 
general harvest failure could affect either a nontrac.fable or importable good 
(e.g., foodgrains) or an important exportable good (e.g., tea, coffee and cI)(oa). 
In tbe case of the former, a pegged exchange rate regime stabilizes the domestic 
price;' /a. Black and domestic consumption a /a. Lipschitz. In a number of LOCs 
an agricultural supply failure normally triggers off inflation in the economy 
quite ~trongly through its impact on expectations9. In such a conLext, a Hxed 
exchange rate regime would help to counter inflation through the cushi(lJl of 
trade balance. A flexible exchan ge rate ~stem, in contrast, would 'Worsen the 
domestic inflationary situation by a depreciation making the domestic price of 
all imports go high. 
In the face of domestic supply shocks affecting the production of an 
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important exportable good, the case for 8· pegged exchange rate regime becomes 
even stronger. As in the case of an essential consumption good, here too a fixed 
exchange rate helps in minimizing the instability of domestic price and 
domestic consumption. A flexible exchange rate while precluding the 
maintenance of internal balance does not help towards the objective of external 
balance either. This is so because of the impossibility of eliciting supply 
response with exchange rate changes in primary producing countries subject. 
to a general harvest failure. 
Turning to the terms of trade shock arising from price fluctuations in 
particular importahies (e.g., oil or foodgrains) or exportables as distinguished 
from fluctuations in the world price level. a flexible exchange rate fails to 
provide insulation to the domestic economy since it cannot alter relative prices 
at ~uch a disaggregated level. Provided such a disturbance is temporaryJO, a 
fixed exchange rate regime with the provision for financing of deficit on 
current account either through dishoarding of foreign reserve~ or foreign 
borrowing or a combination of the two is better in the sense that such a policy 
at least prevents further changes in domestic price and consumpHon. This is 
particularly significant for primary product exporters subject to price shocks 
influenced by periods of boom and slump in industrial countries. 
The above discussion while applicable to many LOCs. it needs to be 
emphasised ~hat,"~ is not applicable with the same force to aU UM.~. A 
disHncHon has to be made as between primary producing but f(lod imporung 
nations and those LJ)(~s which are manufacturing but food self-sufficient. Let us 
caU the former category of LDCs the 'pure LDCs' and the latter category the 
not 
'manufacturing LDCs'. The ab(lve analysis js1... quite relevant to the 
manufacturing LDes. India is a typical example of the manufacturing LJ)(~. She 
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is categorized by the IMf as a 'Manufacturing Product Exporting LOC' with the 
share of manufacturers much above the cut-off point of 50 per (ent of 
aggregate exports. Besides, the country is self-sufficient in fOI)dgrains 
production and also do not require food imports in the event of even a massive 
crop failure. 
In the context of manufacturing LDes, if a general crop failure occurs 
affecting the production of importable foodgrains and exportable primary 
commodities, the appropriateness of a· fixed exchange rate is not that evident. 
Firstly, the release of foodgrains from stocks within the country, from the 
government buffer stocks, could minimize consumption decline and hold down 
the price rise. Secondly, the fall in primary commodity exports could be 
compensated by a rise in manufactured exports if the exchange rate depreciates. 
The argument relating to the terms of trade shocks alsl) has less force in 
manufacturing LDes as, with the low share of primary commodity exports, the 
impact on the economy of a fall in export price of primary products is much less 
in these countries. However, in these countries, sudden rises in import. prices 
which are temporary can be tackled better with a· fixed exchange rate than a· 
flexible exchange rate. 
To sum up the discussion on the desirability of a pegged exchange rate 
regime for the LDC: domestic supply shocks due to harvest failures and the 
terms of trade fluctuations arising from either a. rise in import. prices or a fall 
in export prices constitute the major type of exogeneous disturbances 
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confronting LDes. In that context, a fixed exchange rate regime is preferred to 
a· flexible rate regime. A fixed exchange rate with the provision for financing 
the temporary balance of payments gap arising from such disturbances, could 
enable these countries to maintain price stability and preserve domestic 
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absorption. In this connection. it is pointed out. that the IMf's Compensatory 
financing Facility (err) for export shortfalls and for excess cereal imports and 
the European Community's Stabex scheme are. in fact. meant. to help nations to 
tide over temporary exogenous shocks of the type mentioned above by providng 
short.-term balance of payments support. as well as assistance to stabilize 
domestic absorption (Wickham. 1985, p.268). We have, however, noted that the 
st.rength of the above argument for the fixed exchange rate regime for LDf..s is 
considerably reduced when we consider the small group of t~ for whom 
manufacturing product exports constitute a large portion of total exports and 
who are self-sufficient in food production requiring no import of foodgrnins in 
the event of a huge crop loss. 
In the above discussion, we have assumed away the economic costs of 
exchange rate instability resulting from a· flexible exchange rate regime. The 
neglect of this cost of flexible exchange rates is quite evident in the literature 
on optimal exchange rate regime. This is perhaps due to the majority academic 
belief that prevailed on the eve of generalized floating that. the flexible 
exchange rate system would result in smoothly adjusting exchange rntes 
responding only to changes in underlying economic conditions (johnson. 1972. 
pp.20S-IU. Experience. on the other hand. proved that floating exchange ntes 
are associated with very high short-term volatility of exchange rates (see I.M.F., 
19Mb). The econometric studies on the impact of short-term exchange nte 
instability on trade flows particularly in developed countries. however. have 
not produced conclusive evidence although there are some individual studies 
:!howing the evidence of depressing effects on trade t J. The main explanation:! 
offered for the lack of a nrm relationship between exchange rate instability 
and international trade are: (1) the recourse to substantial hedging in forward 
markets; (j1) the relatively inelastic short-term suppJies (If exports; (jjj) the 
diversification of trade into different. currency blocs; and (iv) the risk 
reduction through diversificatilm of the asset. portfolios of international 
trading firms (see McCulloch, 1983 and Willeu, 1986). While aU these factors 
have been operating in most of the developed countries, the importance I>f these 
factors except (ii) is much le~ evident in LDf"lZ. As a resu1t, exchange rate 
volatiHty accompanying flexible exchange rates has been much more 
pr(lblematic in LDCs than in developed countries. The high cost (If exchange 
rate inslabWty on exports is demonstrated for India quite clearly in Chapter 9. 
This is yet another argument for the desirabHity of a pegged exchange rate 
system for LDCs. 
The exchange rate instability argument. for a fixed exchange rate regime in 
LDCs is further buttressed by the lack of a mature and internationally 
integrated financial market in these countries. In the absence of sound and 
externally integrated financial markets. flexible exchange rates are likely to be 
much more unstable than otherwise. This is clear from our earlier discussitm. 
There is yet another aspect. to the relevance of a pegged regime in LDf'-s. One 
of the major reasons why floating became inevitable for developed nations "as 
due to the progressive lining of controls on capital movements among them. 
When there is free movement of capital across countries, there is also the 
danger of destabilizing speCUlation in the midst of ""hich pegged exchange rates 
are virtually impossible. In the context of most of LDCs, on the other hand. 
capital mobility is quite restricted with the maintenance of trade and exchange 
controls. This is admittedly not an ideal situation. However, this fact besh>,·s on 
these countries the capacity to maintain a pegged exchange rate regime. Thus 
we may state that, whereas in developed countries a fixed exchange rate regime 
is infeasible due to capital mobility, it is feasible in most. LDCs due to the 
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existence of capit.a.l controls. 
3.5 Optimal Peg for LDCs 
After having examined the infeasibility of floating and the desirability of 
pegging for LDCs, the next issue to be considered is the choice of the peg, i.e .• 
whether the peg should be based on a single currency or should it. be based on a· 
currency composite. Again, if the choice is in favour of a· multi-currency peg, 
the question arises as to the choice of currencies and the principle by 'Which 
weights are assigned to the chosen currencies. This is the issue of optional peg 
for LDCs. 
The choice of optimal peg is to be conceptually distinguished from the 
choice bet.ween floating and pegging which was discussed in the previous 
sections. Williamson (982) makes the distinction dear when he says, "There 
appears to be wide agreement. t.hat independent floating is either infeasible or 
undesirable for most developing countries, ...... In a world where the major 
currencies are floating against one another, however, the questi.)n of exchange 
rate policy is not solved by resolving to peg rather than to float; it is als.) 
necessary to decide to what to peg" (p.39). When we keep the choice I)f peg 
separate from the choice of float versus peg, then it. implies that the 
considerations that influence the former are also different. from those that 
determine the latter. 
The idea. of a· single-currency peg has been known since the 1930s when the 
world was divided into various currency blocs after the breakd.)'Vtrn of the 
international gold standard. The majority of nations generally tied their home 
currency to one of the major currencies such as sterling, the dollar or the 
French franc depending on the political and economic relationship they had 
with the U.K .. the U.S. or France respectively. In contrast, the post-World War II 
period up to 1971 based on Bretton Woods par value system particulary since the 
establishment of convertibility of major currencies offered a multilateral 
framework. As a consequence, most LDCs diversified their external 
transactions considerably. In that. context. when the world's majl>r currencies 
fll)ated in the early 1970s, the choice of an appropriate exchange rate system for 
LDr..s was not as simple as in 1930s when international economic relations were 
much less diversified. Under conditions of trade and financial diversification 
and flexible exchange rates among major currencies, pegging to n. major 
currency would imply floatng against all other currencies which are 
themselves not pegged to that major currency. This in turn results in 
fJuctuatjon~ in the home currency'~ effective exchange rateB, i.e .• the average 
of the bilateral exchange rate~, which ha!l nothing to do with the halance (If 
payment positions of the home country. In short, the mu)ti-cunency peg (lr 
the b~ket peg i~ suggested a!I the optjmal exchange rate regime for a ~maJJ 
country as an instrument to avoid the unneceS!lary and often harmful 
variation, in j~ effective exchan ge rate (Diaz- Alejandro, 197j). 
3.5.1 The Early Origin of B~ket Peg 
The origin of the idea of a b~ket peg can perhaps be traced back to M~halJ 
(J887) who recommended a ~mmetaJ1ic standard as a hetter alternative to the 
pure gold. silver and bimetallic standards. Marshall suggested such a monetary 
standard in the context of the rapidly falling gold value of sHver. Harrod (J%9. 
1'.21) explained Marshall's scheme as consisting "not of a certain weight (If gold. 
not of a certain weight of silver. not of certain weight of gold or certain weight 
of silver, but of a certain weight of gold plus a certain weight of silver". The 
idea behind the ~mmetaJ1jc standard was that in the context (If the faJJjng value 
of silver against gold, Hnking a country's currency with an average value of 
th, .. t 
gold and silver would produce a more stable system than based on either gold or 
A 
silver. 
The world monetary system did not evolve the way Marshall v{t)uld have 
liked. However. in the early 1970s when world's major currencies moved to a 
flexible exchange rate system. several developing countries began to accept 
multi-currency pegging systems14 which in fact. constituted a return to the 
spirit of the Marshallian symmetallism.15 
3.'.2 The Rationale of the Basket Peg 
A basket peg involves the currencies of the major trading partners of the 
home country of which one is chosen as the numeraire which usually is the 
currency of the most important trading partner. The underlying logic of the 
operation of the basket peg is as foHows: if the home currency price is moved 
in t.he same direction and extent as the movement in the average price of 
foreign currencies. both the former and the latter measured in terms of t.he 
selected numeraire which is usually the intervention currency. then the 
externally imposed disturbances due to third-country currency fluctuations on 
the home economy is completely eliminated. This is expressed algebraically 
below: 
n 
• • 
e.. I wifj 
i=l 
where e • home currency price in terms of numeraire 
fi .. price of ith foreign currency in terms of numeraire 
wi " weight given to the ith currency ( Iw.=. 1 )16 
hi 
n • number of currencies in the basket 
• indicate percentage change. 
Thus pegging to a currency basket implies keeping the domestic currency price 
of the arbitrarily chosen numeraire on a path given by the weighted average of 
the foreign currency prices of the numeraire. This in turn leads to the 
stabilization of an appropriately defined effective exchange rate of the home 
country. 
What do the stabilization of effective exchange rate really mean? 
Unfortunately. there is no agreement in literature on this issue. The basic 
disagreement is on the precise concept of effective exchange rate thal is to be 
stabilized by the pegging. The lack of consensus on the underlying objective of 
the optimal peg for the LOC17 is brought out in Williamson's survey mentioned 
earlier. We reproduce it below in Table 3.1 in roughly the same form given by 
Williamson with some updating. 
Table 3.1. first of aU. indicates that every author except Connolly has the 
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stabilization of effective exchange rate (EER). either nominal or real. as the 
prime objective of optimal peg. But the authors think differently about what is 
supposed to be achieved by stabilizing EER. Except. Black and Connolly, every 
other author proposed the possibility of alternative objectives that can be 
served by the basket peg. Some of the objectives suggested are the stabilization 
of relative prices of traded goods and thus resource alloutil)n (Black and 
Lipschitz), balance of trade or current account· (Crockett and Nsouli. Flanders 
and Helpman. Lipschitz and Sundararajan, and Branson and KatselH, output or 
real income (Crockett and Nsouli. and Flanders and Helpman). income 
distribution (Lipschitz) and the terms of trade (Lipschitz and Sunderarajan. and 
Branson and KatselD. The dissimilarity in objectives assumed by varil)us 
authors is also reflected in the weighting systems recommended by them for the 
basket peg. This is hardly an ideal state of affairs. This makes the task of PI)1icy 
makers very difficult. There is a need to examine the issue qq IJQf1J in order to 
decide who is right. Fortunately, W iUiamson does precisely that. 
Williamson straightaway rejects three objectives of the choice of peg 
mentioned in the literature as "unambiguously erroneous". They are the 
stabilization of the level of real income and the terms of trade and the 
minimization of the rate of inflation. The argument. for rejecting the first tVI) 
criteria. is that their acceptance would lead to unnecessarily throving away 
potential windfalls that comes in the form of rise in real income through rise in 
the terms of trade. That would involve, in the words of Williamson. cutting dovn 
the peaks without raising the floors which is not a sensible thing to dl). 
Table 3.1 
Objectives of LDC Exchange Rate Policy and Recomm.ended Pegs in the Literature 
Author(s) 
1. Black (1976) 
2. Crockett and Nsouli (1977) 
3. Flanders and Helpman (1979) 
4. Lipschitz ( 1979) 
:So Bacha (1979) 
Suggested Objective 
Minimize yariance of relath-"e prices 
of traded goods by stabilizing 
effective exchange rate (Ern) 
Stabilize balance of trade and output 
by stabilizing EER 
0) Minimize variance of the balance 
of trade by stabiHzin g the Ern with 
Multilateral Exchange Rate Model 
(MER~D-type weights. An improve-
ment in balance of trade is also 
envisaged as an additional objectiYe. 
(ii) Minimize variance of real income 
Minimize variations in resource 
allocation and income distribution, 
by stabilizing real effective exchange 
rate (REm) 
Stabilize REER in order to avoid 
externally imposed instability. 
Recommended Peg 
Peg to a basket with weights based on 
direction of total trade in goods and 
services. Elasticity weights are 
suggested for country with market power 
Peg to import-weighted basket. SDR peg is 
suggested as a good proxy for import-
'U"eighted basket. 
Peg to an elasticity-weighted basket. An 
increase in trade balance over time is 
brought about by increasing the \\o"eights 
of currencies expected to depreciate. 
Pe g to a basket with large weights for 
export markets and small and even 
negative weights for import sources. 
Pe g to a basket with weights based 011 
currency denomination of total trade 
when export and import-competing 
sectors are of similar size. 
Basket peg of some sort. 
.b 
(Xl 
Author(s) 
6. Lipschitz and Sundararaja.n (1980a .. 
19S0b. 1982) 
7. Branson and Katseli (1980 
8. Branson and Katseli (1982) 
9. Connolly (1982, 1983) 
Suggested Objective 
Stabilize REER ~dth the aim of 
stabilizing the terms of trade or 
trade balan ce 
Consider stabilizing EER with the aim 
of stabiliziAg the terms of trade, 
relatiYe prices of traded goods or 
trade balan ce . 
Consider stabilizing REER with the aim 
of stabilizing the terms of trade,relative 
price of traded goods or trade balaAce. 
Minimize the level and variability of 
inflation 
Source: Based on Williamson (1982), Table 1, p. '0. as updated. 
Recommended Peg 
Peg to elasticitj··",·eighted basket modified 
by covariance between relative prices 
and exchange rates 
Peg to basket with weights appropriate to 
the respective objective determined as 
special cases from a ~IERM-tY'pe model. 
Pe g to basket with weights depending on 
the particular objective. The basket 
weights are derived as special cases of 
~IERM-type model. 
Peg to trade-weighted basket. However, 
the retention of single U.S. dollar peg is 
advised for Latin American countries 
mainly to avoid the jolt to confidence that 
could occur with the break of the histor-
ical tie with U.S. dollar and also due to the 
better performance of U.S. with regard to 
inflation. 
~ 
<0 
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The minimization of inflation as the crucial objective of a small country 
exchan ge rate policy. su ggested by Connolly is. in fact. the application (If the 
classic "discipline argument" in favour of a fixed exchange rate. ie .. jf you 
maintain parity with respect to the currency (If an(llher country. that wouJd 
necessitate the maintenance of a rate of inflation in home country neither 
above nor below that in the other country. But the argument against such a 
poHcy is that it leads to an avoidable sacrifice of domestic policy autonomy to 
choose whatever level of infJation the country prefers1S. A better JloJjcy 
strategy would be to decide the choice of the peg based on other considerations 
and accept a change in the level of the peg in order to neutralize the infJation 
differential between home country and its trading partners. On the other 
hand. if it is felt that the resulting home infJation is larger than the desired. 
then the country can subject itself to external discipline. if it so beHeves. by 
effecting an appreciation against the chosen peg. 
After rejecting some of the objectives of the optimal peg adyanced in the 
literature. WjJJiamson suggests that the precise motivation for the (Iptimal peg is 
the preservatjon of "internal balance". However. the proper deHnition (If 
internal balance depends upon the true model of the econ(lmy. To quote 
WilHamson. "In a Keynesian fixprice variable (lutput model. extended to 
inc(lrporate an expectations-augmented PhHJips curve. internal balance can be 
identified with the natural rate of unem{lloyment modified by some margin 
adequate to induce a desired change in the inflation rate. .. ... In the dependent 
economy flexprice full employment modeL internal balance is represented by a 
constant level of output of non traded goods ...... In both cases it is undesirabJe to 
de{lart from internal balance in response to temporary disturbances." (.,.54) 
fluctuations in third-currency exchange rates associated with the generalized 
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floating of major currencies constitutes-a. rant.II)m shock. disrupting the home 
country's internal balance. The peg has to be so chosen as tl) insulate the 
economy from this disturbance. This can be done either through minimizing 
the instabilty of the relative prices of traded goods and ,therefore, the resource 
allocation as envisaged by Black and Lipschitz. or through stabilizing output. 
and employment as envisged by Crockett and Nsouli, depending on one's view of 
the economy under consideration. 
The motivation of the choice of a. peg described above need to be dearly 
distinguished from that associated with a change in the value of the peg. A shift 
in the value at which a currency is pegged is to' be directed toVt'ards the 
objective of "external balance". A change in the value of the peg could be 
envisaged at two levels: the first.ldth a view to just. accommodating an inflation 
differential between home and abroad and the second in order to proml)te 
balance of payments adjustment. The former would preserve the constancy of 
real effective exchange rate. and the lauer would involve a change in real 
effective exchange rate intended towards correcting a· balance of payments 
disequilibrium. 
Even if we agree with the above prescription made by Williamson, there still 
remains two more issues as regards the assignment of weights to the various 
currencies in the optimal peg. firstly, whether the weights should be trade-
based or elasticity-based? The considered opinion of W iUiamson is that 
t.heoretically the currency weights should be based on balance of trade 
elasticities computed from a multHateral exchange rate model (If the IMf type.J9 
However. the practical difficulties in adopting such a weighting ~stem is S<I 
huge due to data inadequacies in LDCs that trade weights are the best that are 
feasible. A further point is that it is the total trade weights that are appropriate 
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a.nd there appears to be no justification for adopting either impl)ct ,'eights 
alone as suggested by Crockett and NsouH or export weights alone. 
The other major issue relating to weighting of currencies in the optimal peg 
is whether it should be based on the direction of trade or currency of 
denomination in trade. This issue is particularly signficant in the context of 
LDC trade being invoiced largely in a few international currencies like the U.S. 
dollar and sterling. It might seem that the currenrl share is more appropriate 
than the trade share since the former determines the current. domestic 
currency value of past trade cont.racts. That is, the currency denomination of 
trade is what matters in measuring the immediate impact. of currency 
fluctuations on the domestic currency value of foreign payments and receipts. 
However, the more relevant consideration for trade decisions is the prices that. 
can be struck for present contracts for future delivery and not the current 
prices obtained from past contracts. The former depends much more on the cost· 
and price situation in home country in comparison with that in the competing 
partner country. The trade competitiveness relates to goods from and b> the 
currency country and not to goods of the currency denomination. Therefore, 
currency weighting in a. basket peg should be on the basis of the directil)n of 
d h h h ... 20 tra e rat er t an on t e currency Ulvolclng . 
However, it is an important question whether a singJe-currency peg j~ 
preferable to a basket peg for countries whose external transaction, are 
dominated by a single country, In such countries, the basket peg, alth(,ugh 
stabilizes the effective exchange rate, would imply variation in the most 
important bilateral rate of the home country, Frankel (197) sugge~ed a 
mea..~\lre which he called the "effective variation" of exchange rates which j~ 
the trade-weighted average variability of individual bilateral rate" Using such 
S3 
a. measure, Frankel conducted simulation exercises with historical data and 
compared the single-currency peg with the basket peg. They indicated that. in 
several cases, single-currency pegs minimized effective variation rather than 
the basket peg. These results may suggest that a basket. peg need nl)t. be 
universally applicable and, in certain LDCs, a single-currency peg could be 
optimal. 
The optimality of single-currency peg based on the minimization of 
"effective variation" of exchange rates can be countered on the grounds of 
'trade diversion'. That is, even if the LOC's present. trade is highly CI)ncentrated 
with a· single country, the continued peg with the currency of that country 
would come in conflict with the highly desirable policy objective I)f 
geographical diversification of that country's trade. (See Joshi, 1979, p,Z«7). 
While it is true that the stability of bilateral rates are more important. for 
individual traders, the stability of tbe effective exchange rate is important. for 
t.he trading sector as a whole. As stressed by Black (1976. pp. 13-H), the choice 
bet.ween trade and production of nontraded goods is an important one in the 
ll)ng run which is influenced by the stability of the prices of traded goods in 
general. In that context, the stability of the effective exchange rate by 
protecting the profitability of traded goods sector in relation to the nontnlded 
goods sector from third currency fluctuations. eliminates the anti-trade bias of 
currency fluctuations. 
3.5.3 A Crawling Basket Peg for LDCs? 
The earlier discussion of the optimal exchange rate regime for tbe LDC 
yielded the conclusion that a basket peg is suited to most of these countries in 
normal circumstances. However, the Underlying economic circumstances 
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underg.) changes. for example, there could occur upward shifts in cost.s and 
prices in the home economy relative to tbose in the trading partner/c.ompetitor 
countries or there could be a· large permanent deterioration in the terms .)f 
trade, like the oil shocks. The hike in domestic costs and prices lowers the home 
country's external competitiveness and thereby generates a trade deficit.. The 
adverse terms of trade directly involve a trade deficit. Both these developments 
'Would necessitate a change in the value at. which tbe domestic currency is 
pegged in order to preserve the external balance of tbe economy. However, 
there arises tbe question whether tbe change in the value of the peg should be 
brought about in a large sudden jump as in tbe 'adjustable peg' of the Bretton 
Woods system or in small gradual steps in what is called the 'crawling peg'. 
A major difficulty with the adjustable peg was that, parity changes under 
that system used to be unduly delayed. Therefore, the extent of adjustment 
required grows so large that it would result in major economic, social and 
political dislocation when the adjustment is eventually undertaken. The 'aura of 
catadysm,Zl atlached to a large discrete devaluation is illustrated in the study 
by Cooper (1986) of 23 developing country devaluations22 , In this re~pect, the 
crawling peg offers a more desirable alternative guaranteeing cri!;js-free 
exchange rate adjustment. 
The idea. of a 'crawling peg' was first suggested by Keynes in 1922 as part. of 
the scheme to restore the international gold standard after World War 1. Keynes 
'Wanted the stabilization of every nation's exchange rate at the prevailing level, 
but advocated for those currencies which depredated less than 20 per c·ent from 
the pre-war levels, the possibility of a gradual appreciation to their pre-wa.r 
parities. (See j.M.K., XVlI, Ch. 16). The scheme for exchange rate adjustment in 
small steps rather than in a sudden sizable discrete step was christened the 
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'crawling peg' by W iUiamson (t %5) and, it received consit.ierllble academic 
attention in late I%Os and early 1970s when the reform of the international 
monetary system was under active consideration (see Williamson, 1981b, pp. 3 -
30). 
It is worth focussing on tWI) versions of the crawling peg. The first. is called 
a 'PPP - guided crawling peg' in which the peg is altered in order tt) neutralize 
the inflation differential between the home country and its trading 
partners/competitiors and the second, a 'real crawl' in which the 'real peg' is 
altered in order to promote balance of payments adjustment (see Williamson, 
1981c, pp xiii-xiv). Although the post-Keynesian proposal of the crawling peg 
was put forward with a view to facilitating balance of payments adjustment 
among developed industrial countries, such a regime has been in fad ad')pted at 
some time mostly by semi-industrialized developing countries (e.g., Chile, 
Colombia, Brazil. Korea, Uruguay Argentina, Israel. Peru and Portugal.). These 
countries have been prone tt) high inflation and crawling pegs have been used 
by them principally to ward off adverse effects of high inflation on external 
balance. 
It looks attractive and simple to recommend that an LDC generally [I)llow a 
'PPP-guided crawling peg' and a 'real crawl' when there is a· need to promote 
balance of payments adjustment. Such a policy is strongly advocated by 
Williamson. But when should a real crawl start? Should the country wait until 
a. substantial deficit is evidenced in its current account or should it start just. 
when a marginal deficit occurs? Kenen (975) conducted a simulation study tt) 
examine the relative performance of alternative indicators of external balance 
like reserve changes and deviations of reserve levels from a norm, for guiding 
a· crawling peg and promote balance of payments alijustment. Branson and 
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Ma.cedl) (1982) generalized Kenen's study in an optimun control framewI>rk. by 
combining the above two external balance indicators and derived optimal 
weight for each of them. 
The above discussion is on the assumptil>n that the crawling peg is operated 
on the basis of certain objective rules, namely, inflation differential or some 
external balance indicators. This is called a 'formula-based crawling peg' and is 
distinguished from a 'discretionary crawling peg' which is based 1m 
administrative decision. (See Williamson, 1981b. p.-t). In the laUer case, the 
authorities dl> not reveal any criteria in advance, but manage the system in an 
arbitrary fashion. Is there any justification for the provision or disueti,>nary 
power to the authorities in the management of a crawling peg? 
A rule-based crawling peg work.s well when monetary disturbances 
dominate the domestic economy. This is clear from our earlier discussion. hr 
elllmple. a hig~:inflation in the domestic economy than abroad will not be 
allowed to worsen trade balance since the crawling peg based on a PPP-rule 
ensure a smooth depreciation of the domestic currency, But such an exchange 
rate regime is not suited when real disturbances occur. Provided the real 
disturbances are not permanentZ3, a fixed peg is preferable. The rationale of 
this conclusion is demonstrated formally by Black. (1981) and empirically by 
Genberg (1980, The substantive point emerging from these studies is that. a 
rule-based crawling peg is not preferable under all circumstances and there is 
a strong case for operating a 'decision-variant crawling peg'. 
However attractive the idea of a crawling basket peg may appear to be, its 
relevance for highly open LDCs cannot be taken for granted. We saw earlier in 
Section 3.Z. how a flexible exchange rate regime is not feasible for small open 
57 
LDr..s. The argument could be valid in the case of a· managed flexible exchange 
cate regime tOl). For example, when the exchange rate is continuously udjusted 
downwards Cor a country whose inflation runs above the world level. will it. not. 
lead to a· vicious circle of inflation - depreciation - inflation? Such a possibility 
is st.rong for highly open LDCs with widespread indexation. In our view, the 
efficacy of a crawling basket peg depends on two factors: firstly, the feedback 
effect on domestic price of a nominal depreciation, and secondly, the te-dde 
balance effect of a real depreciation. Prior to the adoption of a crawling basket. 
system in a specific country, we should make sure that. the above effects are 
favourable in that country. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
We may sum up the theoretical aspects of the choice as an LOC exchange rate 
regime: floating is infeasible in most LDCs, firstly because of the 
underdevell>ped nature of their financial markets and the lack of integration .>C 
these markets with world capital markets, secondly because the trade elasticities 
in some of these countries are not sufficient to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner 
conditil)ns in the short-run leading to J-curve effects and, finaUy because of 
the highly open nature of many of these countries. On the other hand, pegging 
is desirable in these countries not only due to the predominance of transitory 
real shocks but also due to the high cost of short-term exchange rate instability 
in these countries. While pegging is infeasible for developed countries due to 
high capital mobility, it is workable in LDCs with exchange controls. 
In the context of reasonably diversified trade and financial reiaHI>ns, 8. 
basket peg with weights based on 'direction of trade' shares would protect. the 
internal balance of LDCs from disturbances caused by fluctuations in exchange 
rates amongst the world's major currencies. For some countries with highly 
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concentrated trade with a single country although a single-currency peg 
minimizes the average variability of bilateral rates ("effective variatil)Q"), such 
a policy clashes with the objective of geographical trade diversification. 
Besides, the fundamental choice between trade and production for the domestic 
market is influenced by stability of the effective exchange rate and nl)t. by 
stability of any single bilateral rate and hence a basket peg is preferable to a 
single-currency peg. 
A change in the value of the peg is needed when domestic inflation is faster 
than t.he inflation in the country's trade partners/competitors lest. it. should 
adversely affect the country's external balance. A change in t.he value of t.he 
peg is also necessary, for example, when the economy is shocked by a· real 
disturbance which is permanent in nature. However, a change in the value at. 
which the currency is pegged through t.he orthodox 'adjustable peg' melhl)d is 
considered undesirable because of its crisis-ridden nature. A 'crav.Fling peg' is 
suggested as a crisis-free alternative for effecting exchange rate adustments. 
A crawling peg directed towards continuously preserving the constancy of 
t.he real effective exchange rate and a change in the real effective exchange 
rate t.hrough a 'real crawl' when there is a well-recognised need for promoting 
. payments adjustment are advocated as practical guides to LOC exchange rate 
policy. However, the efficacy of such a policy depends upon the domestic price 
effect of a nominal depreciation on the one hand, and the trade balance effect. 
of a real depreciation, on the other. It is also noted that in the face of transitory 
real shocks, there is a good case for a discretionary crawling peg rather than a. 
rule-based crawling peg. 
The synthesis of t.he various contributions to the theoretical literature t)n 
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LDC exchange rate regime has been able to provide a clear guideline as to what 
the LDCs should really seek from an exchange rate regime. An exchange rate 
regime determines the day -to-day n~inal exchange rate. The regime has tt) be 
established once for all with a view to protecting the economy's internal 
balance from the disturbance of third currency fluctuations. If the exchange 
rate regime is instituted on this basic consideration. that will not be subject to 
sudden changes due to factors such as shifts in the value of the dollar and 
inflation as we saw in Chapter 2. Given an optimal exchange rate regime which 
is a basket peg for LDCs. the exchange rate policy has to be directed towards 
preserving external balance. This is carried out at two levels. firstly. when the 
domestic rate of infltion differs from that abroad. the value of the peg has to be 
adjusted to compensate for the inflation differential for fear that it should upset 
the country's external balance. Secondly. when there emerges a dearly 
perceived external disequilibrium the value of the peg has to be changed again. 
a. 
this time by more than the infltion differential. to help promote the balance ,.. 
payments adjustment. 
Our review of LDC exchange rate practices in Chapter 2 showed that. despite 
the general shift away from single-currency pegs to basket pegs and more 
flexible arrangements. the single-currency pegs continue to be the most 
important exchange rate regime of LDCs as a whole. If we count the fixed and 
flexible24 single-currency pegs together. they constituted "i8 per cent of all 
LDCs in June 1985. The share rose to 52 per cent in March 1988. The majority of 
single-currency pegs are dollar pegs which we saw to be unstable. their 
number decreasing when the dollar appreciates and increasing when the dollar 
depreciates in a cyclical manner. There are also a fairly constant number of 
LDCs pegging to the French franc. The existence of a large number of dollar 
peggers is explained by the predominant role of dollar as a vehicle and 
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invoicing currency.2S However. it is made clear in the literature that this is no 
sufficient grounds for pegging solely to the dollar. The french franc pegs were 
explained in terms of the prevalence of a French franc zone in Africa with a 
common currency. the CF A franc. for several countries which are convertible 
into French franc at a fixed rate by the French treasury. Whatever be the other 
benefits of such an arrangement for the participating countries. the peg with 
the French franc is also not justified by the theory of LOC exchange rute 
regimes. 
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[ootootes: Cupter 3 
1. Johnson (1972) is an exception. He stated that for the large number of 
"small and relatively narrowly specilized" countries. a fixed exchange 
regimf11.s preferable to flexible regime. 
2. However. there is a group of nations in the Western Europe ""hich follow 
joint float under the European Monetary System which came into 
operation since 1979. 
3. An excellent discussion of the state of the debate on fixed versus flexible 
exchange rate is given in Johnson (1972). However. it may be noted that 
the major nations moved to a floating system not out of conviction for the 
contemporary academic arguments but rather due to the absence (If any 
other viable alternative. 
-l. Friedman (1953) claimed that the flexible exchange rales would provide 
insulation from external monetary shocks whereas later writers in the 
1960s emphasized the insulation property of the flexible exchange rates 
with respect to both monetary and real shocks originating abroad. See 
Artus and Young (1979). 
5. There is now an extensive volume of writings examining the 
performance of floating in comparison with the previous arguments in 
favour of such a system. See for example. McCulloch (1983). Dunn Jr 
(1983).I.M.F. C1984b). Obstfeld 0985) and Crockett and Goldstein (1987). 
6. The evidence of exchange market inefficiency is provided firstly. by the 
fact that the forward exchange rate fails to be the best predictor of the 
future spot rate and secondly. by the identification of "bandwagon 
effects" in exchange markets. This is based on the Jurgensen Report 
(1983) quoted in WilHamson (1985a). 
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7. Please recall the previous discussion on the openness criterion. 
8. It is also the conclusion of the study by Frenkel and Aizenman (J~)82) who 
treated real consumption as the objective function to be stabilized. 
9. DetaHs of this process is explained in Chapter 9 with respect to India. 
10. If the shift in the terms (If trade is permanent. then it necessitates a change 
in the exchange rate for the simultaneous attainment (If internaJ and 
external balance. The two oil sh(lcks of 1973-7" and 1979-80 are jnslances (If 
permanent real shocks. 
11. See the survey of these studies for both developed and developing countries 
in Chapter 8. 
lZ. See Chapter 6 for more details. 
13. The concept of the effective exchange rate was initially developed within 
the l.MJ. in order to measure the impact of sterling devaluati,)ns of 1949 
and 1%7 (Takagi, 1988 p.Z7Z). For later developmentoflhe concept, see 
Hirsch and Higgins (1970), Rhomberg (1976) and Maciejewski (1983). 
H. We have the earlier case of at least. one currency which adopted a fl)rm of 
basket peg during the inter-war floating period namely, the Canadian 
dollar, whose value was kept mid-way bet:v.'een the value of the 1],5. d.)ll4r 
and sterling (see Takagi, op.cit. p.Z7Z). 
15. It may be noted that Marshall (1987) did envisage the possibility of 
different nations giving different. weightage to gold and silver in the 
determination of the value of their currencies resembling the present. day 
own-currency basket pegs. This is clear from Marshall's statement. "If we 
wished the value of the currency to be regulated chiefly by gold we should 
have only a small bar of silver, if chiefly by silver we should have 
perhaps fifty or one hundred times as heavy a bar of silver as that. of gl)ld. 
But if we wished the two metals to have about. equal influence, we shOUld, 
taking a.ccount of the existing stocks of two metals, probably choose .mr 
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sHver bar twenty times as heavy as that of gold" (p.204). 
16. Please note that the numeraire also has a weight but the fluctuation (If the 
numeraire against itself is zero. 
17. It may, however, be noted that a few developed countries (Austria. finland, 
Norway and Sweden) have also adopted the basket peg. 
18. See further debate on this point between Connolly (J98j) and WiJJjamS(lo 
(J985c). 
19. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Section 6.3"' .. 
20. This point is further substantiated mathematically by Branson and Katseli 
(982). pp. 200-2. 
21. This phrase is borrowed from Williamson 0%5. p.l5) 
22. In the context of developed countries with free capital mobility, the 
adjustable peg would provoke disruptive short-term capital flows 
precipitating the crisi s. Williamson (t98~a. p.67) asserts that the pC'dctice of 
large discrete exchange rate change "has nothing to commend it but. 
nostalgia .... the use of this anticipated practice virtually guarantees 
repeated exchange crises ........ . 
23. If the real shock to the economy is permanent in nature. a real cra1i"l based 
on external balance indicators would be preferable. 
24. Under flexible single currency pegs we include flexible arrangements that 
are 'adjusted according to a set of indicators' and 'limited flexibility vis-a-vis 
of tovnt ... ies 
U.S. dollar'. The former group". is also in a way dollar peggers with the peg 
being adjusted gradually according to a set of indicators. 
25. Connolly (1983)'5 justification for the continued existence of dl)Uar pegs in 
Latin American countries as due to the potential jolt. to confidence if the 
historical Hnk 1i·ith the dollar is broken, is besides the point. This is so 
because there had been no such problem in the large number of LDf..s ,-hi) 
abandoned their historical sterHng Hnk. 
Chapter of 
The Indian [Ichanlc Rate System: A Historical Pcrspecthe 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter we reviewed the theory of alternative exchange rate 
regimes. But the exchange rate regime in practice could differ from theory due 
to institutional factors and institutions are in turn a product of history. A 
proper understanding of the Indian exchange rate regime.therefore. requires 
the examination of its historical roots. The evolution of India's exchange rate 
regime in turn has to be viewed in the context of the dominant-dependent 
relationship between Britain and India from the early 19th century to the (jest 
half of the 20th century. What foHows in this chal,ter is an attempt to bring (IUt 
the historical details of the Indian exchange rate system as it graduaJJy moved 
away from a pure silver standard of the 19th century to a flexible basket system 
of the present time. 
A chronology of major events in India's exchange rate regime is given in 
Appendix Table A4.1. 
4.2 Establishment of a Silver Standard 
According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1985, Vol. 21. p.86). the year 
1818 marks a watershed in Indian history wHh the realization of British 
supremacy over the subcontinent. That year is significant in the monetary 
history of India as well because. the British began a currency reform in India 
in that year by making the silver rupee coin of 180 grains of standard sHver 
(1l1l2th fineness) as the unHmited legal tender for South India. (Jain. 1933 
pp.Z-3). The ending of bimetaUism in India took place, however, in 1835 when 
t.hrough the Gold and Silver Coinage Act, the silver rupee was declared the sole 
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unlimited legal tender for the whole of British India. Thus India ,"as placed on a 
pure silver standard in 1835. 
In order to understand the implications of a silver standard for India "e 
need to take a look at the contemporary international monetary scene. Britain 
came tl) a full gold standard in 1821.1 In that year Germany and most. CI)untries 
of the East were on a silver standard. France. Italy. Switzerland. Holland and 
Belgium. together later known as the Latin Union. and also the U.S.A. ,-ere on a 
bimetallic standard. In this international situation. the stability of the 
exchange value of a currency depended on the stabHity of the ratio between the 
prices of goJd and silver. This ratio remained more or Jess the same up to 1871 
and. as a result. India enjoyed a stabJe exchange rate system from 1833 to 1871. 
The nelt two decades or so. ie. from 1872 to 1894. witnessed a severe slump in 
the market price of silver in relation to goJd. During this period. independent 
nations (If the world one after another demonetized silver in favour (If a pure 
gold standard. 2 This together with the sharp rise in ,'odd silver production 
and stagnant gold production accounted for the historic fall in the price of 
silver.3 This resulted in a continuous depreciation of the exchange value of the 
rupee vis-a-vis sterling and other currencies of major developed countries 
which by then had moved to a gold standard. Thus from an exchange C'dte of 2s 
in J871 the rupee dropped steadHy to Is Id in 1894 (Vakil and Muranjan. 1927. 
p.38). 
4.3 Drift to a Gold Exchange Standard 
The sharp depreciation of the rupee which ~'as extended over a long period 
harmed the economy in general.{ and put severe strain on public finance. the 
laUer arising from the need to make large payments by the Indian government. 
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to Britain in sterling. UM.K .. I. pp.I-2). Belatedly. in response to the Herschell 
Committee (1892) recommendations. the Government of India cll)sed the mints 
for silver on private account in 1893 and fixed the value of the rupee at 1s aid. 
With sterling on gold standard. this implied a fixed gold value for the rupee. 
This official gold value for the rupee being higher than the bullion value 
meant that the rupee was to become a token coin thereafter ",'ith its monetary 
value divorced from its intrinsic value. Ho,,"·ever it. took almost. another five 
years for the shortage of rupees created by the stoppage DC silver coinage tl) 
l"dise the rupee value to the official rate. In January 1898 the exchange value of 
rupee touched 1s 4d. 
After the rupee hit its official rate. the Government oC India took a number 
oC steps with a view to stablilizing the rupee at that level which led tl) the 
establishment of what is called a gold exchange standard in India. The Indian 
gold exchange standard differed from the pure gold standard essentially in two 
regards. Firstly. unlike the latter the former did not admit mnvertibilit}r oC the 
dl)mestic currency into gold but instead. allowed for convertibility into sterling 
which in turn was convertible into gold. 5 Secondly. the gold exchange 
standard did not have local gold coins circulating as a means of payment 
As emphasized by Keynes UM.K., I, Ch.l) the introduction (If the gold 
exchange standard in India was not the result (If any deliberate de~jgn (In the 
part (If neither the Indian nor Briti~h government. but India drifted into such a 
system through a number of administrative rather than legislative measure~ 
taken since 1898 whose implications were not weJJ perceived at that time. 
Keynes was fascinated by the Indian system and praised it in his first boot. 
Indian Currency and finance written in 1913. He noted that the Indian ~'Y~1em 
contained an essential in gredien t (If the future ideal curren cy. namely. "the U~ 
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of 8· cheap local currency artificially maintained at par with the internatil)nal 
currency or standard of value" (j.M.K .• op. cit. p.Z'). later in giving evidence tl) 
the RI)yal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance (Hilton Young 
Commission, 1926) Keynes stated that the pre-war gold exchange standard 
functioning in India was perhaps "the best currency system then existing in 
the ,"orld" (J.M.K., XIX, p.52l). Keynes also said that though India ,'as not the 
first country to introduce a gold exchange standard. 6 she was the first to adopt 
it in its complete form and after the system was perfected in India. it was ~Ion 
widely copied in Asia and elsewhere 7 (lM.r., I, 1'1'.23-5). 
It would not be out of place here to mentjon about the stabHiz..ing role the 
Indian exchange standard played in the pre-Wodd War I internau(lnaJ 
monetary system centred on Britain. This is brought (Iut clearJy by De t:ccco 
(1984, Chs. 2 and 4). During this period India had a large trade sm"plus with the 
re,a. of the worJd but a continuous trade deficit with Britain. Britain', trade 
surplus with India enabled the former to settle her trade deficit with the re,a. (If 
the w(lrld which remained high with the loss of Britain's competiHve advantage 
to others. particularJy the U.S. and Germany. Besides. under the goM nhange 
standard India kept a large part of her exchange reserves in London in the 
form (If sterling securities and deposits which "provided a large masse de 
manoeuvre" for the Bank of England. (De Cecco, 01'. cit. 1'.62). 
4.4 Breakdown of the Gold Exchange Standard 
The pre-war system was generaJJy trouble free. The exact delaiJs of the 
working of the system is not central to our purpose. However, (.ne should n(.te 
that the strength of the system was derived from the wHlingness and abiHly (If 
the government to issue rupees in exchange for gold or sterling and sterling in 
exchange for rupees at Is .ofd per rupee. The rupee being a t(lken coin. the 
former condition required that the ImHion value of the silver rupee should n(,1. 
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be higher than its face value. The trouble started when there occurred a sudden 
from 
rise in the gold price of silver. It more than doubled ,- about27d per ounce in 
" 
1915 to 55d in 1917.8 By August 1917 the ~'OI'St happened; the bullion value of 
silver rupee exceeded its face value. Thereafter the government could have 
issued fresh coins only at a loss. The silver price was still rising and. as a result. 
value of the rupee had to be adjusted upwards depending on the gold price of 
silver. Thus the gold exchange standard collapsed and in effect India ~'as bad: 
again on a silver standard. 
The Babington Smith Committee (1920) set up to review the Indian currency 
and exchange situation. wanted India to be placed once again on a gold standard 
at a time when the pound itself was floating downward against gold.9 The only 
way to bring the rupee to a gold basis. the Committee thought. in the context of 
the risin g value of sHver. was to raise the exchan ge value of the nJpee to a high 
25 gold 10 (which was higher than the rate prevalent at the time of the 
submission of the report) i.e .. a 50 per cent rise in the parity of the rupee from 
the pre-~rar level of 7.5334 grains of gold to 11.30016 grains. In arriving at. this 
rate. the Committee was greatly influenced by Keynes who appeared before the 
Committee as a witness. Keynes' argument for a higher value for the rupee Vf·as. 
however. independent of the high value of silver. which is rather a technical 
matter as we saw earlier. He was concerned. on the other hand. about the high 
and rising 'k'orld inflation spreading into India which had a lower inflation 
than the rest of the world that time. In order to insulate the Indian economy 
from the high comparative inflation abroad high exchange rate was advocated 
11 by Keynes. (See JM.K .. XV. Ch.5) 
The government announced its decision in february 1920 to estabUsh the 
high gold parity for the rupee as recommended by the Babington Smith 
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Committee. HI)wever. it appeared sl)on that. the attempt to drive the rupee to 2d 
was bound to fail on account of two factors: first. India's balance of trade 
deteriorated considerably which reduced the demand f(lr rupees and sec(lnd. the 
factor 'Which kept the value of the rupee rising earHer. i.e .. the rising sHver 
pdces. disappeared and there began a fast decHne in sHver prices after 
December 1919. The government spent about £55 mHHon in supporting the 
exchange value of rupee in the first nine months of 1920. llesides. the 
g(lvernment sold nearly 20 mHlion tolas of gold from february to September 
1920 to the pubHc in order to maintain the exchange rate at 2s gold against the 
n'pee. By the end of September 1920 the Government (If India gave up its 
attempts to defend the value of the rupee. The rupee dropped steadHy thereafter 
to Js 3d sterling in March 1921 and remained that low for some time. (See VatU 
and Muranjan. op. cit. pp.123-9). 
4.5 Return to Gold Standard 
The value of the rupee recovered in early 1923 to Is 4.d sterling. This had 
been due to an improvement in the trade balance during 1922-23 and also due to 
the government policy of fiscal and monetary contraction during 1920-23. 
(VatH and Muranjan. op. Cit. Ch.19). The policy of tight money continued in 
spHe of the improvement in trade balance and the exchange rate r(lse to Js 6d 
sterling Os 4d gold) in October 1924.. In April 1925 Britain re-established the 
gold standard at pre-war parity.lZ But the rupee was maintained at Is 6d which 
meant that the Indian currency was pJaced above the pre-war gold parity Us 
4.d). ~hus the gold parity of rupee became 8.4.7512 grains of gold against. the 
pre-war level of7.5334 grains. i,e. an apreciation of 12.5 per cent 
The Hilton Young Commission (J926) set up to study the Jate~t Indian 
monetary and elchange situation and make recommendations. suggested a gold 
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bullion standard for India. similar to the one esablished in Britain in April 1925. 
Under this system, gold was not to circulate as currency but. the currency 
authority would be bound to buy and seU gold without limit. in quantities of not. 
less than o{OO fine ounces at rates based on the gold parity of the rupee. The g,)ld 
parity recommended was Is 6d which was the one prevailing at that time.13 The 
('.(Immission's recommendations were enacted in March 1927 with (lne ma.jor 
amendment, namely, instead oUhe unlimited purchase and sale (If 'gold' against 
the n.pee as proposed by the Commission, the legislation provided f(lr 'goJd or 
sterling' at the discretion of the government. This change made the new 
euhange rate system introduced in India more or less a gold exchange ~dard 
of the early 1898-1916 period. One c(mld, however, Hnd one difference between 
the t'Wo: the new one had a statut(lry basis whereas the old one was ba...~d (In 
mere executive practice. (Jain 01'. cit. p.35). 
4.6 Rupee and the Sterling Area 
Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931 and sterling began 
to depreciate heavily against t.he dl)Uar. However, many of Britain's principal 
commercial partners pegged their currencies with sterJing.H This group of 
countries who maintained a fixed Hnk between their currencies and sterling 
f<.tlowing the suspension of the goJd standard by Britain, together with Britain 
came to be known as the 'sterling bloc', As the pound floated, the Indian nspee 
was legaJJy tied to the sterling by the government ordinance (If Septemher 24, 
1931 at the then prevailing rate (Is 6d). 
By the beginning of the 1930, Britain's relation 'With the internatioaJ 
economy underwent a fundamental transformation (Cairn cross and 
Echengreen, 1983,1'.11). following the suspension of the g(lld standard the U.K. 
introduced trade and elchange controls. I' However, under the 'ImperiaJ 
Preference' agreed atthe Ottawa Economic Conference in 1932, empire products 
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were exempted from British trade restrictions. Similarly. British capital 
controls were also made generally inapplicable against the Commonwealth 
countries from 1933. 
The year 1931 is an important landmark in the evolution of India's euhange 
rate system. At the international level. that year marked the end of a 
multilateral settlement system which prevailed throughout the 19th century 
and the early 20th century and the emergence of regional dearing systems 
based on different currency blocs. India became part of a· large currenqp bll)c 
which was to shape her trade and financial relations for a number of decades to 
come. The rupee became formally and firmly on a sterling peg ~"ith no link 
whatsoever with any metallic commodity. either direct or indirect. 
The management of the rupee at Is 6d was. however. not easy. Ever since 
the rupee touched that rate in October 1924. the government's determination to 
keep that rate stable involved substantial currency contraction. The pl)licy of 
monetary contraction continued after the implementation of the Hilton Young 
Co .. . d' 16 mmlssmn s recommen allons. The situation became critical in the 
beginning of the financial year 1931-32 due to the unprecedented fall in the 
international prices of agricultural products and hence the collapse of Indian 
exports as global recession deepened.17 The exchange rate dropped to the tovier 
gold point and the government had to unload nearly £11 million tl) maintain the 
value of the rupee at the lo~rer point. bet~'een August. and mid-September 1931. 
(Jain op. cit. pAO). Following the change over to the sterling standard the 
prime consideration was to preserve the sterling value of the rupee. TI)"ards 
that end. exchange control was introduced in the form of refusal of sale of 
foreign exchange for purposes other than normal trade and other prescribed 
items. IS 
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India ran a substantial trade deficit during the 19305. This period also 
witnessed a massive and prolonged outflow of gold from India "hich became 
controversial in the context of India's notoriously inS'dtiabie appetite for 
foreign gold. 19 The huge outflow of gold might have greatly helped the 
stabilization of the rupee at the official rate vis-a-vis sterling in spite of the 
heavy trade deficits. (C,(Inan. 1952. I1P.89-90). 
Although there was strong public criticism20 of the ne~r exchange rate 
arrangement.. the system served India rather well during a very difficult 
period. The immediate effect of the fixed sterling link was the partial insulation 
from world slump in primary commodity prices stemming from the fact that the 
U.K. was relatively less affected than other leading countries during the great 
depression (Nurkse, 1944. p.49). This was reflected in the rapid rise of the share 
of U.K. in Indian exports from 23 per cent in 1930-31 to 35 per cent in 1940-41 
(The Cambridge Economic History (If India. Vol. 2. 1983. I1P.864-:)). Being a 
member of the stecJin g bloc India benefited from the free U.K. marlet and 
probably also from the free long-term capital flows from the U.K. 
World War II brought significant changes in the sterling bloc both in 
membership and in nature. The European nations except Ireland and Iceland 
broke away just before or immediately after the outbreak of war. The 
organisation became a formal and coherent entity with the introduction (If an 
exchange control system not just in the U.K. as before. but in the entire group. 
against the rest of the world with virtuaJJy no payments restrictions among the 
members of the association. 
The phrase 'sterling area' came to be used only during the ~·ar. The 
. 
principal aspect that differentiates the post-1939 sterling area from the 
73 
previous sterling bloc is the emergence of the so called 'dollar problem' 21 
'Which compelled the U.K. to institute rigid exchange controls around the 
sterling area as a whole (Day. 19'54. pp.4S-47) and to set up the centml dollar 
pool. Under the dollar pool arrangement. the members were to curb the 
potential loss of dollar reserves by imposing licensing restrictions on 'dollar 
imports' and to surrender their additional earnings of gold and dollar to the 
Bank of England. 
To India .. like any other sterling bloc country of the time. however. dollar 
pooling during World War Il did not represent something new. These countries 
used to keep most of their reserves as sterling balances in L>ndon by 
converting the earnings of aU other foreign reserves. The difference. 
however. had been the imposition of exchange control and import restrictions 
for the purpose of ensuring and enhancing the central dollar and gold reserves 
of the sterling area.2Z Those regulations came to be operated in India under the 
Defence of India Rules formulated in September 1939. 
A major development during the 1930s in India was the setting up of a 
central bank under the Reserve Bank of India Act. 1935. Thereafter, the 
function of maintaining the exchange value (If the rupee passed from the 
government to the central bank. namely. the Reserve Bank of India. The 
Reserve Bank was obliged to buy and seH sterling for rupees on demand "ithout 
limit at fixed rates so as to keep the rupee-sterling parity at Is 6d. The Bank also 
assumed the authority for administering the exchange control since 1939. 
During World War II the majntenance of the exchange value (If the nJpee at 
Is 6d could have been easy. India acquired a substantial surplus on;(current 
account partly due to a favourable balance (If trade and partly due to the heavy 
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war expenditure by the Allies in India. (Conan, op. cit. pp.31-2). India virtually 
eliminated her external public debt. during the war which had stood at. abl)ut. 
£300 million at the beginning of the war. Mt>re importantly. India's sterling 
balances at the end of the war came to £ 1.3 billion which constituted 35 per cent 
or the total sterling liabilities of the U.K. and 52 per cent. of the sterling 
holdings of the overseas sterling ara·. (See Bell. 1956. Table 1. p.22). 
".7 Rupee and the Post-World War II Bretton Woods System 
The end of World War II did not lead to the dismantlement of the sterling 
area. In India, the exchange control regulations, which became operative since 
1939 based on emergency powers under the Defence of India Rules, ,,-ere in Cad 
placed under the statute through the enactment. of the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act in March 19-t7, Further developments in the exchange rate 
regime of India under the Bretton Woods par value system are examined under 
different sub-heads below, 
«.7.1 Rupee's Initial Par Value in the BreUon Woods System 
The establishment of the BreUI)n Woods sytem at the clt)se of the war in 190(<( 
in which India was a founder member. logically implied that India. should break 
her ties with the sterling area. This is so because. the sterling area with 
exchange controls operating around it, was definitely incompatible ,,-ith the 
IMF objective of "the establishment. of a multi-lateral system of payments in 
respect of current transactions between members and .... the elimination of 
foreign exchange restrictions which hamper growth of world trade" (Article I 
(iv) of the IMFJ. Nevertheless, the immediate post-war period did not. involve 
any !lignificant change in the working of the sterling area arrngement 23 and. 
India's continued membership in that association in turn meant no s\lb~lantiaJ 
change in her exchange rate arrangement. 
7S 
Under the Articles of the Fund, the members were to intimate their 
respective exchange rates in terms of either gold or the U.S. dollar. India 
complied with that provision in December 19i6 by declaring the value of the 
rupee in terms of gold (Le., 4.145142857 grains of fine gold) but the par value 
was so fixed as not to disturb the rupee's then prevailing parity with sterling I)f 
is 6d H.e., £1 - Rs.13.33). Following the communication oC the par value oC the 
rupee to the Fund, the Reserve Bank oC India Act was amended in April 19-t7 
extending the power of the Bank tl) buy and sell 'foreign exchange' instead I)C 
just 'pound sterling' .. However, in practice the Bank dealt in only the p,)und 
sterling (RBI. 1983, p.Z8i). In short, the immediate post-war period saw India 
adopting the Bretton Woods par value system only J(! iUfoe as her exchange rate 
system remained on a de lo(~/} sterling peg. 
4.7.2 Impact of Pound Devaluation, 1949 
The U.K. devalued sterling by 30.5 per cent against the U.S. dollar in 
September 1949 (i.e., from $4.03 to $2.80). The question then arose as tl) whether 
India. should follow suit. Ultimately it was decided to maintain the parity Vf'ith 
sterling by devaluing the rupee against the d.)Uar by an identical extent. This 
decision tl) follow sterling was dictated by the Cact that. India's trade was 
concentrated in sterling area countries and, therefore, Was a defensive step. 
The Prime Minister of India made that clear in his brt)adcast to the natil)n after 
the devaluation: 
"The sterling area is important t.o us in our international 
economic relations. A great part of our international trade is 
with this area; most of our export markets are also in this 
area,... If we have not taken parallel action in revising the 
dollar-rupee ralit) , the prices of our goods in our principal 
export countries would have risen immediately and that would 
have affected our trade interests.... The devaluation of the 
pound therefore made the revision of the dollar-rupee rate 
almost unavoidable in the interests of our own country" 24 
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".7.3 Impact of Sterling Convertibility 
It is well known that although the establishment of the IMF has been the 
most significant world monetary development after W(lrld War II. the IMF 
suffered a temporary eclipse soon after it was ~t up mainly due to the after-
effects (If the economic devastation of Europe during the war. Il was (Inly in 
December 19)8 with the simultaneous announcement (If currency convert.ibiHly 
by aU major West European countries that the Fund objective (If a unified multi-
Jateral settlement system came to be realized.2:> With the adopti(ln (If total 
current account convertibility by the major European nations including the 
U.K. in February 1961,26 the sterling area dollar pool arrangement ceased to 
exist i.e., the members the sterling area from then onwards did not. need to 
discriminate against goods and services from the rest of the world. 
By the beginning of the 1960s, with the restoration of total convertibility of 
sterling, the sterling area became an informal and voluntary associntil)n as far 
as the independent countries of the area were concerned. In India. that. gave a 
big push to the drive for diversification of transactions away from the U.K. and 
the rest of the sterling area, a drive which at first started after the 1949 sterling 
devaluation (particularly with regard to India's exports). This c·an be seen from 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 indicates that the share of India's current. spending (impl)rts plus 
invisible payments) in the sterling area declined substantially from nearly a. 
half of the total in the mid-fifties to just under a fifth by the end of the sixties. 
Similarly, the share of India's current receipts (exports plus invisible receipts) 
from the region declined by more than half from. 54 per cent. of the total tl) 26 
Table 4.1 Share of Sterlin, Area in India's Current Transactions 
for Selected Years (J9~1-7J) 
Year Current Current 
(April-March) Payments Receipts 
1951-52 41.l 59.3 
1955-56 49.4 53.9 
1960-61 34.2 46.4 
1965-66 21.6 34.4 
1970-71 18.2 26.2 
Source: Worked out from various issues of Reserve Bank 
of India Bulletin, Bombay 
t'u- Hr\~ 
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J,. over the same 15-year period. That the share of current payments to the 
sterling area shrunk faster than that of current receipts from the area reflects '\ 
the intensity of the trade and exchange controls erected against the non-
sterling world during the earlier period up to the mid-fifties. 
Although we noted a shift in India's external transactions from the mid-
fifties toward the non-sterling area countries, this was not to have any impact. 
on the country's exchange rate regime which was centred on sterling. Slerling 
continued to be the intervention currency of the system, the authl>rities kept 
parity with slerling and kept the bulk of foreign balances in sterling. This 
situation would have continued but for two developments: first, the 
deterioration of India's balance of payments and second. the devaluation (If the 
pound. The impact of these events on India's exchange rate system is namined 
below. 
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4.7.4 Rupee Devaluation in 1%6 
lndia'a balance oC payments which remained in diffitulty throughl>ut. the 
decade after the mid-19'Os.27 became critical by early 1966-67. The government. 
had been taking a number of measures in the CI>rm of export. subsidies, import. 
restricUI>ns and incentives Cor Coreign remittance. They all proved inadequate 
and. with the situation worsening. the government took the radical decisil)Q of 
devaluing t.he rupee by 36.' per cent. on June 6. 1%6. 
As reported in IMf History 0976. Vol. 1. p,(68). the 1966 devaluation oC the 
rupee was a unilateral step which is unusual within a major currency area. 
This was also the first significant exchange rale policy decision taken by tbe 
28 I' ... independent government· n thLS context. It IS Interesting lo nl>le that in a 
pamphlet issued to the public shortly afler the devaluation, the gl)vernment 
quoted the pre-independent incident of fixing a high value for the rupee in 
1927 against the plea for a lower rate by the Indian public opinion.29 The rupee 
devaluation of 1966 was presented by the government as an assertion of 
nati(lnal autonomy. 
Strangely enough. the 1966 devaluation also became controversial mainly 
because it was generally believed to be the result of pressures from the Aid-
India Consortium under the auspices of the World Bank.30 More<Iver. the 
devaluation could not produce any perceptible increase in exports alth(lugh 
S(lme of the major non-traditional non-agricultural exports did seem to have 
responded to the devaluation (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan. 1975. (h.9). This was 
partly due to a second massive drought following the devaluation affecting the 
elportable surplus, and partly also due to the loss of competitiveness suffered 
on aCC(lunt of the domestic price rises also triggered (If( by the drought. 
Anyh(lw, the nperience was to leave a lasting impression (In the government 
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which might have had a large influence on its decisions relating to exchange 
rate policy in the subsequent period (see Joshi and Little. 1987). 
4.7.5 1967 Sterling Devaluation and the End ofthe Sterling Area 
The pound sterling was devalued from S2.80 to SZAO (14.3 per cent) in 
November 1%7. This time. unlike in 1949. only a limited number of countries in 
the sterling area kept parity with sterling intact by devaluing vdth sterling. 
India. like majority of sterling area countries. did not devalue with sterling. 
By reducing overnight the dollar value of foreign balances of saverdl countries. 
the 1967 sterling devaluation gave a significant jolt to the sterling area.31 It 
induced the sterling area countries including India to speed up the 
diversification of their foreign exchange reserves to currencies (Ither than 
sterling. 
The trend became particularly marked in the second quarter of 1%8 ,'hen 
the officially held sterling holdings of the overseas stering area declined by 
£230 miJlion (British Parliamentary Papers. 1968. pAl. Fearing that such 
massive liquidation of reserves would aggravate Britain's balance of payments 
difficulties. the British Government guaranteed to maintain the doJJar value of a 
large proportion of sterling balances with these countries in return for 
keeping a minimum portion of their reserves in sterling. These agreements. 
which revived the spirit of formality within the sterling area once again. ,'ere 
initially for three or five years depending on the country. starting from 
September 1968 but extended a few times up to December 1974. 
The step which marked the beginning of the end of the stering' area ,'as 
taken by the U.l:. in June 1972 along with her decision to float the pound. 
namely. the extension of exchange control on long-term capital flows to most of 
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the sterling area.. (See Tew, 1985, pp.79-S0). This prompted a large majl)rity of 
countries in the sterling area to go off the sterling peg and alsl) to reduce 
sharply the share of sterling in their total reserve holdings. This together 'With 
Britain's joining the European Economic Community in January 1973, signalled 
the death knell of the sterling area·. 
The U.K. abolished all the remaining exchange controls in 1979 and with 
that the sterling area officially ceased to exist. As far as India is concerned, the 
process of diversification of international reserves accelerated particularly 
from 1975 with the expiry of the exchange rate guarantee agreement in 
December 1970{. By the end of the 1970s and begining of the 19808 the pound 
sterling constituted "only a modest portion" of India's official reserve 
holdings.32 (Reserve Bank of India, 1983, pp.288-9). 
«.S The Rupee and the Dollar 
As the importance of the pound in India's external transactions has been 
waning since the early 1950s.that of the dollar has been waxing. As expected, 
. . I d' , has ~"I\ the growing Importance of the dollar In n 1a s external transactions . 
,... 
reflected much more in India's current payments rather than current receipts 
h ad. t>~el'\ 
as it was the former which constrained by the earlier operation of trade and 
"-
exchange controls under the sterling area arrangement. Thus the share of 
India's imports from the U.S.A. increased rapidly from 13 per cent in 1933-54 to 
as high as 38 per cent in 1%5-66, whereas that of India.'s expl)rts to the U.S.A. 
moved up only marginally from 17 per cent· to 18 per cent during the same 
period.33 On the investment side, the U.S. share of private investment. in India 
grew from 8 per cent in December 1953 tl) ZZ per cent in March 1%5 whereas 
the British share declined from 83 per cent to 5« per cent during the same 
period.34 Howeveljthe importance of the dollar for India is not. cl)nfined to her 
t.ransact.ions with the U.S. alone. The U.S. dollar acquired the status of an 
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international currency particularly after the removal of restrictions on aU 
current account transactions by the West European Nations and Japan in the 
earJy J960s. As a result, the buJk (If Inwa's growing trade with Japan:~5 and 
developing countries has been invoked in the U.S. doJJar. 
The replacement of sterling by the U.S. dollar in India's external 
t.ransa.clions was expected to have its impact on India's exchange mte system 
which was for long been based on maintaining parity with sterling. The 1966 
devaluation which broke parity with sterling with a bang, hov{ever, is 
explained largely by India's balance of payments adjustment. need and it ,'as a 
devaluation agianst all currencies, nl)t just against sterling. The reluctance in 
1%7 to devalue with the pound is only a partial recogition to the reduced 
relevance of sterling for India as it is explained more by the rupee's own earlier 
devaluation. However, in 1971 after the suspension of official dollar-gold 
convertibility by the U.S. in August and the floating of major currencies "hich 
followed it, the Indian authorities opted for keeping parity vdth the dollar. In 
August 22, 1971 India introduced a dollar peg for the rupee and this development. 
is significant.. It could have been interpreted as the first official recognition of 
the reality of the predominance of the U.S. dollar in India's external 
transactions. But, as ,re shall see later, this official act turned out to be quite 
different.. and did not in any way represent the beginning of a consistent policy 
giving larger importance to the dollar in India's exchange rate system. 
Even when India adopted a dollar 'peg in August 1971. sterling ,-as retained 
as the currency of intervention. This meant that while India maintained the 
rupee-doJJar rate at the Jevel that existed since the 1966 devaluation. i.e .. 51 • Rs 
7.50. the Reserve Bank of India would announce daHy tbe buying and seJJing 
rate for the pound sterling based on the doJJar-sterJing rate prevajJjng in the 
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London market. Thus. the Bank would not buy and sell the dollar to stabilize the 
rupee-dollar rate but would perf')rm that function indirectly through the 
traditional medium of sterling. for example. if there was a depreciation of the 
pound against the dollar in the international market. the Reserve Bank v,·ould 
reduce the buying and selling ratesef the pound against the rupee br the exact 
extent of depreciation of the pound against the dollar. This Vt'ould maintain the 
value of the rupee in terms of the dollar in India constant. There was no official 
statement on the rationale of this indirect dollar peg. As we mentioned earlier. 
the Reserve Bank of India Act as amended in April 1947 after India he came a 
memher of the fund. did give the Bank power to intervene through any foreign 
currency not just sterling. The reason why the Bank did not inten'ene through 
the doJJar after a switch to the dollar peg could be firstly. that the Dank 'Wanted 
to proceed very slowly in an uncertain international monetary situation and 
secondly. that the Bank introduced the doHar peg only as a temporary expedient. 
This is explained below. 
The conjuncture about the temporary expediency of the dollar peg can be 
understood this way. The effect of 1%6 rupee devaluation was largely nullified 
by high prices resulting from a second massive drought and also. to some extent. 
by the pound devaluation in 1%7. The Indian balance of payments continued to 
deteril)rate and it might have been thl)ught by the authorities to require 
another exchange rate adjustment. But the bitter political controversy that ,,"·as 
geneC'dted by the 1966 devaluatil)n ruled out another open devaluation. 
However. it was knoVtrn that the dollar Vt'as greatly overvalued and. therefore. 
would depreciate against other major currencies when thl)se currencies 'n~re 
floated against it. Therefore. the Indian authorities might have seen this as an 
opportunity to bring about a gradual devaluation of the rupee by linking its 
value Vt'ith the weak dollar and this. in effect. ",'as the result Pri.)r to the 
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Smithsonian realignment of major currencies in December 1971. the rupee 
depreciated 5.1 per cent against the pound and by similar amounts against other 
major currencies depending on the .... clte of depreciation of the dollar against 
them. 
4.9 Rupee Back to Sterling 
The Smithsonian realignment, of major cu'rrencies did not signify a return 
tf) the Bretton Woods par value system and the official convertibilitr of gold int.) 
dollar was not restored. Instead, the agreement ushered in a temporarr regime 
(If "central rates and wider margins" (lMf History. Vol. I. 1976. pp.557-66). India 
adopted a central rate for the rupee against the pound sterling based (ID the 
rupee-sterling rate which prevaUed on the eve of the realignment. i.e .. £1 ., Rs 
lS.96n. and was to avaH herself of wider margins of 2.25 per cent aboye and 
below the central rate. instead of the plus and minus one per cent margins in 
the Bretton Woods par value system. 
The December 1971 arrangements meant a comeback to the sterling peg, 
although with broader margins. after a brief speH (August 22 t(l December 19, 
1971) of the dollar peg. This relink with sterling was confirmed later in June 
1972 when the pound was floated consequent upon the "rorsening balance of 
payments situation in the U.K. The rupee f.)l1owed sterling as the latter was 
floated, recalling the events of 1931. 
In the absence of any official explanation for this switch in potie}'. some 
plausible interpreations have been put forward by earlier authors. Joshi and 
LiUle (op. cit. p.3n), for example. provide a politico-economic explanation. 
India ",'as involved in a war with Pakistan over Bangladesh in late 1971 which 
severely strained India's relations with the U.S.A. and also led to the suspension 
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of US. aid to India. The quick reversal of the doUar peg almost at the same time 
could have been a fall-out from the worsening of the Indo-U.S. relations. The 
economic interp'reation is similar to the one given above by the present. author 
for the earlier move towards the dollar peg. That is, the Indian offiriais "ould 
have cleverly anticipated the future weakness of sterling with a. view to 
effectin g yet another back door devaluation on the back of sterJing.36 
One could also add another interpretation which emphMlizes the r(lle of 
inertia on the part of the Indian monetary authorities. The dollar peg (If four 
months might have stretched the available expertise within the Bank in dealing 
with a floating pound rate for the rupee which the Bank had not experienced at 
aU ever since its inception in 1935. That could perhaps explain the immediate 
suspension (If forward dealings by the Bank in pound sterling which IMlted (Iver , 
a week. The reversion to the well-accustomed stering peg would mean no 
change in the time-old practice of operation in foreign exchange market by the 
Bank. It avoided the problem of continu(lus decision-making lhal would be 
nece~ary if the pound-rupee rate were to undergo change every day. 
However. the Reserve Bank. after the ~ing back to the sterling peg. tried to 
moderate the impact on the rupee (If the heavy depreciation (If the p(lund 
immediately after it was floated (In june 23. 1972 by revaluing the rupee first (.n 
june 26.1972 and second on july of, 1972 both adding to 0.9 per cent After those 
adjustments, there were no further rupee-sterling rate changes for the nelt 
three years in spite of the continuing depreciation (If the pound again~1 other 
major currencies. The effective exchange rate of sterling declined by 22 per 
cent during june 1972 - June 1975.37 As a result. the rupee aJs(I depreciated 
heaviJy against other major currencies: 10 per cent against the doHar. 13 per 
cent against the yen. 30f per cent against the deutsche mark and J8 per cent 
against the French franc during June 1972 - June 197) (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.Z R.upee"s Exchanle R.ate alainst Selected Currencies. 197Z-
75 (Rupees per foreilft. Currency)a 
Month DoHar 
june 19n 7.363 
june 1973 7,363 
june 1974 7.937 
june 1915 8.190 
july 1915 8,489 
August 1915 8.795 
Sept. 1915 8.865 
Yen 
OJJ242 
0.0278 
0.0280 
0.0279 
0.0287 
0.0295 
0.02% 
a. Period averages of daily rates 
Deutsche 
Mark 
2.322 
2.8)5 
3.142 
3.499 
3.442 
3,414 
3.389 
French 
franc 
1,469 
1.732 
1.619 
2JJ45 
2,£)09 
2.010 
1.983 
Pound 
Sterling 
18.967 
18.967 
18.%9 
18.694 
18.547 
18.'5% 
18.4% 
S(lurce: Rupee-dollar ratc~ are from the IFS, IMf. Other bilateral ratc~ arc 
computed from those rupee-doJJar rates and the respecth'e 
dollar rates of other curren des also given in IfS. 
A recognition on the part of the authorities that the rupee had gone d<lwn 
far enough was indicated by their decision on July 2. 1975 to revalue the rupee 
against sterling from £1 • Rs 18.80 to £1 • Rs. 18.60;i.e. by 1.1 per cent. The 
auth(lrities did not make any further adjustment in the rupee-pound rate in the 
nelt three months despite the accelerated depredation of the rupee against the 
dolJar and the yen in that period; the rupee depreciated by Mother 8 per cent 
against the doJJar and 6 per cent against the yen during JuJy-September 197) 
(see Table 4.2). Perhaps the authorities did not want to vioJate the IMf scheme 
of"central rates and wider margins" in which the maximum margins fr(lm the 
central rate established in December 1971 was only !.2.2S per cent.38 
4.10 UfectofSterling Peg. 1972-7) 
We saw above that the authorities' policy (If a sterling peg during 1972-7) 
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resulted in large depreciation of the rupee against major currencies other than 
sterting. Did the rupee depreciation positively help in boosting India's exports 
during the period? 
The Indian economy was passing through a very difficult time during 1971-
72 to 1974-75. The trouble started even before the first oil shock "ith t"o 
consecutive bad harvests in 1971-72 and 1972-73 which ,-ere follo,-ed by an 
industrial recession in 1973-74 (See Table 4.3). This generated high infJaU(ln 
in the economy. The jndel of wholesale prices rose by 10 per centin 1972-73 .. 
The nelt year the price indel m(,ved up by 20 per cent which was partly due to 
the impact of the first oB shod. Matters turned worse in 1974-75 with another 
bad crop and the in del of whole price prices shot up by 25 per cent that year. In 
the context of this highly troubled domestic situation. it may be too optimistic to 
hope that elports would receive a big boost with a favourable tlchange rate 
outcome. 
Table 4.3 Selected Economic Indicators of Indian EconOMY durinl 
197J-72 to J975-76 (Annual Growth Rates) 
Period Real Agricultural Industrial Wh(llesale 
(ApriJ- GDP production produ clion prices 
March) 
197J-72 1.6 -0.3 5.7 5.6 
J972-73 - J.J -8.1 4.0 JO.O 
J973-74 4.7 JO.O 0.8 20.2 
1974-75 0.9 -3.2 3.2 25.2 
J975-76 9.4 14.9 7.2 
-1.J 
Source: 1. National Accounts Statistics, C.S.O., Government of India 
Z. Economic Survey, Government of India 
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Nevertheless. the volume of India 's exports recorded a remarkable growth: 
it grew by an annual rate of 8 per cent during 1971-72 to 1975-76 (Table ·t·O, 
Table .f. • .f. Volu.e. Price and Value or lndia·s Exports durinl t97t-n 
to 1975-76 
Period Ex~orts 
(April-March) Volumea Pricea Value (Rs, crores ) 
1971-72 107 108 1608 
1972-73 120 120 1971 
1973-74 12) 14G 2)23 
1974-7) 133 183 3329 
197)-76 147 197 403G 
a. Ba..~: 1968-69 .. 100 
Source: Economic Survey, Government (If India 
H(lwever, the r(lle (If the exchange rate in this exp(lrt perf(lrmance js n(lt dear 
as a number (If other favourable factors were in operation during this period. 
The hike in oil pdces created boom conditions in the G\llf and the !lhare (If 
India's exports to OPEC nations rose sharply fr(lm 5 per cent in 1973-74 to 15 
per cent in 1975-76. There were substantial exports to Bangladesh from India in 
this peri(ld which were financed by aid from India. There was a marked rise in 
sugar prices abroad which raised the quantum of India's sugar exports nearly 
.,. 
five limes from 1973-74 to 19n-76 mainly th,t>ugh destocking, Another factor 
was the strict monetary and fiscal discipline administered by the government to 
ta.c:kle the inflationary situation during the period. Curbing domestic demand 
pressures might have released larger surpluses for exports (Ahluwalia. 1986. 
pp,941-2), 
The above discussion does not. ho~'ever. imply that the depreciation of the 
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rupee during 1972-75 arising from the sterling peg did not serve any useful 
purpose in relation to India's exports. Table 4.5 gives the trends in rupee's 
nominal and real effective exchange rale indices from 1971 to 1975. It shows 
t.hat t.he rupee's nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by about. 20 per 
Table 4.~ Rominal and Real Eerective Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
durinl 1971-7:)8 
Year Nominal Effective Real Effective 
Exchange Rate Enhan ge Rate 
1971 98.5 JOO,2 
197Z 91.7 98.0 
1973 83,8 93.3 
1974 81.9 96.1 
1975 78,6 88,9 
a. Base: 1970 = 100 
Source: ll-country export-weighted index computed by the author. 
Methodology of construction of the index is explained in Chapter 7. 
cent during the four-year period, whereas the depreciation in real effective 
exchange rate, i.e., nominal effeclve exchange rate adjusted for the relative 
inflation at home and abroad, was a lower 11 per cent. Therefore, the large 
nominal depreciation of the rupee during the sterling peg helped in improving 
the competitive position of India's exports in spite of the relatively higher 
inflation in India' than abfl>sd. It- appears reasonable to suggest, therefore. 
that but fl)r the large depreciation of the rupee India's exports wl)uld nl)t have 
fared as well as it did during the period of the sterling peg . 
.. .11 Shift to a Multi-currency Peg 
Although the sterling peg had been beneficial, it could at best be a. 
transitional arrangement applicable during a period of considerable 
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uncertainty at. home and abroad. On 2) September 197), the Indian authorities 
snapped the rupee-sterling link and introduced a basket peg by v.'hkh the 
future value of the rupee was to be determined on the basis of the averdge value 
of a. selected number of currencies of India's major trading partners. The 
rationale behind this decision has been exchange rate stability which is dear 
from the statement given in the government's Economic Survey for 197:)-76 
presented to Parliament in febn.ary 1976. It said: 
.... in order to impart greater stability to the effective exchange rate 
in a "World 'Where the major currencies are floating and in the wake 
of the continuing depreciation in the exchange value of the pound 
in recent months. a ne'W arrangement 'Was instituted whereby the 
exchange value of the rupee is changed periodically with reference to 
a suitable weighted average of the exchange rate movements (If the 
currencies of India's major trading partners." (p. 41) 
It w(luld be w(lrthwhile to examine the conditions (If the Indian economy 
which made the ~tabi1ity of n,pee's effective exchange rate very important at 
the time of the introduction of the b~ket system. The inflatj(lnary sjtuati(ln in 
the country had eased from the sec(lnd half of 1974-75 and the index (If 
wh(llesaJe prices registered a decline in the second quarter (If J915-76 as 
compared to the previous year. The agricultural situation changed 'With signs of 
an exceptional harvest in 1975-76. There were a1~o indications that industria) 
production w~ picking up fast. On the external front. however. the situation 
'Was stiU w(lrrying with import prices still continuing to rise faster than exp(lrt 
prices resulting in further deterioration of India's terms (If trade (See Table 4.6). 
In this ~;jtuation. there were fears that increasin g import prices particularly at 
oil. fertilizers and food (the share (If these three combined in India's total 
import biU rose from 25 per cent in 1972-73 to 55 per cent in 1974-75) may 
rekindle inflation which had just been brought under control. The n.pee's 
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Table -1..6 Indices of Unit Value of [Iports and Imports. t971-n to 
197'-7611 
Period Exports Imports Net Terms of 
(April-March) Trade (Z/3xlOO)] 
(1) (2) 0' ( .. , 
1971-72 108 93 116 
1972-73 120 97 124 
1973-74 145 138 106 
1974-75 183 239 n 
1975-76 197 280 70 
a. Base: 1968-69 ·100 
Source: Economic Survey, Govl. of India 
. 
continuing link 'With the pound with no let up in the downward pressure on the 
pound in foreign exchange markets, might have been considered an 
aggravating factor in this regard. That the moderation of the effect of imported 
inflati(ln 'Was a consideration behind the adoption (If the basket peg is implied in 
the Annual Report of the Reserve Bank of India, 197)-76, which stated: 
"The effect of this change (from the sterling peg to the basket peg) 
has been to stabilize the value of the Indian rupee vis-a-,·is 
currencies other than sterling and to increase the purchasing 
power of the rupee in terms of sterling. This has c(lntributed to 
some extent to the stabilization (If prices, by preventing an 
increase in the prices of imported c(lmmodities and sen·ices.H (p, 1) 
There .... ere suggestions within the country during the sterling peg that the 
.rupee should be floated for some time to find its own value. (See Taneja. 1976. 
pp.204-S and pp,428-9). The floating of the nJpee 'Was particula.r1y adv(lcated as 
a possible solution to the problem of black markets in foreign exchange which 
had reached high proportions since the beginning of the 1960s (Nandi, 1985). 
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FI)r example. B.R. Shenoy in October 1973 wanted a unification of the official and 
black markets for foreign exchange in India through an initial floating of the 
rupee. In July 1974. I.G. Patel recommended a controlled float I>f the rupee as 
necessary to make the rupee respond to the needs of the economy and also to 
develop expertise within the Reserve Bank and commercial banks to Opef'clte 
within a system of flexible exchange rates that had come to prevail in the 
international markets. 
However, these ideas were, in fact. premature for a country like India 
~'ithout the minimum institutional back-up necessary for a reasonably 
satisfactory operation of a floating exchange rate system. As made clear in last 
chapter, floating presupposes the existence of a ~·eU-knit domestic financial 
market. which is also integrated with international financial markets ~·ith large 
freedom of movement of capital flows externally. Free capital mobilitr in turn 
implies the virtual absence of any trade and exchange controls. India at this 
stage of her development could hardly afft>rd the scrapping of aU controls I>n 
trade and capital flows. This ~·as the basis on ~rhich the government. rejected 
the proposal of a floating exchange rate system for In<lia (Taneja. op. cit. p.2(8). 
There 'Were also a number of developments at the international level which 
could have partIy influenced India's decision for a switch to a basket system in 
September J975. From early 1973. developing countries were graduaUy shjfting 
from single currency pegs to multi-currency pegs. In March 1973. Malta 
formally announced that the value (,f her currency would be determined by a 
basket (,f currencies and thereby became the first country to ad(Jpt such a 
policy (Takagi. 1988). In May 1973, Morocco moved out of fixed parity ~'ith the 
French franc to an own-currency basket peg. Cyprus announced a basket peg 
in July 1973. Malawi adopted a t",·o-currency basket peg in November 1973 b}" 
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abandoning its sterling peg. Algeria shifted from a Frenc franc peg to II multi-
currency peg in January 197-4.. So also Mauritania in the same month. In 
September 1974, Australia, a. devel')ped country. shifted out of a dl)llar peg to a. 
basket peg. Another major development was the decision taken in IMf to 
introduce a basket valuation for the SDR. the internationally created reserve 
asset. from July 1974. This attracted countries like Burma (January 197), Iran 
(February 1975). Jordan (February 1975>. Saudi Arabia. (March 1975). and Qatar 
(March 1975) to switch over to an SDR peg. By the middle of 1975. there were at. 
least nine developing countries following an currency basket peg and another 
seven on an SDR l'eg.39 
Another development which is significant in relation to the Indian decisil)n 
to shift out of the sterling peg ,'as the expiry of India's foreign exchange 
guarantee agreement with Britain a mention of which was made earlier. We 
saw that effective September 1%8. in order to avert further the heavy 
liquidation of sterling balances which followed the sterling devaluation in 
November 1967. Britain entered into agreements with some sterling area 
countries including India which provided a dl)Uar value guarantee by the lJ.K. 
for t.he major portion of the sterling balances with these countries in return for 
maintaining a· minimum of these balances wi.th them. However. in January 
1974. on account of the instability of the dollar itself. these guarantees were 
converted in terms of a basket of major currencies including the dl)Uar. By 
Decembr 197-4.. the agreement with India. expired and. therefore. the sterling 
balances were subject to fluctuations in the value of the pound which was still 
weak in the market. This prompted India to accelerate the diversificatil)n of 
foreign exchange reserves away from sterling from early 1975 which 
culminated in the snapping of the rupee's tie with sterling on September Z5. 
1975. 
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4.12 M(lve to a More Flexible System 
Initially. the Indian basket system had a band of 4.5 per cent~ ie.,2.2'j per 
cent margin above and below the value of the basket. Since Januarr 30. 1979 
the band has been widened to 10 per cent. i.e./5 per cent above and belov the 
basket value. The earlier relatively narrover margins were a hangl)ver from 
the temporary exchange rate regime that was established by the IMF after the 
Smithsonian agreement in December 1971. However. with the Second 
Amendment of the Articles of the IMF vhich came into effect from April 1978. 
the members were aIJowed freedom to choose any exchange rate regime (If their 
choice except the one which is Hnked to gold. This freedom was \ItiH2.ed by India 
in opting for a broader band for the basket system. This revision (If the margin 
and also the confidentiality with which it is operated might have been 
instnJmentaJ in the reclassification by the IMF of the Indian exchange rate 
arrangement as a managed floating system from 1979 onwards instead (If a Jlure 
basket system as it was designated \IntH then.40 
The broadening of the basket margins which took place in earh' 1979. is a 
quite significant event in the evolution of the Indian exchange rute regime. 
Through this change the authorities ~'ere enhancing their manoeverubility in 
order to employ the exchange rate as an instrument for achieving alternative 
objectives including the balance of payments adjustment ~'ithout in any ,ray 
violating the basic basket rule. Although this change was claimed to have been 
necessitated by larger fluctuatit>ns in international currency markets. the fact 
that this adversity could be converted into an advantage was not mL~d b}' the 
Indian authorities. This point is substantiated by the Reserve Bank statement: 
"Ef~ect~ve JaD:uary 3? 1979. however. the. exchange rate is being 
mamtamed WIth a vlder band. not exceedmg ~ per cent. on either 
side. the change being found necessary in the light I)f the 
developments in the currency markets "hich had been charuder-
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, d b lar e and erratic fluctuations. The change, it. was felt. ,·Quid 
ae ,y gr' of a more appropriate exchange rate for the rupee ~:~i~i~:arlt~~gg a measure of stability to that rate." (RBI. 1983, p,Z87) 
The words "fidng a. more appropriate exchange rate for the rupee" imply 
objectives other than stability. This aspect will be explored further in the nelt 
chapter. 
i.t3 Conclusion 
We have traced the long history of India's exchange rate regime fl't)m the 
early 19th c:enturywhich could thro" much light on the present exchange rate 
regime. An important point emerging from this historical survey is that the 
rupee had generally been pegged to a major currency and independent floating 
had never been practiced in India. This is typical of a.less developed country. 
Another major point is that the present exchange rate regime bears the 
imprint of the long and intimate relationship which India had with Britain 
since the turn of the last century. However. there is a marked difference in the 
impact of this historic relationship on India's exchange rate regime as between 
. 
the pre-1931 and post-1931 periods. Before 1931. the sterling link for the rupee 
had been quite unstable mainly because of the attachment of the rupee with 
silver. In contrast, from 1931 onwards the rupee-sterling link has been most. 
stable. The formation of the sterling area. with the onset. of World War 11 
chara.cterized by tight exchange control around the area, reinforced India.'s 
exchange rate regime based on fixity of the rupee-sterling rate. 
The firm relationship between the pound and the rupee established since 
the 1930s survived during the post-war Bretton Woods par value system ""hieh 
saw only two adjustments of the rupee-sterling rate: the first one in June 1%6 
when the rupee was devalued against aU currencies and the second in 
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November t%7 when t.he pound itself was devalued. 10. June 1972 ve note 
almost a repetition of the history of 1931; as the pl)und vas floated the rupee 
kept parity with it. This time the fixed link with sterling lasted for three years 
and a quarter before finally yielding place to a basket peg in September 197). 
the India's bask.et. system. however, did not represent a. complete break. with 
sterling as sterling serves several functions in the new system including that of 
the intervention currency. For a detailed examination of this aspect as well as 
others of the Indian basket system we tUrn to the next chapter. 
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footnotes; Chapter i 
1. There is no agreement among economic historians about the exact date 
of the adoption of a full gold standard in the U.K. and according to Harrod 
(1969. pp.15-7) 1821 is the most probable one. De Cecco (1987. p.540). 
however. states that Britain was on a gold standard since the beginning of 
the 18th century and after a suspension during the Napoleonic 'Wars from 
1797. it was resumed in 1819 
2. See De Cecco (1984) pp.39-61 for an account of the spread of the gold 
standard. 
3. The average price of silver in London was 60 5/8d per ounce in 1872 and 
in 1894 it was 28 15/16 d. (Vakil and Muranjan.1927. p.38). 
4. Keynes UM.K .. I. pp.1-2) believed firstly. that the benefit of depreciation 
to exporters was largely at the expense of the rest of the community and 
secondly. that even the export advantage was temporary with the price rise 
triggered off by depreciation.neutralizing it subsequently. 
5 As noted by Harrod (1969. p.22) the meaning of gold exchange standard is 
not at all clear, It appears. however. that the gold exchange standard is 
, 
called so because in that system the local currency is convertible into an 
international currency and the latter convertible into gold and. 
therefore. the former is indirectly convertible into gold. This. therefore. 
resembles the Bretton Woods par value system in which the dolJar 
constituted the international currency legally convertible into gold. 
This has to be distinguished from the sterling standard which emerged 
in 1931 after the formation of the 'sterling bloc', There the local 
currency was convertible into sterling and sterling itself was not 
convertible into gold. 
6. Keynes UM.K .. I. Ch.2) argued that several countries of Europe who were 
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on the Sf) called gold standard at that time kept large balances abmad and 
used gold only as a marginal medium of exchange and. therefore. the 
currency system of these countries differ from the Indian system only 
in degree and not in kind. 
7. The meticulous treatment and praise the Indian gold exchange standard 
received from Keynes in his Indian Currency and Finance UM.K .. J) and 
the close resemblance the Indian system had with the post-war 
Bretton Woods system for which Keynes is a principal architect. made 
Johnson (1978. p.113) to suggest that the former is the precursor of the 
latter. This is. however. contested by Williamson (1983, pp.109- Hl) (In two 
grounds: first. that in the above-mentioned bOOK J~eynes was speating of a 
rational policy for a single small country within the international system 
rather than laying down the framework of the international system and 
second. that in 1942 Keynes denounced the gold exchange ~tanda.rd and 
only concurred to its perpetuation grudgingly. 
8. This was mainly due to the sharp shortfall in sHver production in Mexico 
arising from internal political turmoH there which was unrelated to the 
World War. See Vakil and Muranjan. (lp. cit.. pp.109-10. 
9. Pound was (Iff the gold standard in March 1919. 
10. 2s gold is higher than 2s sterling as sterling floated dl)~·n~·ard against. 
gold after it went off the gold standard. 
11. Keynes' view about. the effect. of exchange rate appreciation on 
exporters is now familiar: it is temporary and is more than offset by the 
benefits of stable prices on exporters and other sections of s.>ciet}r. 
Besides. he argued that India. had a complete or high degree of monopoly 
over some of her most important. exports like jute. cotton. rice and tea. 
(lM.r .. XV. pp.27S-9) 
12. See Harrod (op. cit.. I'P.%-IOO) for a brief but ludd discussion of the 
98 
background of this decision and its later effects on Britain. 
13. The issue of fixing an appropriate exchange rate for the rupee generated 
considerable public controversy during the time with the Indian economists 
and business interests arguing for a l,>,*'er rale of 1s 4d and the government 
jnsjsting on the then existing higher rate of Is 6d. See T(lmHnson (1979) (I.-
an evaluation of this controversy after (Iver 50 years. See also Dnlmmond 
(1981.Ch.2) for a detailed account of events connected with the maintenance 
of the rupee-sterling rate of is 6d during the 1930s. 
H This included not. just the members of the British Common,'ealth 
excluding Canada. but also Scandinavian countries. Ireland. Iceland. 
Egypt. Portugal and Iraq. 
15. Besides the imposition of a general import tariff. a number of protective 
measures were taken by the U.K. including the impositi,)n of quotas on 
foreign imports of food products. Foreign lending was prohibited and 
foreign investment was also brought under official control. 
16. Jain (op. cit., p.38) gives the net contraction of rupee notes alone of Rs 
102.50 crores during 1926-27 to 1930-31. 
17. At. this time the pound was still on the gold standard and. theref'>re, 
rupee's parity with sterling at is 6d meant parity with gold as Vt'ell. 
18. HoVt'ever, the Gold and Sterling Sales Regulation Ordinance, VII. 1931 
under which the exchange c'>ntrol came into operation Vt'as Vt'ithdra,'n 
jn January 31.1932. (Jain. op. cit.. p.54).See also Drummond (1981. Ch.2)' 
19. Durjng the 10-year period ending March 1941. India exported H miJJion 
ounces of gold worth Rs 3750 million. (The Cambridge Economic History of 
Indja. Vol. 2. 1983. Ch. IX. p.773). Keynes (j,M.K., J) recaJJs "]evon's 
description of India as the sink of the precious metals always ready to 
absorb the redundant bulJjon of the West and save Europe from the 
more vjolent disturbances to her price level." (p.70). Please also see 
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Conan (1952, p.76) who gives an estimate of $150 million per annum over 
the years 1932-38 as the value of gold outflow from Indian hoards. 
20. The strongest argument raised in India against the sterling standard was 
the loss of autonomy in following an exchange rate policy that is in tune 
with the economic conditions in India rather than following the pound, 
the movement in which is dictated by the economic conditions in Britain 
alone. Jain (op. cit. ppA4-S4) for the details of various criticisms against 
the sterling peg. 
21. The 'dollar problem' refers to the chronic shortage of gold and 'hard' 
currencies particularly of the U.S. dollars within the sterling area. As noted 
by Day (1954. p.4S>, although the dollar shortage may have existed in the 
sterling area in the 1930s, the first conscious awareness of it came with 
World War II which led to the imposition of rigid exchange conlrl)ls in the 
sterling area as a whole. These controls served the purpose of mobilization 
and conservation of the means of payment outside the sterling area for the 
financing of the war. 
22. The term 'dollar pool' is a misnomer as the pooling was done for not. only 
the dollar (the U.S. and Canada) but also for gold and other foreign 
currencies. See Wright (1954, p.560. This source gives valuable details of 
the working of the dollar pool arrangement during the period. 
23 The IMf was concerned about the continued existence of the sterling 
area as an entity. That came to the surface in 1950 after the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers agreed that each member of the area. 
would restrict imports from dollar area to 75 per cent of the 1948 level; 
the Fund in a common meeting with the GATT and the representatives of 
the sterling area refused to treat the 'dollar problem' as a common 
problem for the sterling area as a whole and reported the situation on a 
country-by-country basis. See IMf History, 1969, Vol. II. pp,338-'U for 
deta.i1s of the controversy. 
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24. As quoted in Conan. op. cit.. pp.J07-S. 
25. Tew (1985) views the devell)pments in the international ml)nehuy s(ene 
during the post-World War 11 years as an evolution from a 
predominantly bilateral phase during 1945-49 to a binary one during 
1950-58 to a final post-1958 phase of a unified system. See lew (op. cit.. 
Chs. 1. 2 and 3). 
26. The currency convertibility established by major European nations in 
December 1958 is also termed 'external', 'non-resident' or 'partial' 
convertibility whereas that established in February 1%1 by these 
nations is termed 'total' convertibility, i,e. both 'external and internal' 
C(lnvertibiHty. See IMf History <1969. VoUI. pp.226-7). As the ~erHng 
accounts of the sterling area countries were treated as 'resident' 
U"c:I~T 
accounts the exchange control regulation of the U,K., they were 
" 
convertible only from February 1%1. 
27. This is mainly due to the huge rise in imports with the launching of 
India's ambitious industrialization programme from the beginning of 
the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61>. 
28. India got freedom from British nl1e on August 15. 1947. 
29. The Government of India (1%6) pamphlet. said. "During the herday of 
t.he national struggle for independence in the early thirties. our 
political leaders and economists rightly blamed the British for filing a 
high rate of Ish. 6d for the Indian rupee rather than the lo\\'er f'clte of 
Ish. 4d. We rightly feared that at the higher rate our industrialisation 
would suffer as our industries would have to face stiffer competition 
from British products. This isequaUy true t(lday." (p. 8). 
30. The role (If external pressure for the devaluation is also cJear from the 
very same gl)vernment pamphlet mentioned above "l'hich said. "There 
was a widespread belief among international agencies and among 
101 
international banking and trading community. that the par value of the 
rupee before devaluation was totally unrealistic ..... It alsl) made it almost 
impl)ssible for us to count on further assistance from these international 
agencies." (p. 7). 
31. The 1%7 devaluation of sterling is considered to have given shock not 
only to the sterling system but also to the entire international monetary 
system by shaking the confidence in key currencies as a whole. 
32. It may be noted that the exact composition of the foreign exchange 
reserves are not disclosed by the Reserve Bank to the public. 
33. The figures are computed on the basis of data from various issues of Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletins. statistical sections. It may be noted that. on the 
export side the loss of sterling area. share 1,\'as captured mainly by the USSR. 
Japan and non-UK West European countries. 
tn~ 
34. This is based on studies conducted by A. Reserve Bank of India ""hich 
appeared in different issues of the Bank Bulletins. 
35. The data on invoicing pattern of India's trade are availa.ble onbr from 
1979-80 onwards. In 1979-80, 92 per cent of India's exports to Japan and 
57 per cent of India's imports from Japan were invoiced in U.S. dollars. 
(See RBI Bulletin. 1988. pp.41-2). 
36. B<ltb these interpretations were made earHer by Chawla (1983>. pp.9- J J. 
37. Tbis is based on IMf's Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM) -
weighted effective exchange rate given in International fjnan cial 
Statistics CIFS). 
38. It may be relevant to note that in November 1973, following the generalized 
floating of major currencies the IMF extended the scheme of ''centrdl rdles 
and wider margins", originally established in the context of fixed exchange 
rate regime, with respect to members following a fixed link vdth an 
intervention currency even if that currency itself is floating. See IMf 
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Survey (1976, March 1, p.73). 
39. IMf Survey (1976, February 2, 1'.35). Also see IMf Annual Reports (In 
£Ichange Restrictions 0974, 197) and 1976) f(lr individual ca.-.es. We 
wscussed generaJJy these devel('pments in Chapter 2. 
40. See IMF Annual Report (1980, 1'1'.53-6) for a brief discussion (If this 
definitional change adopted by the IMF. Aghevli (1981), however, 
considered the Indian elchange rate system right from September 197) 
as a managed floating system. The argument is that as long as the basket 
remains undisclosed, it is not clear whether a change in the value (If the 
home currency is due to a change in the value (If the basket currencies 
(Ir due t(l an ad hoc adjustment in the weights (If these currencies in the 
basket. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.f.l Major [vents in India"s [xc:han,e Rate Re,iae 
Yearl Events 
Period 
1818 Silver rupee made the unlimited 
JegaJ tender in South India. 
1835 SHver rupee made the S<IJe un-
limited Jegal tender for the whole 
of British India by the G(lld and 
SHver Coinage Act passed in August 
1872-94 The historic slump in silver price. 
In .response to Herschell Committee 
(1892) recommendation, mints 
dosed for silver 011 private account 
and official gold ratio fixed for the 
rupee at Is 4d in 1893. 
1898 The rupee touches the (lffidaJ rate 
of Is 4d in January. fowler C<lmmiuee 
recommends a gold standard with a 
gold currency. 
1898- India drifts into a gold exchange 
1916 standard with a stable value for the 
nJpee at Is 4d. 
1917 Sharp rise in silver price. 
Bullion value of the rupee over-
takes its face value in August. 
1919-20 Babington Smith Committee (1919) 
recommends relinking the rupee 
with goJd at 2s per rupee. 
Government fails in attempts to 
maintain the high nJpee value. 
J924 Rupee rises to Is 6d in October. 
Remarks 
With this a currency 
reform began in India. 
This marks the 
beginning of a sHver 
standard in India. 
This meant that the 
rupee "Was to hC(;(Jme a 
token coin with its 
face value divorced 
from metalJic yatue. 
GoW exchange 
standard breaks dO'lf'n 
and India. in effect.. 
forced to return to 
silver standard, 
Britain left the gold 
standard in March 
1919. 
With the pound (Iff the 1"Uf'C!C!'s .,a{uct CI 
goJd and beJow par,,...Js 
6d meant a lower Is <fd ! 
gold which incidentally 
was the pre-war parity 
for the rupee. 
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Year/ Events Remarks 
Period 
1926-27 HUton Young Commission (1926) The discretionary 
recommends the gold bullion standard rupee-gold 
and the statutory fixing of Is 6d for the convntihility r(.'du(;(.'~ 
rupee. Government implements the the system to ft gold 
proposals in March 1927 with passin g of exchange standard. 
the Currency Bill but the provision (If 
convertibility of rupee into gold made 
optional for government. 
1931 Britain departs from gold standard in This inaugurates a 
September. Rupee formally tied to sterling standard for 
sterling at the prevailing rate of Is 6d. the rupee. 
1935 The Reserve Bank of India set up in April 
with the Reserve Bank of India Act. The 
managemen t of the exchan ge value of 
rupee passes on to the Bank from the 
government. 
1939 Exchange control introduced in India 
under the Defence of India Rules in 
September as a part of the sterlin g area 
arrangement. 
1946 India intimates a par value for the rupee 
to the IMF in December but keeps the 
parity with sterling unchanged at 
ls 6d. i.e. £1 -Rs 13.33. 
1947 Exchange control placed on the 
statute through the foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act in March. India gets 
independence from the nrjtj~h nde on 
August 15. 
19,(9 Sterling devalued from $HJ3 to $2.80 (30.5 Scandinavian 
per cent) in September. The rupee- countries and every 
sterling rate remains intact at £1· sterling area 
Rs.13.33. countries except 
Pakistan devalued 
with sterling. 
1961 YuH current account convertibility Sterling area relation 
restored to sterlin g in February. The bec(lmes voluntary 
doJlar pool arrangement within the and informaL 
sterling area dismantled. 
Year! 
Period 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1971 
1972 
Events 
Rupee declined by 36.5 per cent on 
June 6; rupee-sterling parity cbanges 
to £1 .. Rs 21. 
Pound devalued in November fr(lm 
$2.80 to S2.10 (t 4.3 per cent); nJpee-
sterling parity changes to £J • Rs. 18. 
Britain enters into agreement with 
India to restrict the drawing down of 
sterling reserves from September. 
Rupee pegged to t~U.S. dolJar on August 
22. Rupee re-pegged to sterling on 
December 19 at the central rate of 
£1 ., 18.9677. 
Pound floated on June 23: India maintains 
the parity with sterling unchanged. 
197:> India adopts a basket peg on September 
25 with a provision for !.Z.25 per cent 
margins. Pound, however, continues as 
the intervention currency. 
1979 The margins for maintaining the basket-
determined value of n.pee broadened to 
!.5 per centon January 30. 
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Remarks 
This, t<1 some extent, 
revives tbe formal 
nature of the sterling 
area arrangement. 
During the short speJl 
of doJJar peg, sterling 
continued to be the 
currency (If 
intervention. 
This repeats the event 
(If 1931 wben the 
pound floated "'ith the 
departure fr(lm g(lld 
standard by Britain. 
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Chapter 5 
The Indian Basket System. 
5.1 Introduction 
The Indian basket system merits attention not merely as a model of the new 
and increasingly popular exchange rate regime of developing countries but 
much more due to the specific features it has ... and particularly those ,,-hich it 
a.cquired during the past fourteen years of its operation. Althl)Ugh exchange 
C'dte stability. defined in terms of the weighted average of the array of major 
bilateral exchange rates. has been at the heart of the decision to opt for a basket 
system. it appears that other objectives began to emerge subsequently that 
necessitated alteration of strategies in the operation of the system. 
Before examining the details of the Indian exchange rate system it "'ould be 
useful to describe the system very briefly. The currency basket around which 
the Indian exchange rate system opeC'dtes, is valued in sterling and also. any 
exchange rate adjustment made by the authorities in response to changes in the 
value of the basket is announced in terms of the rupee-sterling rate. Ho,,'ever. 
as referred to in the last chapter. the composition of the basket as well as the 
details of the operation of the system are confidential. As a result. we cannot 
really observe from the day-to-day changes in the rupee-sterling rate whether 
adjustments have been carried (Iutfor the purpose of exchange rate stabHity (Ir 
any other alternative objective. In short. the Indian exchange rate regime is 
highly discretionary in nature. 
This chapter is divided mainly into two parts. In the first part. ,,'e attempt to 
illustrate the mechanics of the Indian basket system. In the second part. we 
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examine the different features of the system in more detail. Here we ellS!) make 
dear why the Indian exchange rate system should more appropriately be called 
a 'discretionary crawling basket peg'. 
5.2 Mechanics of Indian Basket System 
The confidentiality of the Indian basket system constrains tl) a great. extent. a 
proper understanding and assessment of the system. In the absence of 
sufficient official information, we mainly rely on Varghese (19848., 1986), f.)r 
illustrating the details of the Indian basket mechanism. Besides, it. is known 
from unpublished official sources, mainly through discussions with the 
Reserve Bank of India officials, that the Indian basket system resembles the SDR 
valuation, with the major difference thal, in the Indian basket system the 
pound sterling takes the role of the dollar in the SDR valuation as the unit of 
a.ccount. 
By definition, a currency basket consists of specified amounts of selected 
currencies summed up together after being reduced into a· common measure, 
the numeraire. The units of each selected currency which form part. in the 
basket, which are also called the currency components of the basket, are 
determined on the basis of the relative weight assigned to that currency in the 
basket. for the purpose of illustration, we assume that the selected c.urrencies 
of the Indian basket peg which are also termed the basket. currencies are four, 
namely, the U.s. dollar, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling and the Deutsche 
mark. Essentially, four steps are involved in the construction of the Indian 
basket which are listed below: 
(1) selection of currencies for inclusion in the basket; 
(2) allocation of relative weights to the chosen currencies; 
(3) computation of the exchange rates of the basket currencies 
against the numeraire, the pound, on the day of the basket 
link; and 
(.f..l working out of the currency components in the basket. by 
multiplying the exchange rates as obtained at (3) with 
their respective weights obtained at (2). 
These steps are illustrated in Table 5.1. 
Table '.1 
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Illustration of the Construction of the Indian Bask.et SJstea Oil 
the Dale of the Buket Link. Septcaber 25. 1'75a 
Currency 
1 
U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
Deutsche mark. 
Total 
Weightb 
z 
0.50 
0.25 
0.15 
0.10 
1.00 
Exchange 
rate per £1 
3 
2.05 
620 
1.00 
5.45 
Currency 
components 
as on 25.9.75 
(J 12' 
.. 
I,(J25 
155 
0.150 
0.540 
a. Al1 numbers in the table are fictitious used only for the purpose (If 
illustration 
b. Weights are also purely imaginary. As explained in the text., the official 
information is insufficient to work out the actual '1"eights. 
It may be noted that on the first day of the basket-peg, the Re~rve Bank 
actually adjusted the middle rate l of the rupee against sterling arbitrarily 
upwards tl) £1 - Rs 18.308.f. from £1 - Rs 18.60, i.e. by 1.6 per cent. The reaSl)n 
for this revaluation of the rupee might be tl) offset, to some extent, the sharp 
depreciation of the rupee suffered against. the non-sterling currencies as 
109 
sterling had been depredating against other major currencies after it "as 
floated in June 1972. and also as a signal of a reversal of trends in rupee-
sterling rate. After having filed the value of the rupee against the pound at Rs. 
18.3084 on the day of the basket link. the valuation of the rupee on any 
subsequent day requires the knowledge of exchange rates of the basket 
currencies against the pound on that day. (The Reserve Bank uses the london 
market quotations of the previous day for the calculation of the basket value of 
the rupee. This is because of the time zone difference bet,'een India and 
London; london market is closed when Indian market just opens for business 
and the former opens only in the afternol)n of the Indian time). The calculation 
of the new value of the basket on any day after the introduction of the basket 
peg is illustrated in Table 5.2. 
In Table 5.2 we assumed that the U.S. dollar depreciated by 5 per cent. 
Japanese yen and Deutsche mark appreciated by 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent 
respectively. all against the pound in comparison with the day of the rupee's 
basket link. (See the original exchange rates in Table 5.0. In column (4), the 
figures against each currency are derived by dividing the original units of that 
currency in the basket (column 3) by the nev.' exchange rate of that currency 
per pound (column 2). The results indicate the new percentage contribution I)f 
each currency to the basket value as that currency's exchange rate changed. 
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Table '.2 
Illustration of Daily Basket Valualion of Rupee 
Currency 
(I) 
U.S. dollar 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
Deutsche mark 
Exchange 
rate per £1 
(2) 
Z.t:~79 
'39.13 
1.000 
'.0698 
Currency 
components 
as on Z5.9.75a. 
()) 
1.02' 
1'~ 
0.1'0 
0.'4' 
Value of basket .. £1.02 
a. As worked out in Table 5.1 
New value 
of basket in 
terms I>C £ (3/Z) 
(4) 
0.47}O 
0.Z87} 
0.1:500 
0.10n 
Total 1.0200 
The summation of all such contributions by each currency yields 1.02 as against 
1 on the day of the basket peg. This means that the value of the basket has 
improved by 2 per cent in terms of the pound and this has come about as a result 
of the changes in exchange rates of the different currencies in the basket 
against the pound. 
An important thing that has to be noted in the above computatil)n of the 
value of the basket is that the change in the value of the basket. i.e .• 2 per cent. 
is the average of the changes in the exchange rates of all basket currencies 
against sterling. each one weighted according to the original basket ,'eights. 
This is brought out in Table 5.3 with the help of index numbers. 
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Table 5.3 Computation of the Value of Indian Basket via Index 
Number Method 
Currency Original New exchange Weighta Value (If 
exchange rate rate bruoket (3xi) 
(1) (2) (3) (i) t» 
U.S. dollar 100 95 0.50 47.50 
Japanese yen 100 115 0.25 28.75 
Pound sterling 100 100 0.15 15.00 
Deutsche mark 100 107.5 0.10 10.75 
TCltal 102.00 
a. As in Table 5.1 
As shown in Table 5.3. we start with a base of 100 and find out the change in 
the value of the basket by computing the weighted average (arithmetic) (If the 
indices of the various exchange rates against the pound. Repeating the earHer 
example, we assume that the doIJar depreciated by 5 per cent, yen and D.M. 
appreciated by 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively, each one against. the 
pound. The total in column (5) of the tabJe gives the new basket value as J02 
which is exactly equal to that obtained in Table 5.2. 
Now. if the authorities go by a rigid basket peg. then the value of the rupee 
would have to be adjusted upwards against the intervention currency. sterling. 
by 2 per cent in direct response to the change in the value of the basket. 
However. the Indian system is not a rigid basket peg. It is operated flexibly by 
the discretionary use of the margins of 2.25 per cent on either side of the actual 
value of the currency basket up to January 29. 1979. and plus and minus 5 per 
cent since then. That can imply. first of all. that since the movement in the 
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basket value in our example is wit.hin these margins, the authorities need not. 
adjust t.he value of the rupee at. all. In not making the adjustment. the 
authorities would be permitting the non-sterling bilateral rates of the rupee to 
\ 
change pari passu with the changes in exchange rates of non-sterling 
currencies against sterling in foreign exchange markets through the proces:s 
of international arbitrage. Secondly, it is to be noted that. if the athorities, on 
the other hand. decide to adjust the rupee-sterling rate within the margins, 
they still have the option in adjusting to the full extent of the change in the 
observed basket value or only adjusting partially. That is. in our example, 
instead of appreciating the rupee against the pound by the full 2 per cent. it can 
be altered by less than 2 per cent. Thirdly. it can also be envisaged that. the 
authorities depreciate the rupee. in this case up to a maximum of 3 per cent. 
against sterling and could still be within the it)wer margin of -5 per cent of the 
basket parity. 
Continuing with our example, let us suppose that. the Bank adjusts the rupee 
value to the full extent of the change in the value of the basket by announcing 
a 2 per cent appreciation of the rupee against. sterling. i.e., from £1 ~ Rs. 
IS.30M to £1· Rs.17.9«9«. It should be understood that when this change 
is announced. then the rupee instantly appreciates at the same rate of 2 per 
cent from the existing market rates against all currencies. not just. against 
sterling. through the application of cross rates between sterling and other 
currencies. 
At. this stage. it ,'ould be worthwhile to examine the proposition that the 
operation of a· rigid basket peg would lead to stabilization of the effective 
exchange rate. Table 5.« allows us to view the sequence in an index form. When 
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Table ).4 
Illustration of a Ri&id Basket System 
Name of Weight Base Market Rupee 
ru pee I"clte rupee rate rupee rate indexarter 
index index adjustment 
(1) (2) (3) (,0 (5) 
DolJar / ru pee .50 100.00 105.00 107.10 
Yen/rupee .25 100.00 85.00 86.70 
Sterlin g/ ru pee .IS 100.00 100.00 102.00 
D.M/rupee .10 100.00 92.50 94.35 
Effective exchange 
rate indexa 100.00 98.00 99.% 
a. Defined in terms of basket currencies 
the elchange rates of basket currencies change against sterling in the 
international market. it is automatically reflected in rupee rates; elcept the 
sterling-rupee rate, aU other rupee rates change by the same extent by which 
sterling changed against those currencies. In the present example, dollar 
depreciated by 5 per cent, yen appreciated by 15 per cent and Deutsche mark 
appreciated by 7.5 per cent, all against sterling. Therefore, as seen fr(lm Table 
5.4, column (4), the rupee appreciates by 5 per cent against the doJJar, 
depreciates by 15 per cent against the yen and depreciates by 7.5 per cent 
against the Deutsche mark. The weighted average of these rupee rates with 
weights equal to the original basket weights as in column (2) indicates a decHne 
of the effective exchange rate of the rupee by 2 per cent. to 98. This 
corresponds to the increase in the value of the currency basket which was 
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computed as Z per cent in Table 5.3. At the next. stage, if the authorities follow 
the rigid basket rule, the rupee will be appreciated by Z per tent against 
sterling which will be followed in the mark.et by the appreciation of the rupee 
by the same extent against all other currencies in the bask.et. This is shown in 
column (5) of the Table 5.4 which yield a weighted average exchange rate of 
99.96 which is almost equal to the base rate. This is how the rigid application of 
the basket rule results in the stabilization of the effective exchange mte of the 
domestic currency in terms of the basket currencies. 
The next. step in the analysis of the working of the Indian basket system is to 
examine hl)w a subsequent value of the basket is determined once an adjustment. 
of the rupee-sterling rate is made. This part is crucial to a proper 
understanding of the system and. unfortunately. this has not been explored by 
earlier ,'riters. For illustration, let us assume that exchange rates of basket 
currencies moved against the pound in a similar way as before the previous 
adjustment, i.e"the dollar depreciated again against the pound by 5 per cent, the 
yen and the D.M. appreciated by 15 per cent and 7.5 respectively. The resulting 
change in the basket value is calculated as in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 
Illustration of a further Chance in Daily Basket Valuation of Rupee 
Currency Exchan ge rate New currency New basket 
per £1 components a value in terms 
(If £ (312) 
(1) (Z) (3) H) 
. U.S. dollar 2.2715 1.0790 0.47)0 
Japanese yen 468.81 134.78 0.287) 
Pound sterling 1.000 0.15 0.1500 
Deutsche mark 4.7161 0.5070 0.107) 
Total 1.0200 
Value of basket .. £1.02 
a. The new currency components are derived by multiplying the earlier 
exchange rates given in Table 5.2 by tbeir respective weights in the 
basket shown in Table 5.l. 
The most. important thing to note in Table '.5 is that the currency 
components are different from that at the start. of the basket peg. As indicated 
at the footnote of the table, they are obtained by multiplying those exchange 
rates that prevailed at the time of the previous adjustment. "ith the I)riginal 
currency weights. It is also important to see the pattern of change in the 
currency components: depreciating currency enlarged its units and 
appreCiating currencies cont.racled their units, both exactly in proportion to 
the corresponding depreciation and appreciation. This process, in effect. 
restores the original relative weights of each currency in the basket .. To put it 
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differently, in the Indian basket. system, each of the currency components 
undergoes changes in such a way as to re-establish the Driginal weight. allotted 
to the respective currency at the start of the basket peg. 
The above-mentioned characteristic of the Indian basket mechanism makes 
it different from the SDR basket valuation, although the former resembles the 
lalter in ot.her respects. The basket-valuation of the SDR is based on what. is 
called the "standard basket" which is defined by fixed amounts of five majl)r 
currencies 06 currencies before January 1981) whose relative ,,-eights 
change2 daily as a result of changes in exchange rates. The Indian basket 
valuation of the rupee, it appears, is based on the "adjustable basket" v{hich is 
defined in terms of certain major currencies whose amounts vary as a result of 
changes in daily exchange rates but whose relative weights in determining the 
changes in the value of the basket is kept. intatt all along. It is interesting to 
note that the "adjustable basket" method was one of the alternatives to the 
"standard basket"' which was considered by the IMf for valuation of the SDR 
before finally choosing the latter (see Polak. 1974.1'1'. 12-16). 
5.3 Main Features of Indian Basket System 
Br<.adJy we can distin guish between three main characteristics (If the 
Indian basket system. They are: 
(j) the significant role given to sterling which may be called 
the sterling legacy of the system; 
Hi) most of the details of the system are undisclosed to the public; and 
(Hi) the large flexibility of operation. 
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These three features are examined below, one by one. 
(j) Sterling Legacy: 
The basket system which replaced the historic sterling peg still retains some 
of the vestiges of the past sterling link. We have occasion to refer to the highly 
diminished role of sterling in the world3, in general, and in India, in 
particular. According to the official statistics on invoicing (If India's total 
merchandise trade, sterling constituted only about 10 per cent during 1979-80 to 
1981-82 and the share has declined since then,4 On the (lther hand, the share 
of the dollar in the currency invoicing of India's total merchandise trade 
during the same period was about 57 per cent and has increased since then,' In 
spite (If the above realities, sterling occupies a prominent place in the new 
exchange rate regime (If India. 
Joshi and Little (1987, p. 377) distinguish between three different. functions 
of a foreign currency in the elchange rale regime of a· country: (1) as the 
intervention currency, i.e. the currency the central bank normally buys and 
sells, (2) as the designation currency, i.e. the currency in terms of which the 
value of the domestic currency is announced, and (3) as the peg currency, i.e. 
t.he currency to which the value of the domestic currency is filed with a certain 
margin. In the context of a basket peg there is no single peg currency but. a. 
currency composite to which the domestic currency is tied. That in turn 
necessitates a· numeraire in terms of which the currency composite is valued. 
Let. us call the foreign currency which is employed as the unit of account of the 
basket peg, the valuation currency. In the contelt of the Indian exchange rate 
regime, sterling serves as the currency of intervention, designation and also as 
the currency of valuation. 
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The role of sterling as the intervention currency needs to be vie'A'ed in the 
background of exchange control practiced in India. In devell)ped countries 
which generally follow a floating exchange rate system characterized by the 
absence of exchange control regulations, the monetary authorities intervene in 
the foreign exchange market in order to smooth out exchange rate 
fluctuatiions and sometimes to influence the trends in exchange rate. But in 
India the supply and demand in the exchange market are regulated through 
controls on trade and capital transactions and, the intervention of the central 
bank is directed towards meeting the already controlled net demand in the 
market. Besides, it is normally expected that the banks meet their exchange 
needs through the inter-bank market and also, to SQme extent, through 
transactions with banks abroad and approach the central bank only liS the Last 
resort (Rangarajan, 1985). ",. - . __ 
.' "-'~ 
The Reserve Bank of India. makes spot purchases from the banks nl)t only 
sterling but also the U.S. dollar (since October 1972), the Deutsche mark (since 
March 197-() and also the Japanese yen (since end-May 197-(). The Bank also 
in o.,.clu to 'M~ .. t ~!! ,~ .. idll'l ~ ..... ..d "'" pm!!"" .~c't""!Jt.. 
buys these four currencies for forward delivery as 'A'ell. HO'A'ever, until very 
"-
recently. sterling has been the only currency which the Bank sells and that tOI) 
b .6 only on a ~'p(lt asJ:! . 
Even if the Reserve Bank meets only the highly regulated residual demand 
in the exchange market, that itself is too large to be satisfactorily handled by 
the sale of sterling alone. Sterling's significance as an invoicing currency for 
India's merchandise imports is even less tha.n for the total trade which 'A'as 
described above; it accounted for only 8.8 per cent of the import invoicing 
during 1979-80 to 1981-82 as against 6,( per cent by the dollar. The practice of 
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selling to the banks only slerling, firstly necessitated the large h,)ldings of 
foreign exchange by the Bank in a currency not justified by the pattern of the 
country's external transactions. Secondly, fl)r the banks it. invl)lved 
unnecessary additional transaction costs in first. buying sterling from the Bank 
and later converting them into dl)Uars mainly in international markets for 
meeting the dollar requirements. Therefore, the continued sales of sterling 
alone by the Bank was an anomaly. This was rectified, however. in February 
1987 by announcing the decision to sell also the U.S. dollar. This is a major step 
in the right direction and this reform is expected to reduce significantly the 
role of sterling as an intervention currency in the years to come. 
As regards the functions of designation and valuation. it. may be stated that. 
the decision on whether to retain sterling or to make a switch t.) the dollar 
depends mainly on two (I)Qsiderations: first.. of the tTt'!) cUfl'eQcies, "'hidl. one is 
more stable? and. second. which currency is more important. for India's 
external transactions? As regards the first., the choice is difficult in the light. of 
the experience in t.he past as can be seen from Table 5.6. The stability 
performance of both sterling and the dollar is almost. the same during 1979-85 
in relation to t.he SDR. With regard to the second question, there is no doubt. that. 
the dollar is much more important than sterling for India's transactions. 
Va.rghese (1979) adds anot.her consideration here which arises from the dl)llar's 
pre-eminent international po~jtion M the vehicle currency7, namely, that the 
dolJar rates are the direct quotations in international markets and all (Ither 
rates including the sterling rates even in London8 are derived from the dollar 
quotations and, therefore, contain distortions due to conver~ion costs. After 
having recognized the dolJar as a currency of intervention, there appears to be 
JlO problem in recognizing it also as the currency (If designation and valuation 
in the Indian exchange rate regime. 
Table 5.6 
Stability of Starlin& and Dollar in tar.s of SDR (J979-15)a 
Pound sterling 
. U.s. doJlar 
Coefficient. 
. of Variation 
0.10 
0.13 
Annual Average 
Percentage Change 
-2.66 
2.2(, 
8.. Based on monthly average of observations 
SI)urce: [xtracted from l.MJ.H987, p. 5,0 
(ii) Confidentiality: 
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The confidentiality of the Indian basket peg is at two levels: first. with 
regard to the composition of the basket. and second, with regard to the operation 
of the margins of the basket. The government and the Reserve Bank have not 
. , 
divulged to the public the currencies that constitute the Indian basket. 
Although official pronouncement has it that the Indian basket s}'stem is based 
proVIdeS 
on a selected number of currencies of India's trading partners, it. neither 
'" 
. the number of currencies in the basket nor the C'ut-I)rr pl)int 
regarding trade share to work out that number. 
It is claimed officially that a disclosure of the c')mpl)sitil)n I)f the currency 
basket would encourage speculation in foreign exchange markets (RIll. 1983. p. 
287). If the composition of basket is known, the market agents can prediclthe 
future changes in various bilateral rupee rates and m~ke speculative pJ"(lfits. 
This is due to the possible gap between the actual change in the value (If the 
basket and the authorities' announcement of exchange rates in re~p(ln~e to it.9 
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In the meanwhile, f01'eign exchange dealers who are (1)nstantly in t.)u(h ,-ith 
exchange rate movements abroad can earn p')tential profits by either sh')rt.-
selling or shl)rt-buying. Even though exchange control regulations prohibit 
speculation in foreign exchange markets mainly by insisting that the banks 
maintain square or near square positions in each foreign currency at the end 
of ea.cb day, the secrecy surrounding the basket mechanism would reduce the 
incentive to violate the exchange control regulation on speculation by making 
the future value of the rupee rates unpredictable. This fear of speculati.)n 
on the part of authorities could also be one of the reasons why the Indian 
government did not find favour with an SDR peg whatever be its other 
. 10 
merds. 
The confidentiality attached tI) the margins of thelndian basket system is nl)t 
relating to the extent of the margin (that is very "WeU known), it is regarding 
the mechanics of operation of the margin, ie., it is not generaUy 1n(l"Wn what 
principles are followed in the operation of the margins provided in the basket 
peg. Particularly since the margins' are "ide, the authorities can eJercise 
con~iderable discretion in their operation. It is n(It di~cJ(lsed how enctly the 
auth(Irities make use of their discretion in this regard. 
One reason for the reluctance of the authorities to divuJge the nature of 
management of the basket margins could be again to defeat speCUlation (In the 
future value of the rupee. We saw earlier that the very intention of not 
disclosing the composition of the Indian basket was to discClurage ~pecuJati(ln. 
However, it is quite possible that the foreign elchan'ge operators c~· still 
e~mate the 'currency c~mposition of the basket by closely watching the 
movements in various bHateraJ rates (If the domestic currency f(lr some period 
of time. The operation of the margins in a highly fJelibl~ and unpredictable 
fashion by the authorities can prevent this fr(Im happening by making the 
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functional relationship between the domestic currency and others somev(hat 
imprecise (Takagi, 1988. pp. 27)-6). 
The confidentiality property is not unique to the Indian system. As noted by 
Takagi (op. cit .. p. 276) most country-specific baskets of developing (.I)untries 
are undisclosed to the public. However. the more distinguishing feature of the 
Indian system stems from the large margins it provides for and alsl) the ,"ay 
those margins are used in practice by the authorities. This is discussed in more 
detail belov. 
(iii) Flexibility: 
It was pointed out in the last chapter that the value of the rupee was initially 
maintained within a margin of 2.25 per cent on either side of the basket.-
determined parity and these margins were widened since end-January 1979 to 
!. 5 per cent. The presence of wide margins and the manner in "i'hich these 
margins are operated both contribute to the flexibility of the exchange rate 
system .. 
. It is generally expected that the larger the margins provided in the 
maintenance of the parity. the larger the exchange rate instability "i"ill be with 
respect to the basket of currencies. However. one needs to take intI) account t,,"O 
other important considerations before commenting on the impact of margins on 
exchange rate stability: firstly. the frequency with which the rupee-sterling 
rate adjustments are made in response to changes in the value of the basket and 
secondly, the extent to which the adjustment of the sterling-rupee rate is done 
with respect to a given change in the value of the basket. For example. even if 
there are large margins. if the rupee-sterling rate is continuously adjusted and 
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that too to the full extent of the changes in the value of the basket, that could 
provide more stability than in the case with smaller margins but infrequent. 
rupee-sterling adjustments that are not related to the extent of actual basket 
value changes. 
Table ~.7 gives the picture of the frequency and average magnitude of 
rupee-sterling rate changes since the inception of the basket peg in September 
1975. The table brings out a. clear shift in the strategy of management of the 
basket system. That is, the first two years or so of the basket peg have been 
managed through fewer rupee-sterling adjustments with the average rate of 
adjustment being larger compared to the rest of the period from 1978, 'o\'hen the 
ma.nagement involved larger and larger number of adjustments vtith the 
aver~ge rate of adjustment becomin g quite smaUer11, 
It is' of genuine interest to know what has been the intention (If the 
authorities. for the c.\bove-mentioned shift in the strategr of exchange l'at~ 
management. Basically, a change in the value of the rupee-sterling ("die can be 
motivated by the authorities' desire either (a) to stabilize the value (If the rupee 
against the basket. or (b) to change the value of the peg against the basket. A 
change in the value of the rupee against the basket can be made b}~ the 
authorities either to the full extent of the prescribed margins or "'ithin them. 
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Table '.7 
Rupee-Sterlilll Rate Adjust.ellls sillce September 25. 1975 
Year Number (If changes Avera~e ~ftnil\lde . 
(If change per cent) 
19n 1 0.99 
1976 8 3.07 
19n 1 3.49 
1978 7 1.74 
1979 13 lA8 
1980 34 0.62 
1981 71 0.98 
1982 94 0.52 
1983 125 OS) 
1984 142 0.52 
1985 157 0.67 
1986 157 0.49 
1987 137 0.46 
a. Regardless of sign 
Source: Computed from raw data oC Reserve Bank oC India middle rates 
(averages oC buying and selling rates) available in Reserve Bank of 
India Bulletin, various issues. 
. In Cact, a constant rupee-sterling rate can also be interpreted in a similar 
. . 
manner, i.e., it may either represent (i) a no change in the value of the basket 
and, t.bereCore, is associated with the stabilization purpose, or. (ii) a chllnge in 
the value of the rupee against the basket that occurred in the market The 
change in the value of the rupee against the basket could be either tl) the full 
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extent of the basket margins or only to a partial eltent of the margins. 
In order to assess .... hether the rupee-sterHng adjustments by the authorities 
were intended for the purpose of elchange rate stabilization or to bring about a 
change in the value of the peg, ho .... ever, requires the kno .... ledge (If 'Whal 
constitutes the actual official currency basket. But, as emphasized earHer, 'We do 
not have adequate information about the official basket. Although (Ine can 
examine the actual ~mpact of the authorities' actions (In the basis (If. an 
appropriately constructed basket, unfortunately one cannot dra'W any st.r(lng 
conclusion about the actual intention Clf the authorities f!'Clm exchange rate 
movement!! based on such a basket unle~s it appr(llimates the official basket. 
TherefClre, .... e attempted to construct a basket .... hich .... e beHeve c(I\lld 
apprCllimate the official basket. We consider four currencies, namely, the U.S. 
d(IJJar, the Japanese' yen, the pound sterling and the Deutsche mark, as 
constituting the official basket. These currencies are chosen, firstly because 
they belong to India's most important non-Socialist trading partners jointJy 
accounting for nearly half of India's trade .... ith all countries other than those 
in the Socialist bloc during the three years prior to the introduction (If the 
basket peg, i.e., 1972-7". Secondly, they are the (Inly convertible currencies 
which the Reserve Bank buys from the banks. Thirdly, it might be possible 
that, for the sak~ of convenience in operation as .... ell as due to the availabiJity 
of direct sterling quotations,the authorities have g(lne in for a narro .... er basket 
than otherwise. These four currencies are combined to form the basket "ith 
weights in proportion to the share (If the corresponding countries in India's 
total trade during 1972-7" (i.e .• U.S. dol1ar .370, Japanese yen .263, Pound sterling 
230, and Deutsche mark .137). 
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Table ~.8 gives rupee's instability measured in terms of the 'I-country trade-
weighted effective exchange rate index (base:19na lOO) for the years 1970 to 
1987, The details of the methodology of construction of alternative measures of 
exchange rate instability are explained in Chapters 6 and 7. fig. l.1 gives the 
graphing of the data from Table ~.8. Both Table '.8 and fig. ,.1 indicate that. 
after a considerable reduction in rupee's instability in the first. tvm years I)f the 
basket peg. i.e .. during 19n-77. rupee's instability worsened substantially and 
remained higher than the level of 1977til11983. Therefore. it seems ('orrect to 
state that. although there has been a more frequent small-step adjustments in 
~ . 
rupee-sterling rates since 1978. they have not resulted in lower instability of 
the rupee's effective exchange rate based on what likely to be the official basket 
but rather the opposite. From this one may condude that the exchange rate 
management since 1978 has been motivated by considerations other than 
stability of the rupee against the basket. 
Tahle 5.1 
Variation of "'-Country Trade-yeishted No.inat EffectiYe 
EIchaDle Rate of Rupee (VNEIlH). 1970-173 
Year VNUJH 
1970 0.2081 
1971 0.3557 
1972 1.0193 
1973 1.2367 
1974 IJJ645 
1975 0.8460 
1976 0.8162 . 
1977 0.9290 
1978 1.6793 
1979 1.2479 
1980 1.1135 
1981 1.0207 
1982 Hl673 
1983 0.9742 
1984 0.8159 
198' 0.6887 
1986 1.0990 
1987 0.7915 
a. Annual averages of monthly moving standard deviations of 
effective exchange rate, computed for each month based on 
observations for the previous 12 months. See Chapter 7 for 
details of construction methodology. 
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FIG. 5.1 VARIATION OF 4-COUNTRY TRADE--
WEIGHTED EFFECT. E)(CHANGE RATE, 70-87 
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Some of the earlier studies (e.g .. Nayak (19n). Chawla (1983). and Varghese 
(1984a)J pointed out that the targeting of the rupee-dollar rate. the most. 
important bilateral rate for India's external transactions, could be an 
objective of the management oC the Indian basket system, i.e .. the rupee-
sterling rate adjustments could have been so carried out as to minimize the 
appreciation or depreciation of the rupee against the U.S. dl)llar. Anl)ther 
aspect of exchange rate management could be the use of the exchange rate as an 
anti-inftationary weapon. i.e., tl) raise the exchange rate with a view b) 
bringing the rate of inflation down. These tWI) aspects of lndill's 8xt:'hange rate 
management will be examined in detail in Chapter 10. 
Another objective of India's exchange rate policy could have been the 
maintenance of the stability of rupee's real effective exchange rate. This 
requires the depreciation or appreciation of rupee's nominal effective 
exchange rate in such a way as to offset the inflation differential between India. 
and abroad. That possibility is demonstrated by Varghese (1986) who f.)und a 
'crawling peg' type of exchange rate management. in India particularly during 
1982-85, i.e .• there had been a. nominal depreciation of the rupee in small steps 
during the period to the extent oC neutralizing the larger inflation in India. 
than that. on the average, in her major trading partners. Yet another 
objective towards which the basket system has been directed 10, might be for 
effecting a gradual real depreciation of the rupee. This is a step further 
beyond the crawling-peg mechanism and involves the gradual nominal 
depreciation of the rupee at a rate Caster than the relative inflation. 
Fig. ~.2 illustrates the above two cases with the help of trends from the 
-(-county trade-weighted nominal and real effective exchange rates CI)r 1975 tl) 
1988. We note that the average real effective exchange rate (R£ER.) remained 
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FIG.5.2 4-COUNTRY TRADE-WEIGHTED NOtv1I-
NAt. AUD REAL EFFECT. EXCHANGE RATE,75-88 
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nearly constant during 1980 to 1985 where as the nominal effective exchange 
rate has been steadily depreciating during the same period. Generally during 
1980-85 (except in 1982), the rate of inflation in India has been higher than the 
average of her major trading partners and the nominal effective eUhange f"clte 
has been depreciated gradually to offset the inflation differential. Particularly 
since 1985 the rale of nominal depreciation has been faster than the inflation 
differential such that there has been a real depreciation of the rupee. 
In short. it appears that there has been a gradual evolution within the very 
same basket peg arrangement in India whereby the system has been tailored to 
achieve alternative objectives in addition to the original one of exchange rate 
stability 
.It is. however, important to know how possibly the Indian authorities could 
have athieved the above objectives without violating the basic basket rule. In 
particular, how was it possible to bring about a gradual depreciatil>n of the 
rupee within the basket system as a strict application of the basket rule should 
result in stability in the effective exchange rate? This is clear from the earlier 
discussion of the Indian basket mechanism. Basically, the larger the margins of 
the basket peg and the higher the flexibility "'ith which those margins are 
operated, the betler the possibility of effecting a gradual depreciation. We may, 
however, point out three ways in which that can be done: 
(D when there is rise in the value of the basket, if the 
authorities appreciate the rupee against sterling at 
a rate lower than the appreciation of the basket; - .' 
. Hi) when there is a faU in the value of the basket. if the 
authorities depreciate the rupee against sterling by a 
rate larger than the depreciation of the basket; and 
(iiil when there is a rise in the value of the basket. if the 
authorities depreciate the rupee against sterling. 
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All the above types of adjustment could be undertaken with.)ut violating the 
basic basket rule which provides at present for the margins of .!. 5 per cent.. In 
short. the flexibility of the basket system depends on the discretionary use of 
the large margins. 
~.« How to Classify the Indian Exchange Rate Regime? 
There has 51) far been no indication that the Indian authorities altered the 
currency basket introduced in September 19i5 for the valuatil)n of the rupee. 
either in the names of currencies or in the relative weighting of the 
currencies. In a constant-weight basket system the rupee-sterling rate can be 
expressed in the following functional form: 
n 
In Y • L Wi In Xi • u 
i·1 
where Y • rupee-sterling rate index 
Xi • index of exchange rate of ith basket currency against sterling 
Wi • proportional weight. of the ith currency in the basket 
n • number of currencies in the basket 
u • error term representing the margins of the basket 
This relationship straightaway follows from our earlier analysis t)r the 
Indian basket system in its rigid form. There we showed that. had the Indian 
authorities kept the value of the rupee in a fixed relati.)nship with the chl)scn 
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currency basket. it would have led to continuous rupee-sterling adjustments. 
the magnitude of each would be the average of the proportionate changes in the 
value of the currencies in the basket against sterling. each one weighted 
according to the original basket weights. However. because of the discretionary 
use of the basket margins. the above equation cannot adequately represent the 
Indian system. The discretionary management of the large band around the 
central rate cannot be captured by a pure white noise term. Therefore. we may 
belter describe the Indian basket system as determining the rupee-sterling rate 
in the following way: 
n 
In Y • ~ Vi In Xi + Z + u 
j,.l 
where Z stands for the sum total of objectives which determine the 
discretionary operation of the basket margins. This 'Z' factor constitutes the 
flexibility aspect of the Indian basket system. 
What is the most appropriate description of the Indian exchange rate 
system? Joshi (19M) called it an "adjustable NER-pe g" where NER stands for the 
nominal effective elchange rate. However. the way the system worked since its 
introduction does not fit well with that description. There have been periods of 
gradual depreciation of the nominal effective elchange rate of the rupee and 
recently after 1985 a gradual depreciation of the real effective elchange rate. 
Besides. the authorities did not undertake any sizeable discrete depreciatil>n of 
the rupee during the ~"-year period of the new exchange rate regime. 
The I.M.F. classified the new Indian exchange rate system as l\ composite 
currency peg up to 1978 and 85 a managed floating system thereafter. the 
13-4 
change in designation coinciding with the upward revisil)n of the adjustment 
margins of the system. However, we noted the possibility that the discretionary 
operation of the basket margins started in 1978 itself, even befl)re the vddening 
of the adjustment margins, which might have been instrumental in increasing 
rupee's instability. (This is further taken up in Chapter 7 and also in Chapter 10) 
Notably, the l.MJ. also recognizes the continued basket-based rupee valuatil)n 
in its Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrktil)ns. 
Indian exchange rate system can best be classified as a 'crawling basket. 
peg'. The 'crawling peg' is a fixed exchange rate arrangement v.-ith the peg 
itself gradually adjustable (Vines, 1987, p. 713). As noted by Williamson U981b, 
p . .() such an exchange rate regime can have two versions: o~e, a 'Cormuia-
variant crawling peg' and tv.,oo, a 'decision-variant crawling peg'. In the case I)f 
India, the rupee is still kept in parity with a weighted basket of curr~nd~s but 
that peg is changed in small steps. However, since the Indian system has not 
laid down any objective rule for the management of the crawl but provides for 
administrative discretion, it appears appropriate to call the Indian exchange 
rate system as a 'discretionary crawling basket peg'. 
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footnoto,; Chapter" 
1. The Reserve Bank middle rate is the average of the buying and selling f"cltes. 
2. In fact this is one of the reasons why the I.MJ. decided that there shl)uld be 
a. review in every five years in which currency components are re,'orked 
~~ 
as to being back the original weights O~" weights representing original 
criteria (see I.MJ .• 1987. p. 30). 
3. For example. the share of sterling in official holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves of 76 reporting countries declined steadily from 9 per cent in 19iO 
to 1., per cent in 1977. Although this share showed some rise in the 1980s 
it is still within 3 per cent. See I.MJ. Survey 0978. May 22. p. I'H) and also 
I.MJ. Annual Report. 1987 Appendix Table 1.2 on p. 60. 
4. ('.(Imputed from RBI Bulletin (1988. pp. 29 and 31). 
5. Same as Footnote <t. 
6. The Reserve Bank discontinued selling forward sterling after the 
devaluation of the rupee on June 6.1966. The Bank alsl) stands ready to 
buy and sell currencies of neighbl)uring countries (except the Nepalese 
rupee) as part of the Asian Clearing Union (AClJ) arrangement. 
7. See Krugman (1984) particularly pp. 26~-8 for a theorelicallrealment oC 
the emergence of the dollar as a vehicle currency. 
8. See alsl) the results of the recent comprehensive survey of the foreign 
exchange mark.et in london in Bank. of England Quarterly Bulletin (t 986. 
pp.379-82). 
9 The presence of margins is consistent with this gap. 
10. While speculation is not necessary for stabilization in an administered 
exchange rate system. there is possibility that speculation is destabilizing 
in such a system during balance of payments crises by offering a. 'one-way 
option' to speculators. 
11. It is Varghese (198«a) who noted this mark.ed shift in the Bank.'s strategy 
of management of the value of the rupee for the first time. 
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Chapter 6 
Costs and Measures of uchanle Rate InstahiJity 
6.1 Introduction 
As opposed to the argument by the proponents of a flexible exchange ("dh~ 
system I, the generalized system of floating that came to prevail since March 
1973 has been characterized by wide fluctuatil)ns in elchange ("dtes. The 
euhange ("elte instability that accompanied the neVlr international nU>netarr 
arrangements has been conceptuaJJy categorized into tW(1 types: (j) the ~h(lrt­
term movements. Le .. variation of exchange rates over reJatiYeJy ~hort periods 
oC lime. daily, 'I'eekly. monthly etc .. and (ii) the medium-term mL~lignment. ie .. 
movement of the exchange rate away from its equilibrium value over a 
prolonged duration of time.2 Our concern here and in the subsequent. chapters 
is with the former and we ignore the latter3 in our study. Whil~ there has ooen 
wide agreement about the continued shl)ct-term volatility I)f eIchange rates I)f 
world's major currencies since the floating of these currencks in I'F3. and ab) 
about the potential costs that short-term elchange rate instability imposes I)n 
trade and other international transactions, empirical studies so Car have nl)t 
produced conclusive evidence of damaging effect of such exchange rate 
jn~biHty. (See I.M.f .. J984a: and Gotur. J985) 
There are a number of issues connected with the analysis (If the co~1s (If 
exchange rate volatHity and its measurement. We mate an altempt beloT to 
expJore them in the context (If a Jess developed c(luntry. 
13S 
6.2 r.(I~ts of Euhan ge Rate In~tabHity 
International trade is an ongoing process which involves ~veraJ mages 
~uch as the execution of contracts, procuring (If inpu~. actual pr(Iducuon. 
shipping of products and finally the ~ettJement of payments and receipts. ju" 
like a firm producing for the domestic market. an internati(Inal trading firm 
faces uncertainties in the costs, prices and demand with regard to it" product"." 
Under the Bretton WO(lds par value ~stem. the involvement (If foreign 
currency in international trade did not create any further c(lmplication ~, the 
rate (If c(lnver~ion between national currencie, remained fairly ~tabJe 'Within 
narr(I'''' margins. The situation unden;ent a dramatic change with the (Inset (If 
fluctuating e](change rate, by the addition (If' yet an(lther eJement (If 
uncertainty in the decision-making process of the international trading firm. 
The cost of exchange rate instability arises from the fact that it generates 
exchange rate uncertainty. Although exchange rate uncertainty is reJated to 
elchange rate instability, it is necessary to distinguish between the t,'o in 
order to understand fuJly the costs (If exchan ge rate instability. InstabjJjty of 
the exchange rate by itself is not very damaging if eC(lnomic agent.!f engaged in 
international transactions are able fu11y to anticipate that instability. In fact. 
it would not be unrealistic to assume that expectation, of future exchange rates 
do enter into the decision-making (If internationaJ trading firms. Uncertainty 
creeps in the process as these firm, find that the actual exchange rate tUrns (IUt 
to be different from what they had expected. The larger the difference bet'Ween 
the t ... o. the more costly it becomes for risk-averse traders to go by their 
pre~ent expectations. and that depresses the level of production and 
commitments to trade. 
It is dear from the preceding discussion that an econ(lmic agent's 
perception exchange risk can be considered as an increasing function of his 
elChange rate expectational errors of the past. It may be noted that this 
uncertainty effect is applicable both on the supply and demand side of 
international trade. The commitments to trade both by suppliers and demanders 
are affected by elchange rate uncertainty. Therefore, the ultimate impact on 
the quantum and price of trade of exchange rate risk depends on the relative 
- elasticities of demand and supply as well as on the relative shifts in supply and 
demand arising from the risk factor. This is illustrated below. 
fig. 6.1 represents the market for a typical elPort product.' So and Do show 
fiS.6.1 Esport Martel and Eschanle Rate Uncertaint, 
SI 
Price of 
xr. t-----.....,:" 
Elports 
x~ ~---?~~--~--~ 
XG.I x.G,o 
Volume of Exports 
the supply and demand respectively of exports for the product in the absence DC 
HO 
elchange rate uncertainty. XQo and XPo are the equilibrium quantity and 
price in that context. Exchange rate uncertainty leads to backward shifts of 
both ~pply and demand curves f(lr the export prod\lct indicated by SJ and DJ 
respectively. As a result, the new equilibrhlm export volume declines from 
X~, to XQI whereas the price increa..~!1 from XPo to XPI' It i!l n(It nece~ 
that the price should always rise 'With exchange rate uncertainty; it c(I\lld aJS<1 
fall. In this particular Ca5e, it can be !leen fr(lm fig. 6.1 that the price ro~ 
because the supply curve shifted more than the demand curve, given equal 
ela5ticities f(lr the two curves. The price could fall in the opposite ca..~ (If a 
larger shift in the demand c\lrve than the supply curve unle~ (Iff~t by 
eJ~lidty differences between the two curve~1. 
By emphasizing the costs of exchange rate instability (Ine should not J(I~ 
sight of the theoretical possibility (If a stimulating effect (If exchange rate 
instabiHty on trade. Bailey, Tavlas and Ulan (1987) argue that exchange rate 
variabiHty also offers additional opportunities for pr(lfit and the capability (I( 
exploring these opportunities requires specialised knowledge <If foreign 
exchange markets, the possession of which is positively correlated 'With the 
volume of trade transactions, and the size of this profit is alS<1 p(l!4itively 
correlated with the volume of trade. In the C(Intext of developed c<Iuntries the 
above hYP(lthesis could be valid whereas f(lr LDes such a possibjJjty is rather 
remote. This is particularly due to the elchan ge control regulations txjstin g in 
LDCs which prohibit speculation on foreign exchange markets by traders . 
. With the continued existence of exchange rate uncertainty, methods have 
been introduced to insure the traders against it. forward market racHities have 
Hi 
expanded con~iderab'ly in recent years in developed countries.6 However. it 
may be noted that the presence of forward markets does n(lt alter much the 
argumentaboutthe costs of exchange rate uncertainty. Firstly. the reC(I\lr~ to 
forward cover imply transaction costs for the trader in the form of f(lrward 
margin. brokerage fees. etc .• which are an increa.!ling function (If exchange 
rate variation and hence reflect the implicit cost of exchange' rj~k in the 
absence of cover (Bailey et aI. 1987. pp. 227-8). Secondly. even if (Irward 
markets exist. they remove uncertainty. (If course at a cost, only for the 
current ~ale5 of past production. Uncertainty still exists "With regard t(l 
production for future transactions and such long-term cover facilWes may not 
be available. At the most it can be ~aid that. the existence of f(lrward facilities 
has reduced the element of uncertainty connected "With fluctuating currencies 
but has not eliminated it fully. 
The point above could perhaps be elaborated with the help of the 
distinction drawn in exchange risk literature between 'transaction risk' and 
'economic risk' (see Levi. 1983. pp. 3-·0. The transaction risk refeN ta> 
uncertainty with regard to the future domestic currency reaiizatll>n of a. 
current trade contract denominated in foreign currency, The econl)mic risk 
refers to uncertainty with regard to the future profitability resulting f('t)m 
changes in domestic currency value of a firm's exports or imports. W herea, the 
transaction risk of exchange rate can be insured against in the forward 
markets. the economic risk which is much more important. for the tC'dder 
cannot be protected against through forward markets? 
. ~. .~ 
It has been recognized in the literature that the impact of exchange rate 
instability is more severe in the case of developing country than for devel(lped 
country traders (see HeUeiner, 1981; and Cr(lckett and Goldstein, 1957). The 
absence or the Hmited existence of adequate forward marketing faciJities is a 
factor to be reckoned with in LOC.s. In additj(ln, foreign exchange c(lntrob 
prevalent in most of these c(luntries ruJe out the p(lssibHity of these countries' 
trader' either resorting to international f(lrward markets (II' taking reC(IUNe to 
international borrowing as a spot cover for future trade receipts and payments. 
Another important matter that needs to be stressed in connection with 
elchange rate voJatility and LDCs, arises from the currency invoicing pattern 
of their trade which is different from that of the majority (If developed 
countries. Studies by Grassman (J973), Page(J977), and Magee and Rao 0980>-
among (Ithers, showed that the . deveJoped country trade is generally 
denominated in seller', currency. This reduces the currency fluctuation risk 
faced by exporters in these countries. for developing countries, (In the other 
hand, have their products invoiced either in the developed country buyer's 
currency or in a third currency which is usually the U.s. dollar and very 
seldom in their own currency. McKinnon (J979) explains this a..<I')'mmetry in 
terms of the predominance of "tradables I", i.e .• differentiated manufactured 
products. in developed country exports for which the seUer has the power to Iii 
the price. and of "tradables II". ie.. standardized homogenomc primary 
commodities. in LDC exports for which the seller is largely a price taker. 
Whatever the theoretical reason for the difference between the inv(licing 
patte~n of 1DC and developed country elPorts. the result is that there is a larger 
expo!lure of exchange risk for the former as is explained below. 
H3 
In the context of designation (If trade contracts in the partner cmlntry's 
currency, at least the developin g country's export demand escapes the 
exchange risk. However, if elp(lr~ are denominated in a third c(,unlry 
S' 
currency like the U.S. dollar, which is the usual case, the LOC elPorter is 
subject to a double elthange risk effect: the first, due to the risk borne by the 
foreign importer stemming from fluctuations in the importer's currency vb-a-
vis the U.s. dollar and the second. due to fluctuations (If the LDC currency vb-a-
vis the U.S. dollar which is borne by the elporter himself. In short. trade 
transactions in common currency enhance the exchange risk effect as it results 
in the imposition of risk on both supply and demand sides. 
N(IW we shaH recapitulate the basic argument linking exchange rate 
instability and trade developed so far. The exchange rate uncertainty created 
by elchange rate volatility imposes a cost on traders. both exporters and 
importers. Those who resort to hedging do it at a cost but that frees the trader 
from uncertainty of exchange rate movements with respect only to the current 
transaction for which cover has been made and, therefore, he remains 
unprotected against exchange rate fluctuations which affect hb future 
production and trade transactions. This additional cost created by exchange rate 
uncertainty makes international trade unattractive in c(lmparbon with 
domestic trade. This is cal1ed lhe"anti-trade bias" generated by exchange rate 
volatility. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs assumed that. 8· developing 
country followed a. floating exchange rate system similar tl) a devel')ped (,)untry 
so that the former's currency moved against the latter's continul)usly. But 
lH 
that need not be the case. A large n\lmber (If LDC~ have been maintaining a 
fixed peg with a dominant trawng parlner's currency. Such single-currency 
pegs. while freeing the trade between the LDC and the peg-currency partner 
from exchange risk. could in tUrn lead to deflection of trade away from (Ither 
countries whose currencies are fl\lctuating against the peg-currency. t.(I't"ar~ 
the peg-currency country. Thi!!. however. defeats the very laudable (Ibjectivt 
of geographical trade diversification. 
Although there exists the p(l~ibjJity (If a "trade-diver~ionH effect (If 
exchange rate instability as explained in the preceding paragraph. empirical 
studies by Dychter (1979), Greene (J9S0),and Gupta (1980) did not indicat.e any 
evidence in this regard. Helleiner (1981) view, the lack of evidence for such an 
effect of exchange rate in~tability in LDCs. in terms of the dominance in these 
countries of other factors over exchange rate uncertainty in the determination 
of trade patterns such as. the "1(lng-term competitiveness as indicated by 
changes in real exchange rates, market access. credit availability. multi-
national firms' activity in trade. aid flows. national diversification (Ibjectives, 
altered purchasing or marketing practice!!" (I' ... 7 .. ). Thi!! does not, h(lwever. 
mean that the cost of exchange risk has not been high in LJ)(:s. but rather there 
have been in operation several (Ither factors in these countries which make 
trade diversion towards the peg-currency country stilJ more co~tJy. 
Williamson (1982) makes a distinction between the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic effects of short-term exchange rate instability. The f(lcmer is 
faced by individual traders working through variation in bilateral rates. and 
the latter felt by, the economy as a whole. The macroeconomic impact of 
exchange rate instability operales in the foJJowing manner: exchange rale 
volatility leads directly to volatiHty in traded g(lods prices which is transmitted 
to the econ(lmy as a whole thereby affecting the resource aUocation, (.utput and 
employment. Coes (1981, 1". 119) distinguishes between the aJJocauon and 
production effects of exchange rale uncertainty; the former impHes the 
substitution of domestic market for foreign market, whereas the latter implies 
an overall decline in domestic (Iulput irrespective of martc~, d(lmc~ic (Ir 
foreign. 
We are here not touching upon the various other aspects of the CI)st of 
exchange rate instability particularly relevant to lDf,s such as the effects on 
the terms of trade, the strains it imp')ses on the scarce managerial expertise of 
lDC monetary authorities in managing the foreign exchange assets and also in 
managing international debt. These issues are not pursued here, nl)t because 
they are not important, but because they are not directly relevant. tl) the 
detailed study undertaken in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Some of 
these issues are, however, covered in earlier studies (see HeUeiner. 1981). 
6.3 General Issues on Measurement of Exchange Rate Instability 
An ideal measure' of exchange rate instability should capture fully the 
additional costs imposed by it during the period under considerati.>n. While it is 
virtually impossible to measure exactly the costs of exchange r-clte volatility, 
what has been naturally done by researchers in the area. is tf) U~ the l)b~rvel.1 
variability in exchange rate as the pr.)xy for the uncertainty cost that is 
incurred on account of exchange rate instability. Before introdudng the 
varil>us measures that have been most commonly used, it would be helpful b) 
loto 
!lort out !lome major issue!l relating to the measurement (If exchange rale 
in,tabiJity. 
6.3.1 Nominal vs. Real Exchange Rates 
Perhaps the most lively methodolQgical issue in exchange rate instability 
studies is concerning whether one should employ volatility of nominal or real 
exchange rates. Most of the eac1y econometric studies conducted to e~timllte the 
link between exchange rate instability and trade. have used nominal exchange 
rates. The proposal of nominal exchange rate in the measurement of exchange 
rate instability assumes 'money illusion' on the part of traders. The use of 
nominal exchange rates in measuring exchange risk is also justifiable if the 
time gap between the contract to trade and the actual settlement. of the 
transactions is just a few months during which external prices and internal 
costs may not change considerably and the only source of uncertainty in the 
transaction is the nominal exchange rate changes. In the case of products 
which are already produced this could be a good approximation, lll)wever, in 
regard tl) elpI)rts and imports which involve larger gestation period, trader's 
genuine interest is for the real rather than the nominal exchange rate stability. 
Thus. to the extent that instability in relative prices are offset by the nDminal 
exchange rate instability. trader's overall uncertainty is reduced. 
6.3.2 Which Relative Price to Use? 
If it is decided that the real exchange rate variability is the appropriate 
concern of the trader. the next issue is to choDse the relevant prices to c.onvert 
the nominal exchange rate into real exchange rate. Here, as in many other 
instances of economic investigation, the theoretically ideal procedures may 
1«7 
110t be always the practically feasible ones, and so the economic inve~tigat(lr has 
to seUle for the least objectionable. The economically most meaningful 
relative price for ouJ' purpose is the ratio between the prices (If d(lme~c: 
tradable goods and the prices of foreign competing goods. In the HteJ'ature. the 
real exchange rate is also defined as the ratio (If prices of tradables to 
nontradables. This is based on the "small country" assumption which implies 
the law of one price for tradables. This, however. is not consistent with the 
existence of differentiated products in developed country exports and abo (If 
quantitative import controls in LDCs (Josht 1984, pp. 40-1). 
Artu, (1978) argues that the relevant relative price should be the reJative 
cost of production of tradable goods rather than their prices, as international 
competition tends to equalize the tradable good,' prices acros, countries. 
Nevertheless, in the case of a developed country producing differentiated 
products foJ' international exchange. the ratio between the prices of h(lme 
tradables and foreign tradables reflects the unit cost differences between home 
country and partner country. Thisdedves from the practice of constant 'mark-
up' pricing in modern industry. In the context of many LDCs the point (If Artus 
is more relevant. A large number of these countries speciaJize in 
internationally traded homogeneous primary commodities or fairly standardized 
manufactured products. The forces of competition equalize the prices (If these 
commodities internationaUy through adjustment in profit margins. With 
regard to these commodities. what one has to look for is the cost differences 
which affect the relative profitability. Unit labour costs may be quite relevant 
for manufacturing firms which are labour-intensive (WHlett. 1986, p. SI06). 
Unfortunately. however, . unit labour costs let alone \lnit total C(lsLs are not 
available in many LDC'~ and, if available, they are n(lt (In a frequency le~~ than 
a year. Theref(.re, 'We have to make compr(lmi~' to arrive at a Je" sati,factory 
jnde~ for relative co~ls. 
Issues like what constitute tradable goods also remain. Apart from the fad 
that actual exports and imports compose only part of the tradable goods sect.)r. 
the unit value indices of exports and imports are not very reliable even for 
developed countries (Goldstein and Khan. 1(85). While GDP deflator is one of 
the possible candidates. the low frequency and delay involved in its 
computation rule out its use for the purpose in most cases. Besides. the inclusion 
of services in GDP makes the GDP deflator not a good representative of tradable 
gOI)ds prices or costs particularly for developing countries. 
This leaves the wholesale price index (WPI) and the consumer price index 
(CPI) as the remaining candidates for the construction of relative price. The 
WPI is more representative of costs and prices of tradable goods than CPI and it 
is a better indicator of total costs in the economy than the CPI. The CPI although 
reflects the labour costs which is important for labl)ur-intensive 
manufacturing firms. it includes the prices of many nontradable services. 
Kenen and Rodrik (1984). although agreeing with the superiority of the WPI 
over the CPI in the calculation of real exchange rate index for the set. of 
developed countries which their study covered. have in fact opted for the CPI on 
the grounds that it is more comparable across countries. 
6.3.3 Bilateral vs Effective Exchange Rate 
In the absence of a. stable unit oC account in the· international m,>nelary 
H9 
system. the variation in a currency', exchange rate involve m(lvemenls 
against several different currencie5 at varying rates. This necessitated the 
definition of a.n average exchange rate variation. There are two way, in 
which exchange rate variation can be computed. Either (Ine can find 
movements in each individual bilateral rate and average them ba.<lC:d (In an 
appropriate weighting system. or one can. first of all, compute an effective 
exchange rate index9 by averaging the individual bilateral indices on a 
common base and later obtaining its variation. The former is called the 
"effective variation" (EV) by Frank.al (975) and the latter is termed the 
"variability of effective exchange rate" (V£ER) (Lanyi and Suss, 1982). 
The tvo types of exchange rate variation mentioned above are not the same. 
The variability of effective exchange rate (VEER) will be more or less than the 
effec.tive variation (EV) depending on whether the covariance of individual 
bilateral rates are positive or negative (Lanyi and Suss, 1982, p. 539). The basic 
question is which of the tvo are ml)re relevant for the purpose of measuring 
the cost of exchange rate variation in a particular country? 
The ansver to the above-mentioned question depends on firstly, whether we 
are interested in the economy-vide exchange rate uncertainty or the 
uncertainty facing individual traders and secondly. whether individual traders 
of the home country are sufficiently diversified across countries or are tied to 
particular countries in their trade. In regard to the first. criterion. it. can be 
argued that the ll)ss incurred by individual firms trading with high exchange 
risk markets may be offset by the gain made by firms trading with l,)w risk 
markets. Regarding the second criterion, it is stated that if traders are 
150 
rea!lonably diver~ifjed geographically or if there i~ the po~~ibi1ity (If ~uch 
diversification in the event of high exchange rate uncertainty, then they can 
switch trade away from high-fluctuation currency areas to low-fluctuation 
areas. Variability of effective exchange rate takes into account the effect of 
trade diversification through the variance-covariance matril. For developed 
countries where trade is undertaken by large diversified enterprises. 
variability of effective elchange rate could capture the exchange rate 
uncertainty (I.MI., 198-{a. p. 10). However. in countries where trade is in the 
hands of several small and un diversified firms the possibility (If the benefit (If 
compensation for elchange rate uncertainty as explained ab(lve may not 
possibly elist, and, therefore, effective variation may be mMe appropriate in 
their contexl. Although in the long run the possibility of diversification and 
compen",tion do exist even in developing countries. in the short and medium 
run the structure of trade is so rigid in these countries that effective variati('n 
appears to be more relevant. 
Willett (1986) goes a step Curther with regard to the appropriateness oC 
various measures of exchange rate uncertainty in the context of devel'>ped 
countries, He evokes modern finance theory and argues for an overall measure 
of diversified risk, rather than just the ones mentioned above, tak.ing inlt> 
consideration the international portfolio diversification of individual firms. 
This procedure, no doubt. complicates the measurement of exchange risk, 
However. as stressed by W illelt, the inability of incorporating this aspect in 
various exchange risk measures could be one reason why many empirical 
studies on the impact of exchange risk in developed countries did not produce 
robust. results: 
1') 1 
6.3 . .f EJ~ticity Weights, Trade Weigh~ or Invoice Weight~? 
Whether "We are measuring the effective variati(ln (If bilateral nchange 
rates (11' the variation in effective exchange rate, a proper weighting ~~tem is 
nece~ary to combine the bilateral rates or their individual variations. IIere 
again, in order to settle on the appropriate weights, one has to make a 
compr(lmi~ between what is theoretically ideal and "What is practically 
available. Elasticity weighting ~stem would involve di~tributi(ln (If weights 
Ml(lng bilateral rates in proportion to the contribution a change in each 
bilateral rate makes to the overaU balance (If trade (If the h(lme c(luntry. 
Suppose the home country devalues by a uniform extent again!lt. the 
currencies of aJJ its trading partners and its trade balance improves within, 
say, two or three years, by a given amount in constant dollars. Then the 
eJ~ticity weight for each partner c(luntry is indicated by the ratio between the 
home country', improvement in balance of trade against that country and that 
against all trading partners (including that against the specified country). 
(,.(,nceptually, elasticity weights are ideal in computation (.f effective 
exchange rate or effective variation. However, the derivation (.f these weights 
are not ea.-Of)'. It involves fir~t, the estimation (If the underlying (lwn-price and 
cr(lss-price elasticities of supply and demand of aU products (If all c(!\Intries in a 
general equilibrium framework. Then, such a multilateral model has t(1 be 
simulated for a given exchange rate change against all countries for getting 
the trade balance effects against each country .. Such a model has been 
constructed at the IMF and is caUed the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model 
(MERM) and the IMF regularly calculates the . effective elchange rate indices 
of 18 OEeD countries based on weights derived from the simulation results (If that 
10 
m<tdeJ. 
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Although some attempts have been made to construct a MERM for LDf';5 by 
, 'h 'f' f f h ._' 11 th I' b'J't f h ulcorporabng t e speCI IC eature! 0 t ese C(IUnw les. ere la 1 I Y 0 ~IC 
a construct for these countries is questionable in view of its huge data 
requirements and the accuracy of the data colleeled for these countrie~ for the 
purpose. Therefore. tnoYe !imple alternative! have to be sought and researchers 
have been employing trade weights for LDCs as a proxy for elasticity weights. 
This involves giving each trading partner a weight according to its share in 
total exports and/or imports. The Jarger the number of countries in the 
'Weighting :tystem. the more accurate it will be b\lt in actual practice. a selected 
number of countries are taken and their weights are normalized to sum to 
While using the trade weights instead of elasticity ,.'eights in the 
computation of effective exchange rate or effective variation, one should be 
aware of the limitations of such a procedure. Firstly. a trade-,.·eighting system 
assumes that the home country faces identical export and import (supply and 
demand) elasticities with respect to all its trading partners. Sec')ndly. it is 
supposed that bilateral exchange rate changes have no implicatil)n on third 
country competition. If there is trade concentration of low-elastidty primary 
~ommodities and high-elasticity manufactured products with different trading 
partners, then the first assumption is unrealistic. To the extent. that home 
country's lrading partner imports from or exports to third countries prl)ducls 
similar to those the home country exports to or imports from the trading 
partner. a change in the third country's exchange rate with the trading 
1')3 
partner has effect on bilateral trade between home c(lUntry and the trading 
partner. 
It has been argued that lDCs whose expl)rts are den'ominated in vehicle 
currendes lik.e the U,S. dollar. invoite-weighting is more appropriate than 
trade-weighting (see lipschitz. 1979; and Hel1einer. 1980. But this is nl)t. quite 
a valid argument. Invoicing. no doubt. affects the current domestic currency 
receipts of past contracts as exchange rate changes vis-a-vis the invl)ice 
currency between the time of the trade contract and its actual financial 
settlement. However. trade is a continuous activity and future prices 1)( lOC 
exports in vehicle currency will be quickly affected by the exchange rate 
movements between that currency and the currency of the country tl) .,·hich 
the country exports. But here one has to remember that the impact on vehicle 
currency export prices of the trade partner's exchange rate movements vis-a.-
vis the vehicle currency depends on that cl)untry's import share in the global 
impl)rts of the commodities which the home country exports and nl)\ just. I)n the 
import share of • that country in home country exports alone. (W illiamSl)n. 
1982. pp. ,)')-7). 
In this context. petroleum trade requires a separate treatment. as the above-
mentioned possibility of the continuous equalization of world prices. in dollar 
terms of primary commodities is not strictly applicable to that commodity. This 
is so because. the price of oil is not merely designated in dollar but is also 
determined in dollar through the operali,>n of a producers' cartel. In 
consequence. exchange rate movements of major currencies against the U,S. 
dollar do not have perceivable impact on the dollar price of petroleum in 
international markets. Therefore. it 'Would be more ilppropriate to ilugment 
the 'Weight of the doUar in the calculation of the effective exchange rate or 
effective variation of bilateral rates to the eltent of trade in (Iii (If the home 
country M if that part of trade is conducted 'With the U.S.A.1Z 
6.3.5 Time Period of Exchange Rate Variation 
In fact, there is no single unit (If time period 'Which can be said to be the 
most appropria.te for computing exchange rate instabiHty. TradeN normally 
have a continuolls stream of payments and receipts and. therefore. are dfected 
by elchange rate movements continuously. While Akhtar and Hilton (J983) 
used da.iJy elchange rates for computation of exchange rate variation. HO(lper 
and Kohlhagen (1978) employed 'Weekly (Ibservations. The use (If daily or 
'Weekly exchange rates become un'WieldJy 'When a long period (If data is 
considered. Besides, 'When real elchange rate, are to be used, the ab~nce of 
price information on a daily or 'Weekly basi, compeb the researcher to use 
only monthly or quarterly data for computing short-term exchange rate 
volatility. 
6 .• Common Measures of Exchange Rate Instability 
While a more detailed description of the statistical measures of exchange 
rate instability has to await the next chapter where we discuss the constructi')n 
of different measures for analysing the Indian case, we make in this section a 
general discussion of the measures of exchange rate' instability that is 
commonly used in empirical literature on exchange rate volatility. The purpose 
of this section is to bring out the comparative merits and demerits of these 
different statistical measures. 
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We argued prevjo\l~ly that the C(I~t of exchange rate variation ari~~ from 
the fact that part of it is unelpected. Therefore, each measure of enhange rate 
instability necessarily involves an elflectation formation hYflothesis. There are 
br(ladJy three such measures 'Which are popularly used, each one implying a 
different elchange rate elflectation. They are (i) the standard deviation/co-
efficient of variation of levels of elchange rates; (ji) the standard deviation (If 
percentage changes in elchange rates; and (m) the mean of ab~l\1te 
percentage changes in exchange rates. We shaH examine each of these (Ine by 
one.13 
6.0(.1 Standard Deviation/Coefficient of Variation of Levels 
The standard deviation of levels and its normalized measure of coefficient of 
variation are the earliest measures of exchange rate variation (Black. 1976; and 
Cline. 1976). These measures contained the expectation hypothesis that. the 
elpected future elchange rate during any period is given by its actual average. 
These measures have some obvious dra,,·backs. Firstly. the standard deviation 
of levels is a measure of absolute variation which makes it not very reliable for 
comparison purposes. The coefficient of variation. however. rectifies this 
problem by expressing the standard deviation as a percentage of the. mean. 
Secondly. the standard deviation of levels as well as the coefficient of variation 
could lead to incorrect results when the exchange rate series exhibit a long-
term trend. either upward or downward. This stems from the fact that the 
basic assumption in the computation of these measures is that the trend of the 
series is given by the mean. (Brodsky. 1980. p. 360(). This assumption is true 
only if the series is stationary. If the series is nonstationary. the variance of 
the series is infinite and the sample variance. although can be computed from 
150 
such a ~eries, will not be meaningful (Glassman, 1987). This makes the mndard 
deviation (If exchange rate levels a!I 'Well as its related measure (If coefficient (If 
variation unreliable as an exchange rate v(llatiHty measure. 
The basic limitations of the standard deviation of JcvcJ~ a., noted ah(lve is 
remedied in another related measure cal1ed the standard err(lr of deviations 
from exponential trend, a measure usual1y employed in the study (If elPort 
in!ltabiJity (Brodsky, 1980). Here the hypothesis is that the eC(lDomic agent's 
elpectatioruabout the future exchange rates are given by its trend, and not by 
its average value as in the measure of standard deviation (If leveb. Kenen and 
Rodrik (J98.f) use the standard err(lr ba..c;ed (In a first order auto-regre~ion 
equation a!I an alternative measure (If exchange rate in~tabiHty. Such a 
measure implies that the expected value (If exchange rate is given by "the 
recent history of the actual rate a!I portrayed by the autoregressive equation" 
(p.JO). 
6.".2 Standard Deviation of Percentage Changes 
The standard deviation of percentage changes of exchange rate differs from 
the standard deviation of levels of exchange rate or the standard error measures 
on the underlying assumption of expectations; the latter assumes that, traders 
predict correctly the average level of the exchange rate in the coming period 
while the former assumes that they predict correctly the average percentage 
change in future exchange rate. More importantly. the standard deviatil)n of 
percentage changes is a trend-adjusted' measure as it CI)mpllfeS actual 
percentage change in each period with the'average percentage change f')r the 
period as a whole Ulelleiner. 1981. p. <f28,). finding first differences (in 
\,)7 
percentages) usually eliminates the trend in a series by reducing the series to 
stationarity. This is confirmed by Meese and Singleton (1982) and alS<1 Douthe 
and G1~~man . (1987) in the c~e (If exchange rates, Therefore, this mea.."I\,rc 
c!t~cet. of"'t 
is free from the earHer me~ure of !ltandard deviation of levels (If eschange 
A 
rates, 
However, the standard deviation of percentage changes a~ a measure of 
exchange rate volatility is not free from difficulties. One problem with this 
measure u noted by Brodsky (1980, p. 367) is that, unlike number of other 
measures of economic instability, this does not satisfy the decompositil)n 
property. That is. for example, if you use the standard deviation of percentage 
changes as a measure of variation in effective exchange rate, you C'8nnot split. 
up this total variation into variation in the component bilateral rates., This 
limitation is, however, not a serious problem. 
The more serious drawback of the measure of standard deviation of 
percentage changes as explained by a number of authors such as Farber et al. 
(i9n), Westerfield (19n), and Rana (1980, is that the measure gives a reliable 
picture of instability only if the underlying statistical series is distributed 
normally. These authors have demonstrated that. in the case of exchange rate 
changes, the normality property is not satisfied in practice. The problem 
usually arises when the exchange rate series covers both the adjustable peg 
period and the floating rate period; in the former period, exchange rate 
changes are a few but each one of large magnitude wherea~ in the latter 
period. they are more frequent but in small magnitUde. . This dissimilarity of 
exchange rate movements increases the "kurtosis,,14 of the distribution (If the 
1')& 
exchange rate 5eries covering both the adjustable peg and fJoating rate 
periods to more than three, which i~ the value for the normal popUlation. 
Rana (1981) 5uggests two alternative mea!l\lre~, namely, the scale, "Which is 44 
per cent of an interfractHe range, and the Gini's mean difference (GMD) "Which 
is the arithmetic average of the ab!lolute difference5 between aU pairs of values 
• h' .., 1n t e series, 
6,0(,3 Mean of Absolute Percentage Changes 
Initially the IMF used the standard deviation of percentage changes in its 
analysis of exchange rate instability (e.g., I.M.r., 1979, p. 'lZ) but it has 
subsequently switched over to a simple measure, namely, the mean of 
percentage change, ignoring sign, precisely because of the difficulties "ith 
the former measure just mentioned in the precetding paragraph (I.M.r., 
1980(a., p. 11). But does this alternative measure also incorpI>rate an 
elpectational hypothesis? . 
W f · d' . d 116 e can lD a naive expectahon mo e in this simple measure of 
exchange rate instability, ie., the economic agents believe that the present 
value will continue into the future. In other words, the best guess of future 
exchange rate is given by its present value. . Gupta (1980) used a similar 
measure in his study of exchange rate instability covering five LDr..s, and he 
called the measure the 'mean absolute error'. This measure is admissible only if 
exc.hllnge rates could be characterized by a. random walk process with zero 
drift. When exchange rate follow a random walk process with nl> drift., the 
statistical expectation of future exchange rates 'Would be the same as the present 
rate.17 
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6.4.4 A Comparison of the Statistical Measures 
A way of comparison between the different measure, of exchange ri~k is t(l 
:lee the nat.ure of risk aversion incorporat.ed in these measures. T(.bin (J95S) 
and Markowitz (19:;9) who examined the portfolio behaviour of ecoD(Imic agents 
under condition, of uncertainty, introduced the "mean-variance approach" 
which identifies risk with rise in both mean and variance (square of ~dard 
, 
deviation). This approach assumes quadratic utHity function, which as sh(Iwn 
by Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1964) requires the condition of increasing ah~IJute 
risk aversion with weallh or inc(Ime. As opposed to the mean-variance 
approach, RothschiJd and StigJitz (1970,1971) introduced the concept (If "mean-
pre~rving spread" in which a distribution is made more rhiky by transferring 
~me of the observations from the centre to the taiJs while Jeaving the mean 
undisturbed. This methodoJogy can inc(lJ'porate the intuitiveJy more appealing 
concept of non-increasing abs(lJute risk aversion. Gupta (1980) and eoes (1981) 
discarded the standard deviation for measuring exchange rate uncertainty and 
applied the RothschHd-Stiglitz "mean-pre~rving spread" in deriving 
alternative measures 
In contrast. Brodsky (198<4) and Y..enen and Rodrik (1986) recommended the 
use of standard deviation as a measure of exchange risk on the plea that it is 
consistent with the hypothesis of risk-averse behaviour of economic decisi')n 
makers. "Risk aversion is usually modelled by assuming that decision makers 
maximize objective functions in which unexpected events show up as squared 
deviations from expected values" says Kenen and Rodrik (p. 311). Standard 
deviation gives higher weight to larger values and Brodsky finds that aspect 
particularly attractive and he states. .. .... studies of portfolio choice under 
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conditions of uncertainty have generally utilized quadratic cost function, 
thereby effectively giving greater weight to extreme (lbservalionsH (1'. 2~'»). 
6.5 Conclusion 
The review above indicates that although there is considerable agreement 
in the literature about the possibility of high costs oC exchange r-cl.le risk in lDCs 
there is much less agreement on how to measure the exchange risk. There are 
several methodological issues involved in the construction of appropriate 
exchange risk measures and there exists no single perfect measure of exchange 
risk. The only practical step then Cor researchers would be to employ more 
than one measure and see whether they give consistent results. We adl)pt this 
strategy in the nelt chapter where we examine the Indian exchange risk 
experience in detail. 
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footnotes; Chapter 6 
1. See for example friedman (1953) and Johnson (1972). 
2. See Crockett and Goldstein (1987, pp. 2-3) for a clear distinction between the 
two concepts of elchange rate instabiHty. 
3. for more details of the costs of medium-term misalignment of exchange 
rates. see Williamson (198Sa) pp. 38-'(5. 
... There is a large volume of literature on firm's decision-making under 
price uncertainty. See Coes (1981) for a brief survey and its 
relevance in the analysis of exchange risk effect. 
5. Our reference to exports alone does not imply that imports are unaffected 
by exchange risk. However, with direct government imports as weU as 
quantitative restrictions on private imports in most lDes. the measurement 
of the impact of exchange risk on imports in these countries is difficult. 
6. See De Lattre (1985) particularly, pp. 87-89 for a description ofthe different 
types oC schemes that have emerged to insure the traders against exchange 
risk uncertainty. 
7. It may now be clear from the discussion so far that we do not make the 
Knightian distinction bet-ween risk and uncertainty but use either of the 
terms to mean the same thing. It may also be noted that, although elchange 
risk and exchange rate instabHity (short-term fluctuations) are conceptu-
aJJy separate as made clear in the telt. we use them alternatively 
throughout the thesis to refer to the former. 
S. See Black (198~), Table 2.1 on p. l1S9. 
9. Hirsch and Higgins (1970) were the first to write about tbe concept of an 
effective exchange rate index. The various problems connected with the 
construction of an appropriate effective elchange rate indel were 
subsequently discussed in Rhomberg (1976) and in Maciejewski (1983). 
10. Artus and McGuirk (1981). See also IMF Survey (1982), pp. 37-39, for 
a simple exposition of the MERM. 
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11. Feldslein,'Goldslein and Schadler (1979) for the !.fERM-type m(,deJ of 
pdmary producing countries. 
12. Joshi applied this pdnciple in constructing an import-weighted effective 
exchange rate index for India. See pp. 55-6 of Joshi (198·0. 
13. Please note that the definition (If elchange rate uncertainty as the pa.c:t 
. expectational errors do not come out explicitly in this exposition. This is 
so because, our attempt in this section is the statistical c(Imparison (If the . 
various measures of exchange rate instability and not to hring mit 
the economics of these measures. The economic rationale of the djICerent 
mea.qares shall be discussed in Chapter 7. 
H. Kurtosis of a sedes is measured as the ratio between the fourth moment 
about the mean and the square (If the second moment about the mean 
of the distribution. 
n. See Rana (1981, (984) and Brodsky ( (984) for details of these measures. 
See also Boothe and Glassman (1987) for further research on the 
statistical distribution of exchange rates. 
16. ~taddala (1988), pp. 338-·(Q for more details of naive ml>dels of expectation. 
17. See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981. pp. 494-6) for a simple exposition of the 
random walk process. 
Chapter 7 
E:lchanle Rate Instability and the Indian Basket Syste. 
7.1 Introduction 
We saw in Chapter.( that the Indian authorities adjusted themselves to the 
uncertain international monetary developments of the early 1970s by 
following a sterling peg initially. and that they made a shift to a multi-
currency peg subsequently in September 19n. The switch from a sterting 
peg to a basket system has been prompted by the objective of reducing 
exchange rate instability. In this chapter we attempt to analyse the Indian 
experience of exchange rate instability during the last tvm decades. 1968 to 
1987. with a view to assessing the impact of the Indian basket srstem on 
. b'l' 1 elchange rate tnsta J tty. 
7.2 Methodological Issues 
As ~'e noted in Chapter 6. there are several methl>doll>gical issues 
connected 'i'ith the construction of an appropriate measure of exchange rate 
instability. First of all. one has to decide whether the exchange rate volatility 
has to be measured by nominal or real rates. Although there are strong 
reasons Cor employing the real exchange rates rather than the nominal. we 
consider both nominal and real measures of exchange rate volatility rl>r the 
foUowing reason. For the monetary authorities. nominal exchange rate 
constitute the control or instrument variable. the manipulation (If 'Which 
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1M 
enables them to reach the targeted real exchange rate. It would, therefore. be 
important to monitor nominal euhange rate variation at the fir~t in~tance. 
and then compare it with the real exchange rate variation. This comparb<tn 
could throw more light on the a\lthorities' cUhange rate management. With 
regard to relative prices, i.e., the ratio of foreign prices to domestic prices. 
which is used to convert the nominal exchange rate into real. 'We employ the 
ratio of foreign and domestic 'Wholesale prices. In the context (If India.· 
wholesale price indices are the least {Ibjectionable of a11 the available prmdes 
for the prices of tradable goods. Joshi (198 .. ) also employed the same 
procedure for constructing India's real exchange rate. 
The second issue is to determine the choice between the effective 
variation. i.e., the average variation of each individual bilateral exchange 
rates. and the variation of effective exchange rate. We saw in Chapter 6 that 
the choice mainly depends on the extent of actual/potential trade 
diversification of individual traders (If the C(I\Intry . In the case (If Indian 
exporters, it seems that the assumption of low actual/potential ge('graphicaJ 
trade dispersion is more appropriate, whereas for Indian imports it does not 
seem unrealistic to assume a high degree of actual/potential ge(lgraphicaJ 
dispersion of trade. This asymmetry stems largely from the fact that while 
Indian exports are highly decentralized and mostly done by several private 
participants. a large quantity of Indian imports are arranged through large 
public sect(lr agencies. Therefore, in the case of Indian exports the switching 
between markets may not be possible, while it is theoreticaJJy possible for 
· Indian imports. Our concern in this chapter is with the overall tuhange 
rate instability and not with exchange rate instability relevMt just to the 
· exports or imports. This in turn necessitates the consideration by us (If b(Ith 
the effective variation and variation of the effective exchan ge rate mea..~ures. 
The third methodological issue with regard to the construction of 
exchange rate volatility measures is the choice of an appr(lpriate weighting 
system. Following the arguments in Chapter 6, 'We employ a trade-'Wcighting 
system adjusted for the role of the U.S. dollar in India's oil imports. But it can 
be argued that exchange rate fluctuations in India affect exp(lrts rather than 
imports as the latter is largely controJled by the government and, therefore, 
export weights alone are needed. While it is agreed that the impact <If 
elcbange rate instabHity on the volume (If imports in India c(Iuld be 
negligible in the short run· this arises from the highly inelastic nature <If 
imports in a tightly controlled import regime - it does not mean that there 
could be no additional costs to the c(luntry from the import side on account of 
exchange rate volatility. Even if the additional costs imposed by exchange 
· rate uncertainty is not passed on to actual consumer!' immediately by the 
government (II' private importers 'Who~ profitability is affected by exchange 
rate volatility, it has implications in the longer term. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to have trade weights rather than just export weights {(Ir the 
computation of the costs of exchange rate uncertainty in India. 
finally, 'We have to decide on the appropriate periodicity for the exchange 
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rate volatility mea.!lure. We consider a month a.!I a reasonable unit (If peri(ld. 
and employ the period average (If exchange rates f(lr the purpose rather than 
the end-(If-the-month rates. This averaging process in fact undere~1.imates 
the actual volatility but we use that data in order to maintain consistency with 
the price data which is avaiJable only on a monthly average ba.!lis.2 
7.3 Definition of Various Measures of £Xchange Risk 
We argued in Chapter 6 that the best way to measure the exchange risk (If 
an economic agent is to find out his past expectati(lnal errors relating to 
exchange rates. In order to proceed that way one needs to know how the 
economic agent forms his exchange rate expectations. ModeJJing (If the 
economic agent's exchange rate expectations is ideal to the exercise. This in 
turn requires a model 'of exchange rate determination, 'Which the economic 
agent can use to forecast the future evolution of exchange rates. Surveys on 
exchange rate modelling in developed countries (e.g., brad, 1987) indicate an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. While it has not been p(ls~ible ttl furmulate an 
appropriate exchange rate model for a de~eloped C(luntry, such an atlempt is 
meaningless for LDCs Hke India where exchange rate system is (lfficiaJJy 
managed. Therefore, 'We have n(lt undertaken any exercise to generate 
exchange rate expectations based on any formal exchange rate model f(lf 
India. Instead, we foJJowed a more simple and straightf(lf'Ward approach 
which is not inconsistent with previous empirical studies in the area. We 
define below three basic statistical measures that are considered in the 
construction of exchange risk proxies for India with a view to bring out fuJJy 
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the economic logic of each measure. 
AU mea..c~ures of exchange risk, as n<Ited above, are measures of devjati(ID <If 
actuals from expected elchange .. ates and, the .. efo .. e, require c(Inside .. ations 
reJating to economic agents' prediction of future eJchange rate. The 
knowJedge of future, however. assumes forwa .. d-Jooking elpectations and 
hence. in a limited sense, these measu .. es draws from issues raised by the 
-rational expectation, hypothesi'" originaUy proposed by Muth (1961). 
7.3.1 Moving Standard Deviation of Percentage Changes 
The first basic measure of exchange rate uncertainty is de .. ived from the 
idea that the best guess of an economic decision make .. 's futu .. e exchange rate 
is given by the trend based on its actuaJ percentage changes. Here the 
exchange .. isk for the economic agent in any pa .. ticuJar month is computed as 
the standard deviation of pe .. centage changes of exchange .. ates f( ... the 
preceding 12-month period. The fo .. mula fo .. thi, exchange rate uncertainty 
mea.cru .. e fo .. the cu .... ent month. t. is given as: 
• 1 
J2 
r 
Jl 1;..1 
'J.. 
. .-(ejt-k - ej> 
whe .. e ejt • exchange .. ate in the current month (domestic currency units 
per f<Ireign currency) 
ejt- ejt-l 
( ) 100 
ejt-l 
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12 
t 
This me~ure ~s\lmes a period of one year for formation of exchange rate 
elpectation" In other 'Words. the economic agent has a time horizon which is 
larger than the immediate short period of say, a quarter, that is relevant {(Ir 
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just one trade transaction, One year hi admittedly arhitrary and may 'WeJJ he 
shorter than that is appropriate for an international trading firm, HO'Wtver •. 
one could argue that the high volatility of elchange rate movemenl.!! h~ the 
effed of culling short the period for 'Which the firm forms elchange rate 
eJpectations, 
The exchange rate uncertainty that is assumed to influence the decision of 
a trader in any particular month is derived as a function of the difference 
between the actual and expected e~change rate for the previous 12-ml)nth 
period. This is what is implied by the standard deviation proceliure: the 
larger the gap between the actual and the expected during the past 12-ml>nth 
period as measured by the standard deviation. the larger will be the perceived 
exchange risk for the lrader in the curr~nt month. 
7.3.2 Moving Mean of Absolute Percentage Changes 
The second basic measure of exchange' rate uncertainty considered is 
based on the notion that, the economic agent's best guess of future exchange 
rate is given by the present rate. However, here we a..~me that the economic 
agent forms expectations for a period not longer than a month ahead, unlike 
in the nrst basic measure where expectations were assumed to be formed for a 
full year ahead. Nevertheless, the exchange rate uncertainty pertaining to 
each month is computed as the arithmetic mean of absolute percentage 
changes of elChange rates for the previous 12 months. Thus, this measure 
takes into account the average expectationaJ errors of the previous J2-month 
period as influencing the trade behavi(Jur of the econ(Jmic decision maker in 
tbe current month. The formula for this measure for the current month, 1, is 
given by: 
where 
• 
12 
1 ~ .I;jt-k l 
12 k:l 
ejt - ejt-l 
( ) 100 
ejt-l 
and I I stands for discarding sign 
A3 we noted in Chapter 6, this measure involves a naive ml)del of 
expectations. Gupta (1980) employed a similar measure in the study of 
elthange rate instability in India and a few. other developing countries. 
7.3.3 Moving Coefficient of Variation of Levels 
The third statistical measure of exchange rate uncertainly ,re consider. 
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relies on the hypothesis that, the best. guess of an economic agent's future 
elChange rate in the coming year is given by its monthly average for that 
period. Therefore, the measure of exchange rate uncertainty for any month 
is computed as the standard deviation of exchange rate levels pertaining to the 
preceding 12-month period. The formula for this measure in any month, t, is 
given by: 
EDt .. 
12 
1 ~ 
11 k-l 
'2.. 
(ejl-k - ej) 
where ejl & exchange rate in the current month (domestic 
currency uni~ per foreign currency) 
12 
1 ~ ejt-k 
12 k,.1 
As the above measure is not scale free and. therefore. not reliable for 
comparison. we divide it by the arithmetic mean to derive the co-.r:llident of 
variation in the following way: 
EDt • ( 
1 
11 
12 2-
~ (ejt-k ~ ej> 
k-l 
-e" , 
100 
It appears that the third measure described above resembles closely the 
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first one; whereas the first basic measure of exchange rate uncertainty is 
based on percentage changes in exchange rate. the third measure is based (In 
elchange rate levels. Apparently one cannot choose between the two and in 
fact the third measure is intuitively. more appeaHng than the fim. 
However. recalling the discussion in Chapter 6. we know that the first. 
measure is superior to the third. This is so because most of the economic series 
are non-stationary whereas its first difference is stationary. N(lnstati(lnary 
series has the ,tatistical property that their variance is infinite. Allh(Iugh the 
sample variance is finite. it could give misleading results. Therefore, the 
standard deviation of levels or its normalized measure of. coefficient (If 
variation of levels is not a reliable measure of exchange rate instabiHly. 00 
the other hand. the standard deviation of percentage changes do not suffer 
from this drawback and. therefore. is superior as a measure (If exchange rate 
instabHity. 
7.3.0{ Choice of Appropriate Exchange Risk Measures 
Corresponding to each one of the basic statistical measures explained 
above. one can formulate four different versions. tv."O nominal and tv."1) ft:!aL 
They are (0 nominal effective variation; (2) variation of nominal effective 
elchange rate; (3) real effective variation: and (4) variation <.f real 
effective exchange rate. However. in tbe· light of the drawbacks (If the 
measure of the coefficient (If variation (If levels discussed above. 'We decide 
against making use of that basic measure.3 . Therefore. 'We are left witb 
altogether eigh t measures divided equalJy between n(lminal and real (In e~. We 
formally define. first of aU. the nominal measures. The first two oominal 
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effective variation measures for any month, t, are 
n 
NEVlt • ~ 'Wj 
j s l 
n 12 
NEVZt • ~ 'Wj ( l··! I ejt-kl ) 
js! ··12 ksl 
n· 
'Where Wj. trade-'We~ght given to the jth foreign currency ( I .... I ); 
Vl: n~fTl\:)(!:" o~ -4''''f'~'9t'\ eU"YVC;?Vlc.-le.$'; j%1 
and all other symbols are as explained before. 
In order to derive the mea.!lures of variation of nc.minal dfecHve 
elchange rate, ~e first define the nominal ,effective elchange rate f(.r any 
. , 
month, t, a.!I: 
where ej and Wj are the same as indicated earlier. 
The two measures of variation of nominal effective exchange rate ilre 
given by: : 
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• 
where [t . ( 
. 
[ 
12 
1 ~ ([~-k - bZ 
11 k.,l 
12 
1 ~ • I [t-k I 
12 k=l 
[t - [t-l 
) 100 
[t-I 
• 
12 
1 ~ 
12 ksl 
Et-k 
Similarly, we could define the four real exchange rate vl)latility measures 
by using real bilateral rates (i.e., nominal bilateral rate multiplied by the ratio 
of foreign to domestic 11.'holesale prices) instead of nominal bilateral C'oltes. 
Thus we define REV1t and REV2t as the real effective variation measures 
which corresponds to the nominal effective variation measures in th~ S3me 
order. finaUy, we define VREERlt and VREER2t as the tv;o measures of 
variation of real effective exchange rate which also correspond tl) the 
respective measures of variation of nominal effective exchange rate. 
It could very well be argued that yet another statistical instability measure 
which does not have the drawback of the standard deviation/coefficient of 
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variation of leveIs. namely. the standard error <If deviations from a trend 
equation could also be con~idered. In fact. Br(,dsky (1980) has sh(lwn that such 
a me~ure satisfies the statistical dec(lmpositi<,n property. This me~ure h~ 
abo been used by some earlier writers (see Helleiner. 1981; and Brodsky and 
Sampson. 19M). However. besides c(lmputational difficulty - it would involve 
in our case the estimation of a trend equation for every month ba..~d (In 
previous lZ monthly observations - there is now evidence that such a meth(ld 
would be improper .. Nelson and Plosser (1982) have demonstrated with the 
help of the U.S. data that most of the eC(lnomic time series are 'difference 
stationary' rather than 'trend-stationary'. This buttresses the case f(lr the use 
of standard deviation of percentage changes against the u~e of standard err(lr 
ar(lund the trend as a measure of exchange rate instability. 
7.4 Data (.onstruction and Sources 
The first major wk in the con~tr\Jction of exchange ri~k measures is to set 
up a currency weighting system. In (Irder to derive the currency "eights for 
India we have to. first of all. decide on the number of bilateral exchange rates 
which are the most important for the country', international transactii(lDs. 
We have chosen currencies of eleven major industrial countries which 
together C(lDstiluted on the average ~2 per cent of India's total vi~ible trade 
with the convertible currency area 4 during the three year perhld. 1979-81. 
According to the RBI Bulletin (1988). about 78 per cent of India's merchandise 
trade (exports plus imports) had been invoiced in the~e eleven currencies 
during the financial years 1979-80 to 1981-82.' However. as emerged from the 
170( 
discuS!lion in Chapter 6, the weighting (If each currency in the calculation (I( 
exchange rate variation is not'to be (In the currency-invoicing pattern but 
on the 'direction-of-trade' basis with appropriate correction for oi] trade, the 
price of which is filed in U.S. doHaN. Therefore, we have given weights to 
these currencies in proportion to the c(Irrcsponding countries' ~hart!l in 
India's trade during 1979-81. but with augmented weighting for the U.S. d(IHar 
in proportion to India's imports from five major oH. producing countries 
H.e.,.Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) which are 
predominantly crude oil. The resujting currency weights normalized to add 
up to unity are given in Table 7.1 on the nelt page. For the purpo~e of 
comparison, we have also indicated the pure trade weights and the invoice 
weights in a similar fashion in the same table. 
It may be noted from Table 7.1 that, the weight (If the dollar in the modified 
trade-weighting procedure described above is almost the double that in the 
pure trade- weighting procedure (as adjustment is made f(lr the pricing (If (IiI 
in doUar> _ and it nearly triples on the basis (If trade invoicing. Another 
interesting aspect of India's trade that is br(Iught (IUt in the table, is the 
negHgible role of aU currencies other than the U.S. dollar, pound sterHng 
and the De\ltsche mark, in the invoicing (If India's trade. 
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Table 7.1 
AlternatiTe Yeilhtinl Systems for Indiaos Eschanle Rate 
Calculation InTolTinl 11 Major Currencies 
Currency 
1. U.S. d.)Uar 
2. Japanese yen 
3. PI)und sterling 
-t. INutsche mark 
~. Italian lire 
6, Dutch guilder 
7. French Crane 
8. Belgium franc 
9. Australian dollar 
10. Canadian dolJar 
lJ. Swiss franc 
Total 
Modified 
trade weights3 
.·H~ 
.121 
.109 
.099 
.03~ 
.03-t 
.037 
.04G 
.oz.t 
.031 
.019 
1.000 
Pure trade 
weights3 
.2~O 
.IM 
.HS 
.t3-t 
.0-t8 
.0-tG 
.050 
.062 
.032 
.04J 
.025 
1.000 
Invoice 
weightsb 
.727 
.02-t 
.130 
.052 
.OO71.~ 
.(lOGc 
.017 
.013 
.OOSc 
.OO9c 
.010 
1.1.11.10 
a. The difference between pure trade weights and modified trade 'i'eights is 
that the former is the 'direction-oC-trade' weights for 1979-81 and the 
lalter adjusts the former by amalgamating the weight of India's impl)rts 
from five major oil exporting countries with the U.S. dollar. See text. for 
explanati'>n of this procedure. The raw data for these weights are from 
IMf's Direction oCTrade Statistics. Yearbook, Washington, 1986. 
b. Based on data from RBI Bulletin (1988) 
c. Residual invoicing share is allocated in proportil>n to the share I)C the 
respective country in India's total trade with these 11 countries. 
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The basic source of data for the construclicln (If the different measures 
of exchange rate uncertainty for India is the International Monetary fund 
(lMF). The particular series of data employed in this study are indicated below 
with their source. 
(D Bilateral exchange rates: We collected monthly dollar rates of the 
rupee and ten major currencies Ccom the IMF's International finandal 
statistics (IrS), Supplement Series on Exchange Rates, 1981 and 1985 and also 
from recent monthly issues of IrS. These rates are the period averages 
(average of daily rates) shown as 'af series in the Irs. The ten dollar rates are 
converted intI) rupee rates by using cross rates as shown below. 
ejus 
where ej. rupee rate of jth currency (units of rupee per jth currency) 
ei • rupee rate of U.S. dollar (units of rupee per U.S. dollar) 
ejus. dollar rate of jth currency (units of jth currency per U.S. dollar)6 
(ii) Wholesale prices: The basic data on wholesale prices of India and the 
other eleven countries are taken from I~1f's ill, Supplementary Series on 
Price Statistics, 1981 and 1986 and also various monthly issues of IfS (Hne (3) . 
. (m) Trade Data: . The data on export and import shares (If the eleven 
countries in India's aggregate trade required in the C<lnstruction (If trade 
weights are compiled from IMf's Direction (I{Trade Statistics WUTS), Yearbook, 
1986. 
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7.5 Previous Empirical Sludie, 
Before going into details of the present work on the rupee's exchange rate 
instability, it would be useful to mention the important past similar studies on 
India. A number of studies on developing country exchange rate experiences 
included India as one among the countries covered (see Black (1976), Crockett 
and Nsouli (1977), Gupta (1980), Helleiner (1981), Rana (1981), Lanyi and Suss 
(1982), and Bautista (1981, 1(82) J. A limitation of these common studies is that 
they focus on 'pre-float post-float' comparisons and, therefore. dl) not take 
into account the specific Corms of exchange rate systems adopted by individual 
countries in the floating period like the Indian basket peg. 
A study by Lipschitz (1979). however. tOI)k the Indian basket peg fl)r 
illustration and examined the impact the basket system had on rupee's 
stability. The study undertook comparison between two periods. 1973 11-19i8 
11. and 1975 IV-1978 11. the former a longer one which included the pre-basket 
period and the initial years oC the basket peg and the latter only the basket 
period. Based on the measure of variance (i.e .• square of standard deviatil)n), 
the study demonstrated that the new exchange regime had led to a substantial 
reduction in the instability of· India's major bilateral exchange rates 
(nominal) as well as the rupee's nominal and real effective exchange rates. 
The author, therefore. concluded. "the Indian elperiment with a basket. peg 
must be regarded as a notable success in achieving exchange rate stability" (p. 
««3). 
17S 
Varghe~e (I 98-fa, 19S-fb) made a more c(lmprehen~ive ~tudy (If India', 
b~.tet system. In analysing short-run exchange rate in~tability. the auth(lr 
concentrated on a few major bilateral exchange rates (nominal). The study 
employed only one basic mea!lure of exchange rate instability, i.e., the mean 
of absolute percentage changes of observed bilateral rates. but computed four 
variants of the same measure based on (D month-end rates (H) quarter-end 
rates CiiD monthly period average rates and (iv) quarterly period average 
rates. A major conClusion of the study which covered 13 years fr(lm 1971 
t.hrough 1983 is that the volatHity (If the bilateral exchange rates (If the rupee 
"continued to remain large after the basket Hnk (If the rupee in J975,~ w~ 
during the pre-ba!lket yearsH (l9Ma. p.1I03). 
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We examine the stability effect (If the Indian basket system in the 
backgr(lund (If the mutually contradictory results of those two previous 
studies. Our study covers a much longer period (If 20 years slarting from 1965 
and extending up to 1987. Besides, it examines the exchange rate variation in 
a more exhaustive way. Thus. we consider both nominal and real effective 
variation which include eleven important bilateral rates of the rupee. The 
analysis of the variabiliJity of a few bilateral rates as the previous studies did, 
cannot produce conclusive results unless we combine them through an 
appropriate weighting procedure and thereby obtain an average variation. 
Our study precisely does that. In addition, the present work computes 
variation in both nominal and real effective exchange rates of the rupee. 
which adjust the variation of bilateral rates for the covariation between 
bilateral rates. As we have stressed earHer. the individual traders are 
interested in effective variation alth(lugh the variation of effective eJcbange 
rate is the concern of the economy as a whole. 
7.6 Results of Present Study 
In the presence of eight different measures of exchange rate volatility it 
becomes some'Vo'hat tedious to draw a. clear conclusion from these results. SI), 
first of all, we attempt a general comparison of the results from the various 
exchange risk measures before focussing on the results from any particular 
measure or group of measures. 
7.6.1 Results from VariQus Exchange Risk Measures - A General Analysis 
Table 7.2 . exhibits the correlatil)n between the annual averages of the 
different exchange risk proxies we have constructed for India for the period 
1968-87. We can compare the results from these measures in three 
meaningful ways: one, between the basic statistical measures, Le., standard 
1S0 
Table 7.2: Correlation Matrb for the Various Trade-Yei,hted 
(Modified) Exchanle list Proxies (Sa.ple Period: 1961-17)1\ 
NEVI NEV2 VNEERl VNEER2 REVl REV2 VREERI VREER2 
NEVI I 
NEV2 .97 I 
VNf£RI .86 .75 I 
VNf£R2 .89 .91 .82 I 
REVJ .58 .52 ... 8 ... 6 I 
REV2 .70 .68 .58 .62 .93 1 
VREERI .24 .16 .34 .17 .84 .74 I 
VREER2 .42 .34 .46 .37 .84 .87 .86 I 
a. Each exchange risk measure has been computed on a month by month 
moving basis making use of observations in the preceding 12-month (.'eriod 
and averaged for each calender year. See text under Section 7.3 for the 
details of computation of each measure on a monthly basis. 
deviation of percentage changes (S.D\ CH, for short) versus mean of absolute 
percentage changes (MEAN ABS ,. CH, for short); two. effective variatil>Q 
versus variation in effective exchange rate; and three. nominal versus real 
measures. This three-v.'ay classification of the results from the various 
exchange rate volatility measures reveals that they are highly cl)rrelated v.·ith 
ISl 
regard to the first two methods of c(lmparison. whereas they are not in the 
remaining method. More explicitly, we find that the results from S.D ~ t:H and 
. . 
MEAN ADS ~ eH measures move very closely (the correlation coefficient 
ranges from .82 to .97) and so the results fr(lm the measures (If effective 
variation and variation of effective exchange rate (the correlation coefficient 
ranges from .S'f to .(1), but the results from nominal and real mea...cnlres do n(lt 
elhibit much correlation (the correlation coefficient ranges from .3'f to .68). 
This in turn implies that in the Indian case. the nominal exchan ge rate 
instability of a given magnitude does not necessarily generate a predictable 
magnitude of real exchange rate instability. 
Thislack of Uniformity in the pattern of nominal and real exchange rate 
volatility noted above in the Indian context has important implication. It is 
the real elchange rate stability that is desirable. Nominal elchange rate 
variation that compensates for relative price variati(ln and thereby stabilizes 
real exchange rate is quite consistent with the g(lal (If exchange rate stabiHty. 
Tbis point bas to be borne in mind in our assessment (If the impact (If the 
Indian basket system. 
figs. 7.1 to 7.4 give the graphing of the results from the various exchange 
risk measures (again on an annual monthly average basis). It may be noted 
that each graph depicts just one concept of exchange risk but 'measures it. 
through the two basic statistical formula, i,e., S.D % Cll and MEAN ABS ~ CII. A 
glance ot these graphs confirms our preliminary observations above, i e., the 
lS2. 
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FIG. 7.1 r\jOMINAL EFFECTIVE VARIATION 
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FIG. 7.3 REAL EFFECTIVE VARIATION OF 
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two statistical formulae give very similar results (If elchan ge rate instabiHty. 
the effective variation and the variation (If effective elchange rate (If the 
rupee also show similar trends. but movements in nominal and real elChange 
rate instability are not very close. 
NoW' we have to move on to a deeper analysis of the Indian experience in 
exchange rate volatility keeping in mind the question W'e raised at the 
beginning of this chapter. Le .. how did the Indian basket peg perform vis-a-
vis its objective oC exchange rate stabilization? Although our main thrust is 
on 'pre-basket versus post-basket' analysis it would be helpfullo keep in mind 
at least four different phases in India's exchange rate regime during the 20-
. 7 
year period of our study. 
(1) January 1968 to June 1972: This corresponds to the last phase of the 
Bretton Woods adjustable peg system: 
(ii) July 1972 to Septemberl975: During this period India folll)~·ed a 
'floating' sterling peg; 
(iii) October 197) to January 1979: This can be termed the first phase oC 
India's basket system during which the authorities restricted the 
margins for the operation of the system to!. 2.25 percent; and 
(iv) February 1979 to December 1987: During this period the Indian 
basket system became more flexible with the widening oC the 
adjustment margins to .!. ~ per cent. 
lS5 
As the graphs (Figs. 7.1 to 7.") are drawn on a calendar year b~i!' 'We 
cannot clearly distinguish the results bet'Ween the above sub-periods from 
them. H(I'f/ever, we have drawn lines in these graphs 'f/hich broadly 
demarcate these four phases. 
7.6.2 Rupee's Effective Variation, Nominalvs. Real 
Let us first concentrate on bilateral exchange rate instabiHty. i.e .• 
effective variation, nominal versus real. fig. 7.1 allo'Ws us to vie'W rupee's 
nominal effective variation me~ured by both S.D % l:H and MEAN AilS % eH 
measures. As expected. n(lminal effective variation had been marginal during 
1968-71 'Which corresponds to the last phase of Bretton Woods adjustable peg 
system. In the next phase. when the rupee foJJo'f/ed a sterling peg, effc<:uve 
variation in 'nominal terms rose very high. The high level of instabHity was 
brought dO'f/n considerably during 1975-19n which reflects the impact (If the 
introduction (If the basket peg. HO'f/ever. rupee's nominal effective variati(ln 
... orsened in 1978. almost a year before the widening of the margins (If the 
basket peg and the instability remained at a high levelthereafler \11" to J987. 
the last year (If (lur study. 
Table 7.3 on the next page reproduces the nominal effective variation of 
the rupee in numbers and compares it,with its real effecUve variation. It IllIlY 
be noted that Table 7.3 does not folll)w strictly the periodizatil>n which ,n laid 
down earliet'. The difference is that, the third period. i.e., the initial pba~ I>C 
the basket peg. is cut short to October 75-December 'n as it is only during 
\86 
this short period after the introduction (If the bi\!lket peg, that we c(luld n(ltice 
a significant drop in effective variation. We, therefore. combined the 
remaining part of the initial pha!le of the bi\!lket peg with the final ~uh­
period. This, we believe. gives 3 more clear picture (If the situation. 
Table 7.3 Nominal and Real Effec:ti.e Variation of Rupee by 
Different Sub-periods durin, 1«)68-873 
Type of Instability Measure 
A. Nominal Effective 
Variation (NEV) 
1. S.D. % CH 
2. MEAN ABS ,. CH 
B. Real Effective 
Variation (REV) 
1. S.D% CH 
2. MEAN ABS '7. CH 
________ Sub-period ____ _ 
Jan.68 
to 
Jun.72 
.476 
.306 
1.721 
1.290 
Ju1.72 
to 
Sept.7) 
1.816 
lA21 
z..168 
2.018 
Oct. 7) 
to 
Dec.77 
1.294 
1.038 
1.723 
1.~66 
Jan.i8 
to 
Dec.S7 
1.706 
a. All measures are computed (In a monthly moving basis. making use (If the 
prevjous 12 monthly observations. and then avera~ed for the various sub-
peri(lds. See text (Section 7.3) for the computational details (If each (If lhese 
measures on a month by month basis. 
The picture that emerges from Table 7.3 is that although rupee's D(lminal 
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effective variation had been brought down by slightly more than a quarter 
from July '72-September '75 to Octc.ber '75 - December '77, ie., from 18 tet 1.3 
by S.D % eH measure and 1." to 1.0 by MEAN ADS % eH me&!lure, the jn~tabiJjty 
rose during the next decade and reached an average level which has been 
only marginally lower than that during the sterling peg by S.D % ell mea..~\lre, 
i.e., it has been 1.7 during January '78-December '87 against 1.8 during July 
'7Z-September 'n. The nominal effective variation during the last decade has 
been 'Worse by the alternative measure, i.e. according to MEAN ADS % CH, the 
variation during January '78-December '87 at 1.5 has been in fact a little 
higher than that during July '72-September "15 at l.<f. 
TUrning to the measure of real effective variation, the fint cc.mment to 
make i, relating to its value in comparison with the nc.minal effective 
variation. By both statistical mea..~ures, the real effective variation has been 
larger than the nominal effective variation. More importantly, we notice a 
sharper relative difference between nominal and real effective variation 
during the adjustable peg period than during the rest of the period. That is .. as 
can be made out from Table 7.3, while during January '68-June '72 the real 
effective variation had been larger than the nominal effective variation by a 
factor of abc.ut four by both statistical measures, it has been higher by a 
factor of a maximum of one and a half thereafter. Another important fact is 
that we could find no significant change in this relation between nc.minal and 
real effective variation as between the sterling peg and the basket peg 
regime" 
lSS 
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The finding t.hal the relationship between the n(Iminal and real effective 
variation in India remained more or less intact through(lut t.he P(Ist-llreU(ln 
Woods period is ~ignificant. During this period India faced nol only the two 
external oil shocks but was also subject to adverse agricultural supply shocks 
almost 'coinciding with the elternal shocks. A~ a result, inflation in India 
reached levels much higher than those in the world economy, In spite (If this 
development, if the relationship between the nominal and real effective 
variation of the rupee remained fairly stable, then that would imply that part 
of the nominal exchange rate variation had gone towards offsetting the 
relative price variation and, therefore, had been beneficial. (Recall fr(lm 
earlier analysis that rupee's nominal effective variation remained high 
during the entire post-Bretton Woods period except during Oct. 75-Dec. '77). 
This advantage would not have readily been possible durin g the adjustable peg 
period when countries kept their nominal exchange rates stable by rule. This 
bas been amply illustrated in the Indian case during 1%8-71 when real 
effective variation had been about four times the nominal effective variation. 
What about the comparative performance between the basket peg and the 
sterling peg with respect to real effective variation? Table 7.3 bring!!! (IUt that, 
Jjke nominal effective variation, real effective variation als(I r(lse after a 
temporary dip for the first two-and-a-quarter of years of the basket peg. 
However, it is important to notice that the rise in real effective variation after 
December 1977 has been much less marked than the rise in nominal effective 
variation. Thus, the average level of real effective variation during January 
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'7S-December '87 ha!l been about 10-15 per cent lower than it~ average leveJ 
during the sterling peg period, i.e., July 72-September 75. This is in C(Intrast 
to the behaviour of nominal effective variation in the last decade, where it 
remained nearly equal (marginaJJy lower by S.D ,.. CH and marginalJy higher 
by MEAN ABS % CH) to the level during the sterling peg, as we saw earlier. 
7.6.3 Variation of Effective Exchange Rate, Nominal v~. Real. 
We now turn from effective variati(In to variati(ln of effective euhange 
rate. Table 7.4 brings up the picture of variation (If rupee's effective 
exchange rate, nominal as weJJ as real. in a similar fashion as we had f(,r the 
effective variation in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.4 Variation of the fffecliTe fKchaole Rate of Ru.,ee by 
Different Sub-.,eriods durinl 1968-87a 
Type of Instability Measure Sub-period 
Jan.68 Jul.72 Oct. 7j Jan.78 
to to to to 
Jun.72 Sept.7j Dec.77 ' . Dec.87 
A. Variati(ln (If Nominal 
I:ffective Elcbange Rate 
(VNITR) 
1. S.D ~ CH 322 1.237 .820 .956 
2. MEAN ABS ~ CH .22~ .905 .665 .864 
B. Variation of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate(VREER) 
1. S.D ~ CH 1.572 1.881 1.304 1.563 
Z. MEAN ABS ,. CH 1.161 1.544 1.304 I.Z9'~ 
a As in Table 7.3 foolnole. 
A comparison of Table 7." with Table 7.3, first of all, indicates that the 
variation of effective exchange rate has been invariably lower than the 
effective variation. This has been so CI)r both nominal and real cases. The 
explanation Cor the lower value oC the variation of effective exchange rate 
than the effective variation is the negative covarialion bet'W"een the different. 
bilateral exchange rates, Le., the variation in rupee's bilateral rates has been. 
to some extent. mutually cancelling. With a closer look at Tables 7.3 and 7." we 
. , 
can make out that the negative CI)variation has been relatively larger fl)f the 
nominal than fol' the real bilateral rates. This is implied from the fad that the 
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ratio of the variation in effective exchange rate to effective variation b )(Iwer 
in the case of nominal variation than for the real. This is not unexpected as 
there could be much more ~imi1arity (If movements in inflati(ln rales (If India's 
major trading partners than that in their nominal exchange rate~, In (Ither 
Y(lrds, .... e expect inflation rate, of the major induslrial counlries .... hich are 
India's important trading partners to converge more than their biJatend 
e1change rale" 
Another interesting finding relating to the covariation between bilateral 
rates is that the partial offsetting of the instablity in nominal bilateral rates 
has been larger during the last decade than during any time in the past. ~ a 
consequence, there should have been a better outcome of exchange rate 
stability in the last decade as recorded by the variation of nl)minal effective 
exchange rate than that recorded by its counterpart measure of effective 
variation. This is explained below. 
We noled in the earlier description of effective variatil)n that the nominal 
effective variation had been brought down significantly only during the first 
two-and-a quarter years of the basket peg, and in the subsequent period. the 
instability aggravated and remained at a high level almost equal tt) that 
during the sterling peg regime. The picture is somewhat different 'Vt'hen 'Vt'e 
Collt>w the variation in nominal effective exchange rate. The nominal 
effective exchange rate variation dropped by a quarter to one third from the 
average level of the sterling peg period in the first t'Wo-and-a-quarter years 
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of the ba!lket peg (the drop Wa.!l one third by S.D % CH and a quarter by MEAN 
ABS % CH). Thereafter, although the variation in nominal effective exchange 
rate ro,e, its average level during January '78-Decembel' '87 has been well 
below that during the sterling peg; it h~ been lower by a quarter by S.D % l:H 
but lower by only:> per cent by MEAN ABS % CU. 
Noy let us move on to the analy,is of the variation of rupee's real effective 
exchange rate. First of all, we see from Table 7.4 that, the variation (If real 
effective exchange rate of the rupee had been quite ~ubstanliaJ in 
compari~n with the variation in nominal effective exchange rate in the 
adjustable peg period of January '68-June '72; it was higher by a factor (If 
fjve. H(lwever, this factor came down to within the range (If (Ine-and-a-half t(l 
tyO during the rest of the period. This is almost similar to the resul~ (If 
rupee', effective variation, where ye ~ay that the ratio between real and 
nominal yariation remained much lower durin g the p05t-Bretton W (Iods period 
than that during the adjustable peg period 
What about the comparison between pre-ba!lket and post-ba!lket periods? 
It may be seen from Table 7.4 that the variation of real effective exchange 
. , 
rate during January 78-December '87, in addition to being well below its 
average level during the sterling peg period of July '72-September 75 0.3-1.6 
against 1.5-1.9 by the two statistical measures), it has nCll been much different 
from its level during lhe adjustable peg period of January '68-June 72 U .3-1.6 
against 1.2-1.6 by the two mea!lures). Thus, in terms of variation (If reaJ 
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effective exchange rate. the performance of the basket peg has been 
somewhat better than that indicated by the analysis (If variation (If Jlclminal 
effective elchange rate. 
7.7 Summary of findings 
The analysis of India's exchange rate uncertainty experience has been 
somewhat long drawn out by the sheer presentation of several measures of 
exchange rate uncertainty, Therefore, there is a need to bring together the 
different findings of that analysis. Table 75 provides the analysis in a 
summary form. 
Table 7.~ tells the story of India's post-basket peg exchange nte 
uncertainty by eight different measures in the form of percentage changes 
from its average level obtained during the sterling peg, i.e., June 72-
September 7~. The post-basket peg period has been divided into t,n) sub-
. 
periods: the first. corresponding to a short period of two-and-a-quarter 
. ,. 
years, i.e .. October 7~-December 'n. and the second period consisting of the 
remaining period up to December 1987. In the initial period, the table 
clearly indicates that there had been considerable reduction in exchange (,dte 
instability computed by all the eight measures. The decline ranged from one-
sixth tl) one third, a lov.er decline by the measure of MEAN AHS ,. CD 
particularly for the real exchange rate. However, it is rather difficult tl) draW' 
a general conclusion regarding the experience in the remaining period. The 
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wor~t is indicated by nominal effective variation by which there is (IDly a 
marginal change in the average level of exchange rate uncertainty during 
the last decade in c(lmpari~(In with that during the ~terling peg regime. with 
S.D ~ CH giving a smaJJ decline and MEAN ABS % CH giving a small rise. The 
real effective variation, however. declined by 13 percent by bolh basic 
measures. The variation of nominal effective exchange rate. which is 
nominal effective variation adjusted for the c(lvariation between hilateral 
elchange rates. has been also lower during the last decade in comparison with 
the sterling peg period, by almost a quarter by S.D % CH but only marginally 
lower by MEAN ABS % CH. However. the best performance of the basket peg is 
indicated by the variation of rupee's real effective exchange rate. It rec(lrded 
almost a uniform decrease of 16-17 percent by both basic measures from the 
level of sterling peg period. Another ~pect of the decline in variation (If real 
effective exchange rate during the last decade. which is not shown in Table 
7.5 but can be seen from Table 7 .... is that it brought the rupee's variation (If 
real effective exchange rate just equal to the average variation during the 
la..c;t phase of the adjustable peg period. ie .• January, 68-June '72. by S.D % CH 
measure and only marginally above that by MEAN ABS % CH measure. 
19,) 
Table 7.5 A Summary AJlalysis of the Performance of the Indian 
Basket Pel yUh respect to [IchaJlle Rate Stability 
Type of Instability Measure Percentage Change from June '72 to September '71 
. Oct. 75 to Dec. 77 Jan. 78 to Dec. 87 
At. Nominal Effective Variation 
(NEV) 
1. S.D 1. cn -28.7 -6.1 
2. MEAN ABS '7. CH -27.0 
+ "2 
Bl Real Effective Variation 
. (REV) 
1. S.D'7. CH -30.2 -13.0 
2. MEAN ABS '7. CH -22.4 -12.9 
A2 Variation of Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate (VNEER) 
1. S.D 1. cn -33.7 -22.7 
2. MEAN ABS '7. CH -26.~ 
- 4.5 
B2 Variation of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (VREER) 
1. S.D 1. CH -30.7 . '-16.9 
2. MEAN ABS '7. CH -15.5 
-15.9 
1% 
7.8 Comparison with Past Studies 
Now there remains the task oC reconciling our results ,·ith the mutually 
contradittory results of two previous studies whith we destribed in Scttion 
7 .•. Our ~esults are consistent with those of Lipschitz (1979) whose study 
covered only up to the second quarter of 1978. Our more detailed study shl)wed 
a substantial lessening of exchange rate instability up to Dec-ember 19n by 
using eight measures which contained both effective variation and variation 
of effective exchange rate in their nf)minal and real forms and by applying 
two mathematical formulae of exchange rate instability. Therefore, ,,'e have 
generalized lipschitz's conclusion of the success of the basket system in 
achieving exchange rate stability in its initial immediate period. However, 
our study does not find the impact of the basket system on exchange rate 
stabilization as remarkable after the initial two-and-a-quarter years of its 
working as it had been before .. 
Therefore. Varghese (1984a. 1984b) is correct in her conclusion lhatlhe 
voJatHity of major bilateral exchange rate of the rupee continued to be as 
high in the post-basket period as they were in the pre-bastet period. 
However. the author was not able to pinpoint the temporary reduction jn the 
in~tabiJjty of bilateral rates in the immediate post-basket peri(,d. Besides. 
more importantly. our study reveals that although Varghese js correct "ith 
regard to nominal bHateral rates. the matter is different regarding real 
bilateral rates. The conclusion is also quite different when we consider 
variation in effective exchange rates. either nominal or real. 
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footnote!!: Chapter 7 
1. Although exchange rate instability (volatility) and exchange rate risk 
(uncertainty) are conceptually separate as noted in the last chapter. they 
are used alternatively throughout this chapter and the rest of this thesis 
to mean the latter. The basic difference between the two is that the 
exchange risk constitutes only that portion of exchange rate instability 
which is unanticipated. 
2. This is also the argument given by Mussa (1986) in employing peril)d 
average exchange rates rather than end-of-the period exchange rates in 
his very detailed study of exchange rate volatility in sixteen advanced 
industrial countries. However. the author indicated that the use of the 
quarterly period average rather than end-of-the-quarter data reduces 
the variance of change in exchange rate by nearly one-third (p. 13~~ of 
Mussa.. 1986) 
3. In fact we did construct all the four versions of this measure as "ell and 
noted conflict in results between all of them and those under the other 
two. particularly during periods when the unde-rlying exchilng~ n,te 
series exhibited marked upward trends. This, we believe. has validated our 
decision not to employ this measure further. In addition, we alsl) tested fl)r 
stationarity of all the major bilateral rates involved, both real and 
nominal. by using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test and found that 
only the first differences of these exchange rates (in percentages) are 
stationary. 
\98 
.f, About 14 percent (If India's aggregate trade during 1979-81 has been with 
what is called the 'bilateral grclup' countries comprising the U.S.SR. 
Poland, East Germany. Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The trade and 
financial transactions with these countries are settled in non-cclnvertible 
Indian rupees, 
5. The Reserve Bank data do not give the break-up of all the eleven 
currencies in the. invoicing of India's trade. For the purpose 1)[ our 
calculation. we have distributed the small residual group data over the left 
out currencies among the eleven in proportion to their respective trade 
shares. 
6. In the case of pound sterling and Australian doUar, the reciprocal. i.e., the 
units of U.S. dollar per the respective national currency is given in IfS. 
Therefore. the formula applied to these rates for deriving rupee rates is 
given by ej • ei· ejus' 
7. The more details of these phases ~ discussed in Chapter <t. 
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Chapter 8 
Studies on EKc:hanle Rate Instability and Trade Boys: A Survey 
8.1 Introduction 
Studies on the impact of exchange risk on trade flows differ both in the 
treatment of the exchange risk variable and in the inclusion of other variables 
that influence trade. Some studies consider exchange risk in nominal terms 
whereas others incorporate real exchange risk. There has also been a 
distinction between studies which concentrate on bilateral trade flows and those 
which consider aggregate trade flows of individual countries. finally, whereas 
some studies employ a full-fledged supply-demand model in the specification of 
the exchange risk-augmented trade functions, others consider either a demand 
or a supply function. We propose in this chapter to review some of the major 
studies that estimated the influence of exchange risk on trade. firist. we shall 
deal with developed country studies and later the studies on developing 
countries. In the final section we shall attempt a general evaluation of these 
studies. 
8.2 Developed Country Studies 
8.2.1 Early Studies 
Among the early studies on the impact of exchange rate variation on trade 
must be mentioned the work by Clark and Haulk (1972) which, although carried 
out before the start of the current system of generaHsed floating, is significant 
, 
as it covered the Canadian case for 1952-70 during the earHer part of which the 
Canadian doUar floated. This study used the standard deviation of daily nominal 
exchange rates during each quarter as the elchange risk variable but could not 
detect any adverse effect of exchange rate instabiHty on the Canadian trade .. 
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Makin (1976) studied the early impact of floating using data from 1960 IV to 
·1973 IV. This study estimated individual import functil;ms for West Germany. 
Japan. the U.K. and Canada and contained a 6-monthly moving standard 
deviation as the exchange risk variable. Makin also did not find any significant 
effect of exchange rate variability on trade volume. 
8.2.2 Recent Bilateral Studies 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) can be considered as the first systematic study 
of the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows. This study is in a 
way path-breaking as it inspired several studies which followed it. First of all. 
for the first time Hooper and Kohlhagen analysed bilateral trade flows in 
contrast to global trade flows of individual countries. Secondly. the study was 
based on a formal supply-demand model. It derived reduced form equations by 
solving the model in equiliriumconditions. As a result. it could study the effect 
of exchange risk not only on trade volumes but also on trade prices. The study 
examined the bilateral trade of the U.S.A. and West Germany with other 
major industrial countries during 1965-75. The authors experimented with a 
number of elchange risk proxies including variances of 'Weekly spot and 
forward rates and found out that the average 'Weekly absolute difference 
between the current spot and past forward rates gave the best results. The 
conclusion of their study was that exchange risk did not have any significant 
effect on volume of trade but it strongly affected trade prices. 
Hooper and Kohlhagen shoved that the nature of the impact of exchange 
, 
rate volatility on trade prices depends on the invoicing pattern of trade. 
Suppose the trade is denominated in exporter's currency. Then the importer 
bears the exchange risk as his payments in domestic currency is subject to 
uncertainty. That vould reduce demand and thereby the price. On the other 
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hand. if the trade is denominated in importer's currency then the exporter 
bears the risk causing a decline in supply and thereby a rise in price. The 
authors found that. nine out of eleven cases of prices of U.S. exports and German 
exports and imports where the trade invoicing is expected to be in exporters' 
currency. the proxy for exchange rate uncertainty had either weak negative or 
significantly negative co-efficients. This indicated that exchange risk was 
, 
mostly borne by importers which depressed import demand and in turn their 
market prices. By contrast. in four out of five U.S. import cases. exchange risk 
had increased prices reflecting the fact that U.S. imports are invoiced mostly in 
dollar and hence. the exporter faced most of the risk which caused the prices to 
rise. 
The contrast in the impact of exchange rate uncertainty between trade 
prices and volume indicated in Hooper- Kohlhagen study needs ·explanation. It 
may be noted that the authors used a very short-term trade model assuming only 
one-quarter order delivery lag. In that context they state. "This apparent 
discrepancy of a price effect in the absence of a statistically significant 
quantity effect could be explained by the presence of short-run price-inelastic 
export supply in the case of a fall in price and short-run inelastic import-
demand in the case of a price increase". (p.501) 
In the Hooper-Kohlhagen model. the future exchange rate is the only source 
of uncertainty, and future prices and costs are assumed to be known with 
certainty. Cushman (1983) modified this model to accommodate relative 
foreign-domestic price uncertainty together with nominal exchange rate 
uncertainty by using real exchange rate uncertainty. His study covered 
bilateral trade flows similar to that of Hooper and Kohlhagen. but extended them 
up to 19n. The real exchange rate uncertainty was measured by the moving 
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standard deviations oC Cour-quarterly percentage changes in real exchange rate 
ending in the current quarter. In contrast to Hooper-Kohlhagen results, 
Cushman Cound significant negative coefficients Cor exchange risk variable in 
six out oC Courteen bilateral trade flows, but,. Cewer cases of significant price 
effects. 
An I.MJ.U98-fa) study extended Cushman's work Cor period up to 1982 by 
using a simplified version oC his model and estimated equations Cor a much 
larger set of bilateral flows bu~ could not find any significant effect oC 
exchange rate instability on trade. This implied that Cushman's results vere 
not robust across countries and time periods. 
In a very recent study, Cushman (1988) repeated his 1983 exercise for the 
U.S. bilateral trade with other six major industrial countries for 197-4-1983, and 
tried more proxies Cor real exchange risk in addition to the one in his earlier 
, , 
paper. The new risk variables make, use of 12-monthly real exchange rate 
changes, instead oC 4 quarterly observations in the old measure, Cor calculating 
quarterly moving standard deviation measures. Besides, t~ey differ in the 
assumption of inflation and nominal exchange rate elp~ctations.l Cu~hman 
could show that seven out of twelve U.S. bHateral trade flows had at least one 
significantly negative sign among aU the five exchange risk pr~lies. 
Cushman haie several explanations for the dissimilarity between his recent 
results and the IMF results which contradicted his earlier study. Firstly, 
, , 
Cushman experimented with several risk prolies. Secondly, IMF results could be 
subject to a specification bias due to a structural change as it combined both 
. , 
find and floating rate periods. Kenen and Rodrik (198-4) had earHer pointed out 
that the change in exchange rate regime could introduce a possible break in 
structure. Thirdly. Cushman notes that the IMF study did not correct for serial 
20 .. 
correlation in many oC the trade equations. Finally, the IMF study suffered Crom 
omitted variable bias as it did not employ the full version of Cushman model but 
simplified it by omitting several variables. 
Thursby and Thursby (1985) in their study of the impact of exchange risk, 
pooled the cross-section data of nineteen trading partners for 5 years. 1973-n . 
. This study which used alternatively both real and nominal exchange rate 
variability measures found that eJports (in value terms) were significantly 
affected in nearly half of the cases. 
Much more interesting has been Thursby and Thursby's more recent study 
(1987) which. within a demand-supply framework, included variables to test 
three separate things: (a) the gravity model (b) the Linder hypothesis and (c) 
the exchange risk effect. The gravity model relates bilateral trade positively to 
incomes of the countries concerned and negatively to the distance between. 
them. The Linder hypothesis. as applied to bilateral trade. implies that 
manufaturing trade between two nations will be negatively related to the 
difference in their per capita income. This study included seventeen countries 
for the period 1974-82 and. like their earlier one. pooled annual data for the 
estimation of bHateral eJport equations for each of these countries. The 
exchange rate instability measure was calculated monthly as the variance of the 
previous 12-monthly exchange rates around a' quadratic trend, and then 
averaged for each year. Although' both nominal and real exchange rate 
measures were tried alternatively in each equation. that did not make much 
difference in the results .. The study yielded results to support the hypothesis 
that the value of bilateral trade is affected by exchange risk; of the seventeen 
export patterns. ten gave significantly negative coefficients for the exchange 
risk proxy. However, as the export data were in nominal units. the study could 
20~ 
not distinguish between quantity and price effects. 
8.2.3 Recent Multilateral Studies 
A major drawback with the bilateral trade flow studies surveyed so far is that 
they do not take account of exchange rate effects of third country competition. 
For example, trade between country A and country B is influenced not only by 
the exchange rate between A and B but also by the array of exchange rates of 
these countries with those other countries whose products compete with the 
products of A and B. Therefore, it is more appropriate to make individual 
country's aggregate trade and effective exchange rate the focus of study rather 
than bilateral trade and bilateral exchange rate. 
Akhtar and Hilton (198 .. ) estimated price and quantity equations for 
aggregate exports and imports of two countries, the U.S.A. and West Germany for 
197.f-81. The study used quarterly data, and the exchange risk proxy employed 
was the standard deviation of daily nominal trade-weighted effective exchange 
rates during each quarter. Akhtar and Hilton opted for nominal exchange rate 
volatility measure on two arguments: one, the exchange rate changes are much 
more unpredictable than relative prices and two, there is no empirical support 
for the purchasing power parity principle over the medium-term. The 
regression study indicated weekly significant negative effect of exchange risk 
on U.S. export volume, strongly significant negative effect on German export 
and import volumes and weekly significant positive effect on U.S. import prices. 
Gotur (198~) applied the Akhtar-Hilton methodology to three more countries 
(France, Japan and the U.lU but came out with no signficant negative effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade volumes of these countries but significant 
effects on their trade prices. Gotur also subjected the U.S. and the West German 
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results of Akhtar and Hilton to a baUery of sensitivity tests regading sampling 
period. Cochran-Orcutt autogression correction procedures. polynominal lag 
structure. volatility measure etc. The outcome of these tests cast serious doubts 
on the validity of the Akhtar-Hilton results. 
, . 
The work by Kenen and Rodrik (198<{.1986) marks an advance in the area of 
estimation of the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. Akhtar and 
Hilton. although using effective exchange rates in computing exchange risk 
variable for each country. followed a rather ad hoc procedure for the purpose 
in the sense that the number of bilateral rates involved in the calculation of 
effective exchange rate for each country varied from country to country (nine 
for the U.S.A. and thirteen for West Germany). Kenen and Rodrik. on the other 
hand. standardized the procedure by defining effective exchange rate for each 
country in their study in terms of the same number of countries/currencies. 
.' . 
Their study covered eleven developed cou?tries (Group of Ten countries plus 
Switzerland) and. in order to calculate each country's effective exchange rate. 
. . 
they used bilateral rates between that country's currency and those of the 
remaining ten and weighted each rate by the share of the corresponding 
country in the total of that country's exports to or imports from the other ten. 
Kenen and Rodrik admit that their procedure has two limitations: first. it 
ignores the exchange rates and inflation di~ferentials between the developed 
countries under study and countries in the third world and second. it 
. 
underplays the third market effec~ of exchange rate changes. Regarding the 
latter. we have already noted that the studies on bilateral trade flows completely 
ignored this factor. But in the multilateral trade flow study by Kenen and 
. . 
Rodrik. the variance of the trade-weighted effective exchange rate. although 
. . .' . 
incorporating the covariance between the bilateral rates within the group of 
. . . 
countries studied. do not give appropriate weighting to such covariance.2 The 
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only way to solve such a problem in a multilateral context is to use elasticity 
weights as we explained in Chapter 6. 
Kenen and Rodrik considered three basic measures of exchange risk, all of 
them in real terms: (1) the standard deviation of the monthly percentage 
changes in real exchange rate, (2) the standard error of real exchange rate 
obtained from a log-linear trend equation, and (3) the standard error of real 
exchange rate obtained from a first-order autoregression equation. Each of 
these basic measures had t'Wo versions; the first covers the 2<f-month period 
preceding the current quarter and the second covers the 12-month period 
preceding the current quarter. Of these t'Wo versions, the former, i.e., the one 
based on the preceding 24-month period 'Was claimed to have performed better. 
The study used only the floating period (1975 I -1984 IV) which according to the 
authors avoid specification bias on account of the change in the exchange rate 
regime. Finally. they used a trade model incorporating. in addition to the 
exchange risk variable. the income and price variables consistent with the 
current literature on international trade. We may. however. note one possible 
bias in this model. namely. the neglect of the capacity variable, a common 
affliction 'With many of the contemporary trade models.3 
Kenen and Rodrik (1986) reported seven (out of eleven) negative effects of 
exchange risk on imports of which only four were significant. In their 1984 
study. which covered exports as well. there were many positive effects on 
exports and only three negative significanteCfects. In short. Kenen and Rodrik 
studies on exchange rate volatility and trade. although brought some 
methodological improvement in the field of investigation and showed some 
evidence of the depressing effect of exchange rate volatility on trade volumes. 
the evidence produced by them does not appear to be overwhelming. 
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It may be noted that the debate on whether exchange rate uncertainty 
should be treated as a nominal variable or a real variable continues. In a recent 
study undertaken by Bailey, Tavlas and Ulan (1986) for the major seven 
industrial countries. the authors used a nominal exchange risk variable. This 
study which used quarterly data for 1973 I through 1984 III. regressed the 
aggregate export volume of each of these countries on the real GDP of 12 OEeD 
nations. real export earnings of oil exporters. the terms of trade and the 
elChange risk. The terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the export unit value 
index of each country in dollar terms to the dollar export unit value index of the 
IMf's 'industrial country' group.of Since the terms of trade term has dollar unit 
values on both the numerator and the denominator. it is. in fact. the real terms 
of trade and the authors consider it standing for the real exchange rate in terms 
of tr~ed goods. 
The particular measure of exchange rate instability employed by Bailey et 
a1. is very simple. namely. the absolute quarterly percentage changes in 
nominal effective exchange rate. The effective exchange rate made use of by 
the authors are those calculated by the Morgan Guaranty Bank. The authors 
tried the volatility measure both in its current quarter form and also in an 
eight-period. second degree polynomial-distributed lag form. However. the 
study could not report any significant relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and aggregate exports in any of the seven industrial countries. 
Bailey et a1. conducted a more recent study (1987) which covered the period 
1975 1- 1985 III. This work differed from the earlier one in at least three main 
regards: (a) the alternative use of nominal and real elChange risk measures. 
the latter adjusted for the differential movements in manufacturing wholesale 
price indices between home and trading partner countries. (b) the 
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consideration of a second basic measure of exchange risk i.e .. an eight-quarter 
period moving standard deviation besides the earHer measure of absolute 
quarterly percentage changes, and (d the eltension of the study to four smaller 
OECD countries in addition to the big seven OECD countries covered in the earHer 
study. The authors found a negative and significant impact of real elthange 
risk for Italy with regard to both of the basic statistical measures, and for 
Germany based on the measure of absolute quarterly percentage changes. The 
nominal elchange risk did not yield any significant results which is consistent 
with the authors' earHer study. Considering only those equations which 
incorporated only the real elchange risk measure, the authors got only three 
instances out of seventeen where the elchange risk negatively and 
significanUy affected real elports. On the other hand. in two cases. ie., the U.K. 
and the U.S., the real elChange risk gave positively significant results. The 
authors argue that the positively significant results of elChange risk on trade 
volume are consistent with theory. We already discussed in Chapter 6 about the 
i 
theoretical possib)ity of a positive relationship between elthange risk and trade 
volume and we will again have occasion to refer to it later in this chapter. 
8.3 Developing Country Studies 
In contrast to developed country studies. the studies on the impact of 
elchange rate instability relating to developing countries have been few and 
far between. That appears strange in the .contelt of a more likely adverse 
impact of exchange risk that developing countries could have had. in 
comparison with their developed country counterparts.:> Besides. while 
elchange rate instability in developed cuntries could be endogenous resulting 
from other developments within the country, a fact which makes the estimation 
of its separate impact econometrically difficult (see J.M.~., 1984.a. pp.33-34), in 
LDCs. elChange rate instabiHty is largely exogenous, imposed from abroad or 
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resulting from the pegging behaviour of their governments. This fact should 
make the trade effects of exchange rate volatility more easily measurable in 
lDCs. One reason for this relative neglect in the study of lDC experience 
relating to exchange rate instability could be that most of the developing 
countries have adapted themselves to the world-wide floating of major 
currencies by following one type or other of pegging systems which could 
presumably have had the effect of insulating them, on the average, from high 
exchange rate instability. 
Two of the early econometric studies to test the link between exchange rate 
uncertainty and lDC exports could be found in Behrman (1976, pp.18~-90) and 
Diaz-Alejandro (1976, pp.66-70. Both of these studies cover the pre-floating 
period. The first dealt with the Chilean case of real exports subdivided into 
agriculture, mining and industry for 1947-6~. It showed that exchange rate 
variation, measured as the standard deviation of real exchange rate, had highly 
significant adverse effects on mining and industrial exports and marginally 
significant adverse effects on agricultural exports. The second study pertains to 
the Colombian experience during 19~~-197Z for exports other than coffee and 
oi16, and reported significant negative impact of exchange rate uncertainty, 
proxied as the standard deviation of quarterly percentage changes in real 
exchange rate, on the growth oC Colombian dollar value oC exports of non-
traditional items, which are largely manufactured products. However, this 
study could not detect any impact of exchange rate uncertainty on a group of 
primary commodity exports consisting of bananas, cotton, sugar and tobacco 
(BCST). 
The dissimilarity in the effect of exchange risk as between agricultural and 
non-agricultural exports brought out in the two early LDC studies mentioned 
above is significant. We may explain why the exports from agricultural sector 
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are less affected by exchange risk than those from non-agricultural sector in 
terms of the lower price elasticity of supply in the former sector than the latter. 
From this result it would be wrong. however. to conclude that agricultural 
exports are free from all adverse eCCects of exchange risk. To examine the issue 
further, we need to estimate the impact of exchange risk on agricultural export 
prices separately. Unfortunately, there have been no LDC empirical studies so 
far testing separately the impact of exchange risk on export prices. 
A major work which examined the relationship between exchange. rate 
uncertainty and trade in a developing country context has been Coes (1981). 
which deals with the Brazilian experience before and after the introduction of 
the crawling peg in August 1968. Coes estimated export equations' for 22 sectors 
covering both primary and manufacturing products using annual data for 
1957-73. Coes argues that for Brazil. taking the cruzeiro - U.S dollar rate as the 
nominal exchange rate and the ratio of the U.S. and BraH's wholesale price 
indices as the relative price for converting the former into real exchange rate. 
would not be much off the mark. Regading the relevance of real exchange rate 
uncertainty rather than its nominal counterpart in Brazil. Coes states. 
"Although money ilJusion may linger on elsewhere. it is reasonable to assume it 
long dead in Brazil ...... (p.ll"). The author is referring to the eCCect of long 
period of high inflation which engenders a consciousness for real exchange 
rate among economic agents. This has direct relevance on the choice of 
exchange rate volatility measure between the real and the nominal that 
remains a highly contested issue in the literature.' 
Coes constructed real exchange rate uncertainty indices for Brazil based on 
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) · mean -preserving spread' with the additional 
assumption of non-increasing absolute risk aversion. The estimation of the 
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equations which included additional variables representing domestic demand 
.' " (capacity utilization) in the economy and relative prices of export products 
yielded highly significant negative eCCects of exchange rate uncertainty on 
exports in majority of cases. 
Although the study on Brazil indicated adverse eCCect of exchange rate 
instability during the pre-crawling peg period, Coes himself is cautious in 
drawing a strong conclusion from these econometric results. It is possible that 
the uncertainty proxy could be capturing the eCCects much more of a change in 
the economic environment of Brazil since the late 1960s when government 
policy there began clearly to become more eJport-oriented. The case of Brazil is 
atypical in two other ways: first, it was not a case of increased exchange rate 
instability after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system but 
rather of decreasing real exchange rate uncertainty after 1968 with the 
introduction of a crawling peg, and second, the quantum of change in exchange 
, . 
rate instability was much larger in Brazil than in the case of many developed as 
. , 
weU as developing countries. 
Gupta (1980) considered the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on the 
, 
exports of five developing countries <India, Israel. South Korea, Mexico and 
Taiwan) during 1960 I - 1978 IV. The author addressed himself to two basic 
questions: one, whether exchange rate uncertainty has depressed aggregate 
exports of these LDCs and two, whether in the case of countries which adopted a 
single-currency peg, there has been a shift in their exports toward the peg-
currency country. 
Gupta used export supply functions on the assumption that these countries 
, ' " '8 '" 
face a perfectly elastic demand curve for their products. The supply variables 
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included in the export function are export price, domestic price and a capacity 
variable represented by the logarithmic trend in industrial production. Two 
alternative measures of exchange risk were computed by the author from the 
price of dO,mestic currency in terms of the SDR: (1) the mean absolute error, 
i.e., the mean of the past 12-month absolute first differences (not in 
percentages) of exchange rates and (Z) the root mean squar~ error, i.e., the 
square root of the mean of the squares of past lZ-month first differences of 
. . 
exchange rates. The first measure, as claimed by the author, is sensitive to the 
frequency of changes in exchange rates and the latter sensitive to the 
magnitude of changes. 
The study by Gupta on aggregate exports indicated significant negative 
effects oC exchange risk for India and Israel and not for any of the other 
countries. Regarding bilateral exports, the author could not find any evidence 
for the 'trade concentration' hypothesis in countries which maintained a fixed 
relation with the U.S. dollar during the period under study H.e., Mexico, Taiwan 
and South Korea). 
Gupta's study, however, suffers from a number of difficulties. First of all, it 
relies on the static expectation hypothesis regarding exchange rate risk and 
does not consider alternative measures like the standard deviation of percentage 
changes. Secondly, Gupta's measure oC exchange rate instability is not free 
from unit of measurement and, therefore, is subject to bias even for intra-
country comparison. Thirdly, the simplification of exchange rate as the SDR 
value of domestic currency may not be quite appropriate for the set of countries 
covered in the study. Fourthly, with regard to India, the study estimated a high 
productive capacity elasticity in export Cunction (0.8 - 0.9) along with a very 
low export price elasticity (0.03) implying a heavy self-driven pressure for 
exports in that country irrespective of the price situation. This cannot be true 
214 
for a strongly inward-oriented economy like India. 
While in the literature the controversy regarding whether nominal 
exchange risk or it.! real counterpart is the appropriate variable to include in 
trade equations continued, Bautista (1981) defined the concepts of nominal and 
real exchange rate in an altogether different fashion such that both the real 
and the nominal risk variables could simultaneously be used in the same 
equation. He computed nominal elchange rate as a net (export minus imports) 
trade-weighted effective exchange rate so that it measures the anti-elPort bias 
in favour of import-substituting industries. On the other hand, the real 
elchange rate is computed as an elport-weighted real effective exchange rate 
so that it measures the anti-export bias in favour of production for the domestic 
market? The tvo measures of exchange rate instability are computed for each 
month as the standard deviation of the previous 12-month nominal/real 
elchange rates and averaged for each quarter. Bautista's s~udy covered samples 
of 22 LDCs for the period, 1974-79, and used quarterly data on export earnings in 
U.S. dollars. It gave negatively significant effects for only two cases (Argentina 
and Portugal) of nominal exchange rate uncertainty, and four cases (Argentina, 
Colombia, Greece and South Korea) of negatively sHgnificant effects of real 
exchange rate uncertainty. The author also reported two additional cases of 
marginally significant negative effects with regard to nominal elchange risk 
(Morocco and Philippines), and five additional cases of marginally significant 
effect of real elchange risk (Costa Rica. India, Melico, Spain and Taiwan) .. 
Bautista's exchange risk result.! are vitiated by the fact that he employed the 
standard deviation of nominal/real effective elchange rather than the standard 
deviation of percentage changes in nominal/real effective elchange rate. We 
have discussed at length in Chapter 6, the drawback of the former measure 
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when exchange rate series exhibit a clear trend. In simple terms, Bautista's 
measure cannot be taken as a measure for short-term exchange rate instability 
as it would have captured a part of the Ion g-term trend of the series as well. 
Rana (1982) examined the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on import 
volumes in four ASEAN countries (South Korea, Taiwan. Thailand and 
Philippines) by speciifying an import demand function which, other than the 
exchange risk variable, contained relative price, real income, real elPort 
earnings and the nominal import-weighted effective exchange rate. The author 
employed various alternative exchange risk proxies based on standard deviation 
and Gini mean difference of quarterly proportionate changes in both nominal 
and real import-weighted exchange rate. The study which covered different 
periods for different countries from 1960 I to 1977 II showed that import orders 
were significantly affected by real elchange rate instability in three countries 
(South Korea. Philippines and Thailand) and by . nominal enhange rate 
instability in one country (Jaiwan). 
All the developing country studies so far. considered aggregate trade (except 
that a part of Gupta's study was on bilateral exports). Chan and Wong (198:». in 
contrast. estimated bilateral export functions for Hong Kong with regad to her 
major markets. the U.S .• the U.K. and West Germany for 19771 - 198-4 III. Besides 
real income of the importing country. real elchange rate and time trend 
vadables. Hong Kong's export function included the exchange risk proxy 
computed, following Cushman (1983), as the standard deviation of quarterly 
percentage changes of real bilateral exchange rate for the recent four quarters 
ending with the current period. However, the authors found no empirical 
evidence of any significant negative effect of exchange rate variability, 
current or lagged, on the volume of Hong Kong's bilateral exports in spite of 
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experimenting with alternative estimation methods. However. the estimates of 
Chan and Wong could be challenged as they are subject to simultaneity bias 
stemming Crom the neglect of supply influences. 
8." A General Evaluation 
The survey of the major studies on the impact of exchange rate instability 
indicates rather mixed results. There could be several possible reasons why 
studies have not produced conclusive evidence of an adverse impact of short-
term elChan ge rate volatility on trade flows. 
First. the previous studies perhaps have not been able to construct proxies oC 
exchange risk which could reasonably capture the cost of exchange risk. In 
more recent years there have been attempts to employ a series of risk proxies 
based on different expectations assumptions in an aUempt to get significant 
results by at least one of them. This is a questionable approach as the authors 
. 
have not been able to give any convincing reason for choosing one proxy over 
the others but rather have gone by the performance of each proxy in 
producing" good results". Here we notice a highly objectionable tendency to 
forego the need to pursue good theory in selecting an appropriate exchange 
risk measure in Cavour of an attempt to report significant statistical results. 
Willett (1986) suggests the need for analysing the impact of exchange risk 
on trade flows by examining the contribution the exchange risk makes to firm's 
overall portfolio risk. He particularly points to the empirical studies 'Which 
indicate a reduction in overall risk through inclusion of several risky 
international assets. Theoretically. this arises from diversification of the risk, 
. .' 
i.e .. through the negative covariance between a firm's different assets, the 
returns from each although elhibit high variance. (See also farrell et. al., 
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1983). If this is true then it can explain. to a certain extent. the insignificant or 
even positive exchange risk effects detected by some pre:vious studies on 
developed country trade volumes. This is also consistent with the theoretical 
possibility of a stimulating effect of exchange risk on trade put forward by 
Bailey et a1. (1987).10 
Second'is the argument by the defenders of the present floating system that 
exchange rate instability is more a reflection of the underlying instability of 
the domestic economies than an independent cause oC instability by itself. 
(Willeu. 1986. p.Sl02). Thus exchange rate instability is not eiogenous but 
rather endogenous. and hence capturing its separate effect. if any. is 
statistically difficult. This idea is very well echoed in the revieW' of exchange 
rate volatility studies by the I.M.F.C198«a). 
Pursuing the above-mentioned idea further. it can be envisaged that 
attempts to keep exchange rates stable administratively in the presence of 
underlying instability of the system could jeopardise trade more than when 
exchange rates are allowed to be unstable to absorb the disturbance elsewhere 
in the system. For example. in the event of a fall in demand for a country's 
exports. exports and domestic output could be stabilized if the exchange rate is 
free to depreciate. On the other hand. if the exchange rate were kept rigidly 
. , 
fixed that W'ould be destabilizing to the domestic economy. Therefore. exchange 
, . 
rate instability need not be costly ~n a relative sense (see Crockett and Goldstein. 
1987. p.3). 
In an absolute sense. it is pointed out that the exposure to risk arising from 
exchange rate instability has been reduced by the development of effective 
hedging techniques and future markets at a relatively loW' cost (see Group of 
Ten Report. 1985. paragraph 16). This could be a third reason for not finding 
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adequate evidence of an adverse effect of currency risk on trade volumes. 
Fourth, the previous studies could be at fault in employing imprecise trade 
functions. There are a number of influences on trade behaviour and it has not 
been easy to select the most crucial variables. Particularly, most trade models 
are not fully specified supply-demand models, but either simple demand models 
which ignore the supply variables or supply models "hich ignore the demand 
varibles. The specification of a satisfactory dynamics for the equation is yet 
anoLher difficult issue. It is possible that the impact of elchange risk on trade 
flow, could take a much longer period than what has been allowed for by the 
previous investigators using mostly quarterly data. In short. the previous 
elchange risk studies may have been subject to specification mistakes relating 
to trade equations. 
Each of the reasons detailed above that are likely to be behind the failure to 
estabHsh empirically a definite link between eIChange risk and trade flows, 
need to be looked at from the point of view of developed and developing 
countries separately. Regarding the inaccuracy of the exchange risk prolies 
used. we agree that there is need to. view eIChange risk in an altogether 
different perspective. In the context of developed countries, there appears to be 
a large involvement in trade of big multi-product multinational firms. These 
firms possess firstly, a great degree of geographical dispersion in their trade 
and secondly, asset portfolios which are highly diversified. The first aspect 
moYe 
makes the 'variation of effective exchange rate' a'reasonable proxy of exchange; 
" risk than the 'effective variation', whiJe the second aspect entails the 
consideration of covariance relationships among the entire asset portfoHos of 
the trader in order to determine the elchange rist effect. 
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In LDCs, individual trading firms are neither much diversified 
geographically nor do they possess diversified international asset portfolios. 
Therefore. an 'effective variation' measure like the one initially suggested by 
Frankal (1975) would be a more appropriate proxy for elchange risk (see also 
La.nyi and Suss, 1982: and I.M.F .. 198-{a). However. it may be noted that, we have 
not come across any single empirical trade study on developing countries 
making use of effective variation measures. 
Endogeneity of exchange rate instability is also true mostly with respect 
only to developed countries. In the case of most developing countries, exchange 
rate instability is largely imposed from abroad due to the instability of major 
currencies in the international market and partly also due to the pegging 
practices of developing country authorities. Therefore, we expect the 
tractability of the impact of exchange rate instab~lity easier in these countries 
than in developed countries. 
The availability of low-cost insurance facilities for the market operators is 
found mainly in developed industrial countries. The majority of developing 
countries still lack well developed financial markets with arrangements for 
forward cover and. therefore. market participants in these countries are 
exposed to high exchange risk (see Group of Twenty-Four Report. 1985, 
paragraph 63). 
The fourth and final explanation for the lack of robust exchange risk results 
is the familiar mis-specification problem. It appears that this difficulty is more 
evident in developing countries than for developed country studies. The 
formulation of an elPort function is beset with grealer trouble in the context of 
the former than the latler. This is particularly so due to the significance of 
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supply factors in the former. More of this will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
However. it needs saying here that. in order to improve upon the estimates of 
the trade effects of exchange risk in developing countries, more attention have 
to be paid on first. the correct specification of teade equations and second. the 
construction of accurate statistical proxies of exchange risk relevant to these 
countries. 
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footnotes: ChlPtor 8 
1. Regarding nominal exchange rate expectations. one measure uses 
forward exchange rate without risk premium and two other measures 
make use of time-varying risk premium. See Cushman (1988) p1'.320-1 
for more details. 
2. See Cushman (1986) for an attempt to incorporate third country 
exchange risk effects for U.S. exports within a bilateral framework by 
the use of covariance term. 
3. See the trade literature survey for Goldstein and Khan (198~». By 
ignoring the supply side of trade, these studies assume infinite elasticity 
of export su pply with respect to price and other variables. 
-t. For Canada, the terms of trade term uses the export unit values of Canada 
and the U.S. as the bulk of the former's elPorts is to the latter. 
:;. Please see Lbe earHer discussion in Chapter 6. 
6. These exports are termed 'minor exports' in Colombia. 
7. The ratio of the volume of actual exports to total exportable production 
'Which Coes called 'export coefficient' was the dependent variable. When 
both exports and production of elportables are increasing fast as was the 
case jn Brazil during 1%8-73, the ratio of the two 'Would be a more 
appropriate variable for a stringent test of the effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty on exports (Coes. 1981. p.120). 
8. Gupta also estimated the export supply function in a simultaneous 
equation model applying Two-SLS method and found no appreciable 
change in the results and. therefore. concluded that for these countries 
the small country assumption is validated. However, it may be noted that 
in the demand equation employed by Gupta. there was no exchange rate 
222 
volatility variable 'Which is questionable. 
·9. While the nominal effective exchange rate is influenced solely by the 
movements of foreign currencies, the real effective exchange 
rate could be influenced by the independent pegging behaviour of the 
LOC. See also Lipschitz (1979) and Bautista (1982) for the mathematical 
proof. 
10. See a discussion of this point also in Chapler 6. 
223 
Chapter 9 
Did E:lChan&e Rate Instability Affect India's EIports?: 
An EcoDoaetric Study 
9.1 Introduction 
We saw in Chapter 7 that although the Indian's basket system had been able 
to reduce exchange rate instability particularly in real terms in comparison 
with the previous sterling-peg period, the record had nl)t been uniform 
throughout. In the basket period, there had been years of falling exchange 
riskl followed by years of rising exchange risk. The question then arises hoW' 
damaging had been exchange rate volatility to the Indian economy? 
The topic of the impact of exchange rate instability or uncertaintr is quite 
broad and our focus in the construction of the instability measures has been on 
the merchandise trade and thereby we had completely abstracted from the 
invisibles and capital account of external transactions. A justification for such 
a narrow focus is that trade in invisibles and capital flows are much less 
sensitive to exchange rate risk than trade in merchandise in a developing 
country. Cannot the same argument be appHed fA) the case of imports as 'WeB in 
the context of a highly controJJed import regime that operates in India? In 
Chapter 7 we considered the imports in the construcHon of varhlus exchange 
risk measures for India since we beHeved that there is an impact (If exchange 
, 
risk on the economy operating through the channel of imports. Most (If India's 
imports consist of vital imports to the industrial and agricultural sectors (If the 
economy and a part of it also goes towards meeting the essential consumption 
requirements of the people. Therefore. exchange rate volatHity is bound to 
have effects on the economy as a whole via imports. 
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It is one thing to know about the existence of an impact of exchange risk 
through imports. but it is quite a different thing to estimate that impact.. It. is 
really difficult to estimate the impact of exchange risk on imports. The impact 
of exchange risk on imports is not expected to be felt in the short run in the 
Indian context in the form of quantity and price effects as it is normally 
absorbed in the government budget and in the profitability of private 
importers. This is so because quite a substantial portion of India's impl)rts are 
canalized through governmental agencies and the bulk of the balance of 
imports made by the private sector is subject to quantitative restrictions. The 
impact of exchange risk on India's exports, on the other hand. is easier to 
estimate as that is expected to be exhibited fairly quickly in terms of price and 
quantity. This is basicaUy on account of the fact that. in India there is a larger 
role for market forces in the export sector than in the import sector. In this 
chapter. therefore. we confine ourselves to India's export sector and estimate 
the impact of exchange risk on that sector ailme. 
While the main focus of attention is towards the impact of exchange risk on 
India's exports, we are also greatly interested in the impact of the exchange rate 
on exports. In the context of a general study of India's exchange rate regime. 
how exports respond to exchange rate changes is of crucial impl)rtanc.e. 
Particularly with the above-mentioned government control on imp')rts, the 
efficacy of the exchange rate policy in India hinges very much upl)n the 
exchange rate elasticity of exports. 
9.2 Methodology 
We develop a general model for India's exports. This model vdll be nestor all 
emplt>yed in estimating aggregate exports. We will subsequently adapt this 
model in estimating separately the two majl)r cI)mponent groups: (D 
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manufacturing product exports and (ii) non-fuel primary product exports. The 
need for disaggregate estimation of trade behaviour has received consillerable 
attention ever since Orcutt (1950) wrote his famous article on trade estimation 
problems. We explain below the rationale of this approach in our particular 
context. 
It is now well known that export elasticity (demand and supply) with respect 
to price is quite different as between manufactured and primary products. 
Therefore. when the share of these two components in aggregate exp.>rts are 
varying over time. the elasticity estimate from an aggregate equation is likely 
to be unstable. For India. the share of manufactured products in aggregate 
exports rose steadily from 51 per cent in 1968 to as high as 72 per cent in 1986.2 
Secondly, when export prices of higher el~ticity export products exhibit lower 
variation compared to those of lower elasticity products, then the "hi~t(lrical" 
price elasticity estimated from an aggregate equation would be inappr<Ipriate 
for policy purposes. This was illustrated byOrcuU (1950) and Barker (1970) in 
the Ca.!le of price elasticity of imp(lrt demand; they found that primary 
commodities had higher price variations compared to manufacturing pr(lduct.3. 
(See also Magee, 1975. pp.206-7). 
Another major issue in the estimation of an export function is the 
simultaneous equation problem. i.e .. the price and quantity of exports are 
determined simultaneously through the operation of both demand and supply 
factors and in practice it is not possible to identify demand and supply fadocs 
separately through single equation methods. However. the demand equation 
can be estimated without bias if the supply function is infinitely price elastic. 
or if the demand function is stable whereas the supply function is unstable. 
Similarly. the supply function can be estimated without bias if the demand 
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function is perfectly elastic, or if supply equatit)n is stable while the demand 
eqUllUt)n is not (s~e, for example, Maddllia. 19n). 
A large volume of empirical trade studies has relied on one or the other of 
the above simplifying assumptions. Thus. a. number of export studies have 
estimated export demand functions through the ordinary least squares method.3 
This procedure is less justifiable for developing countries than for developed 
countries as the assumption of supply constraints is more valid jn the former 
ca..~ than in the latter. In spite of the importance of supply factors in lD(:S, 
researchers have been estimating single equation export demand functions for 
these countries ignoring completely the significance of supply in exports {e.g. 
Houthakkar and Magee (1969), Dornbusch (1985). Rittenberg (1986). Md 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1986»). We have also some early studies concentrating (In 
India .,;hich have estimated demand functions for India's expoN "ithmlt 
making any aUo'Wance for supply factors { e.g. Dutta (1%5), Da l~sta (J%5), and 
Agarwala (1970) 1. although as noted by Peera (1979), Indian exports h"d been 
subject to severe supply constraints during the period covered in these !!tudj~. 
In contrast. there have been a number of other studies 'Which Jink LDC 
exports to supply factors alone including trade poHcy. a survey (If which can be 
found in Bond (1985). One can very weU justify the estimation of a single export 
supply equation for LDCs. The argument is that a typical developing country is 
small such that it has no influence on world price of its exp(lrts and, theref(lre. 
it is facing an infinitely elastic demand curve for its export products. AH (19M) 
estimated a single equation aggregate elPort supply function f(Ir India and, he 
, 
justified the approach by stating that India has a very smaJI and decHning 
share in world exports. 
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However small may be the share of India in world exports, the country could 
still be impl)rtant in specialized items. In particular, there have been a number 
j 
of items in India's export basket whl>se share in world exports has been rising 
(e.g .• leather products, gems and jewellery. articles of apparel and c11>thing 
materials). ·The predominance of manufacturing products in India's expl>rts 
could also imply a possible downward sloping demand curve for her exports. 
Even in certain primary commodities. India has a large share in "1) rid expl)rts 
(e.g .. tea. raw leather. cashew kernels. pepper Ilnd shrimp) and one cunnl)t. rule 
out. the possibility of India influencing world price in these items. 
The point that is raised is that, single equation estimation of either a demand 
function or a supply function is likely to give biased and inconsistent estimates 
fo~ndia's exports. One SQlution to this problem is to use simultaneous eqtJ~,til)n 
methods as was done by Khan 097«) for a number of developing countries 
including India. Sundararajan (1986) and Lucas (1988) for India, and Riedel 
(1988) for Hong Kong. The most popular simultaneous equation methl>d is the 
two-stage least squares. All simultaneous equation methods give C'1)nsistent. 
estimates, but in the context of a· small sample. the bias in the estimates can be 
quite large. Therefore, following Bond (1985) "e have chosen the alternative of 
solving the demand and supply model for equilibrium conditil)ns to obtain the 
reduced form equations and estimate those equations by ordinary least. squares. 
The estimated coefficients from such II procedure will be unbiased but they "ill 
be II mixture of both demand and supply parameters and. therefore. individual 
parameters from the structural demand and supply functions cannl)t be 
recovered as the system is bound to be over-identified in most cases (see 
Maddala.19n). 
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9.3 An E~porl Model for India 
As indicated above, we do not make any extreme assumption about the nature 
of export demand and supply and attempt to specify a general demand and 
supply model for India's exports with the objective of solving it under 
equilibrium conditions. We try to incorporate as many explanatory variables as 
theoretically relevant in a general case, and leave for estimatit>n the burden of 
deciding the significance of those variables in the determination of aggregate 
exports as well as of the two component groups, namely, manufacturing and 
non-fuel primary product elports. 
Export Demand: 
MI)deUing export demand is fairly simple. One approach is tl) 1'1)111)"(( the 
conventil)nal demand theory in which the consumer is assumed tl) maximize 
utility subject to a. budget constraint (see l:ohH, 1980 and Goldstein and Khan, 
1985). Applying the utility-maximization approach, we can derive the demand 
for export quantity as a function of foreign currency price of exports, prices of 
foreign competing products. foreign money income and nominal exchange 
risk. On the assumption of absence of money illusion for the foreign ct)n~umer, 
the export demand becomes a function of the ratio between foreign currency 
export price and the price of for~ign competing goods, foreign real income and 
real exchange risk. 
The above mentioned approach is valid for India's manufactured products 
which can reasonably be assumed to be directed towards final consumption 
abroad. However, for India', primary commodity exports it would be ml)re 
appropriate to evoke the production theory and assume a cost-minimizt,ti'>n 
approach. (See Burgess, 197of; and Kohli, 1982). Thus, ~'ith the additil)nal 
assumption of absence of money illusion on the part of foreign producers whl) 
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demand India's primary products, the quantity of export demand is a· function 
of the ratio between foreign currency price of exports ami the price I)f foreign 
competing composite input, foreign real gross output and real exchange risk.. 
However. if we assume that the foreign price would represent the price of 
final goods competing with India's manufactured product exports and also the 
price of compo:lite input competing with India's primary product exports 1. bolh 
approaches yield to a single common equation. We additionally ft..~·\lme a 
multiplicative form of equation for all explanatory variables including the 
exchange risk variable'. Thus the export demand equation, ignoring the error 
term. becomes: 
where the term for each variable represents its logarithms and the ~mbs(ript. d 
stands for demand; XQd· quanity of expl)rt demand; XP· domesti( (urrency 
price of exports; [. nominal. effective exchange rate (units of foreign 
currency per domestic currency); Fp· • foreign price (in foreign currency); 
WY • world real income; R· real exchange risk; t<d .. constant; ~d and V d 
are demand elasticities with respect to relative price and world income 
respectively; and &d is demand elasticity with respect to exchange risk. The 
signs of the parameters are expected to be: 
~ d < 0; 'V d > 0; &d < 0 
We further assume that export demand adjusts instantaneously within a year to 
changes in all explanatory variables. . 
In fact., an export demand function should take into account the impact of 
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tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. We have not incorporated them here as 
their quantification is very difficult. In particular, the international quota 
system prevailing in textile trade, i.e., the Multifibre Agreement (MfA), tariff 
and non-tariff barriers on India's exports to the [[C, non-tariff barriers against 
India's marine products to the U.S. and meat to the Middle Inst are ,·octh 
mentioning (see Wolf. 1982; Nayyar. 1987; and Sapir and Stevens, '1987). 
However. it is expected that leaving out the influence of these trade restrictions 
on India's exports does not severely affect the results (If (lur study,6 
Export Supply: 
Modelling export supply is more complicated and is very much a 
controversial part of empirical work on trade (Goldstein and Khan. 1985. p, 
10<47) and that could be a reason vhy the supply side is assumed alway in most 
empirical studies. In the context of developing countries the task is made more 
difficult due to tvo reasons: firstly. there exists a very complex system of export. 
incentives in these countries and, secondly. the capacity to export. in these 
countries is partly affected by rising domestic demand for exportables (Riedel. 
1988. p.13S). In the context of India. these factors are particularly relevant. as 
explained below. 
In fact. the Indian export supply situation is complicated due to the 
presence of a highly protecteij domestic industry .. on' the one hand, and a 
complex system of export subsidies. on the other. The licensing-rum-tariff 
system of import control provides a high incentive for imp'>rt-substituting 
industries thereby rendering export production relatively unattractive. As if to 
offset this imbalance. the export sector has been provided with a variety of 
subsidies. The Indian export incentive system consists of (a) a duty drawback 
system (b) cash compensatory support. (c) concessional expI>rt credit (d) tal 
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rebates on export income and (e) import replenishment licenses. We are not 
going into details of each of these schemes except to say that previous studies' 
have pointed out the highly unsatisfactory nature of the Indian export 
incentive system. Apart from the long delay in the disbursement clf the cJaims 
under these items, it has been noted that they do not amount to much in the 
form (IC additional incentive for expclr'" as the bulk clf it just compensates for 
the disadvantages in export production in comparison 'With production fClr 
domestic sales. Secondly, a quantitative assessment of the total subsidies under 
all these schemes is exceedingly difficult particularly because of the prclvision 
for the transferability of the import replenishment licenses for exporters. 
There is no accurate picture oC the premium the~ licenses carry in the market. 
the knowledge of which is necessary to determine the quantum of incentive 
under this scheme. 
The export subsidy system which had been in operation in India since the 
early I%Os was dismantled in June 1966 following the rupee devaluati'>n only to 
be reintroduced more or less in the same form just after two months. The 
system underwent several modifications since then. Nevertheless, a recent 
study by Nl1yyar (1987) shows that the tinkering of the export subsidy system in 
India has not led to any major "qualitative or even quantitative change" during 
the seventies and early eighties (p. AN-SO). Our study covers the perit>d 1%8 b> 
1986. Although we do not fully subscribe to the view that leaving out the export 
subsidy system from the export supply function is theoretically correct in the 
Indian context, partly because of the difficulty in computing the series on ad 
valorem rate of net export subsidy and partly also because of Nayyar's assertion 
of its unchanged qualitative and quantitative significance during the period 
under study. we do not consider export subsidies in the Indian export supply 
equation. However. we state that. 10 the extent that export. subsidies have 
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affeded the growth of India's exports, our estimates will be biased. 
Next. we have 10 consider the importance of demand pressure a~ a factor 
influencing export supply in India. It could be argued that the effect of demand 
pressure on exports is picked up by domestic price; the higher the demand 
pressure the larger"tliJI be the domestic price, and larger the domestic price the 
less 'Will be exported as domestic market becomes more attractive for the 
exporter. We argue that domestic price only partially captures the impact (If 
domestic demand pull on India's exports. The reason is that at the margin, firms 
have a natural preference for domestic market to foreign market due to the fact 
that domestic market is more secure and less competitive than the f(lreign 
market. 
There could be at least two ways in which domestic demand pressure cuts 
into exports. Firstly. the process of domestic industrialization is bound to 
generate a general awareness of the potential extra profits that can be had by 
converting the hitherto exported primary commodities into more value added 
items either for the domestic market or for exports. Animal skin and raw 
leather. raw cotton. tobacco and iron ore are examples. Secondly. with an 
overall rise in domestic demand one can expect a rise in consumptil)n of 
exportables too. Tea is a typical case in point .. The share of India in world 
market of tea has been declining steadily ,-hich is attributed to the rising 
domestic absorption (see Baladi and Biswas. 1987). Coffee. sugar and spices are 
other examples. 
How do we incorporate the impact of demand pressure in an export supply 
function? We employ domestic real absorption. i.e .. real consumptit>n plus real 
investment (including government expenditure). as a proxy· for domestic 
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demand pressure that curtails exports. Real national income is sometimes used 
to pick up the domestic demand pressure (see Srinivasan and Bhagv.°ati, 19n; 
and Baladi and Bis'Was. 1987). But real national income in the CI)ntext of lDCs 
could represent more the productive capacity than the demand pressure as real 
income in these countries is driven more by the supply side than the demand 
side. 
The best way to specify an export supply function for a developing cl)untry 
appears to be to combine the profit-maximization apprl)Clch with th~ d')Olt'stk 
absorptil)n factor. Holly and Wade (1986) give a. clear exposition of how an 
export supply can be formally derived from a profit function .. We have modified 
that approach by incorporating the additional variables that represent 
exchange risk and domestic demand pull. The resulting export supply equation 
in logarithms is given as: 
whereXQs" quantity of export suppJy; XP· export price in domestic currency; 
He • domestic production co'st; HP· domestic price; Kf· real fixed capital ~tock; 
HA • domestic real ab~orption; R • real exchange risk; ()( s • (Instant term; ~s. 
~s, 'V s and ~s are export suppJy elasticities with respect to the respective 
variables in the equation; and Es is the supply elasticity with respect to 
exchange risk. The signs of these parameters are given by 
, 
~s >0; ~s>O; 'Vs >0; ~s (0 andEs <0. 
The first variable on the right-hand side of equation (2). i.e. (XP - He), 
represents the absolute profitability of exports; the larger the difference 
between elport price and domestic C(lst. the higher wm be the profitability of 
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exports. The second variable, (XP-HP), indicates the relative profitability of 
export~, Le., the profitability of elpl)rt. sales in c;omparison with dl)mestic sales. 
Given the domestic cost conditions and domestic price of tradables, the trader 
will supply more to the foreign market and less to the domestic market if export 
price rises. Given the export price and cost cl)nditions, the exporting firm will 
supply less to the foreign market and more to the domestic market if the 
domestic price of exportables rises. Besides, domestic resources can be 
transferred from the production of tradables to non-tradables. In the case of a 
rise in price of domestic non-tradables (which is also reflected in dl)mestic: 
price), export price and domestic price of tradables remaining the sume, the 
trader can shift from the production of tradables as a whole to non-tradables 
t.hereby reducing exports. 
We did mention about the tariff-cum-licensing system which characterizes 
India's import regime. Import controls adversely affect exports in hrl) main 
ways: firstly, by making exports more. unprofitable than import substitutes 
and secondly, by denying cheaper raw materials, components and ma.chinery 
either domestically or from abroad (see Clements and Sjaastad, 1980(; and 
Greenaway and Milner, 1987). The export supp1)' function spedfi~d above is 
able to capture this typical Indian phenomenon through domestic: price and 
domestic cost as is evident from the description in the previous paragraph. 
The theoretically ideal specification of export supply function given above 
has, hO"i'ever, to reckon with certain practical problems. first of all, there is nl) 
time series data on domestic cost available for India. HI)wever, one can 
construct a unit la.bour cost index for the manufacturing sector "i·hich could 
fairly represent the unit total factor cost in a relatively labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector of India. It is reasonable to assume that movements in 
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domestic cost are reflected in the movements in domestic price. Th~ ""11$ tested 
for the Indian case by regressing the logarithms of unit labour cost (Ute) in 
India's manufacturing sectJ)r8 on the logarithms of manufacturing dl)mestic 
price [RPM (wholesale price index)] for 1967 to 1985 and found a cll):Je positive 
relationship between the two (R2 • .96). This intimate relationship between 
domestic price and cost would imply in turn a mulicollinearity problem if they 
are retained simultaneously in the export supply function for estimation. 
Therefore, we would better drop the cost variable altogether from the export. 
supply function and leave the domestic price to perform a dual function. In 
other words, the gap between export price and domestic price, i.e. (IP-HP), ""ill 
capture both the absolute and relative profitability of exports. This procedure is 
now fairly standard as indicated by the recent survey of trade studies by 
Goldstein and Khan 0985, pp. 100(7-8). 
The next variable in the export supply. function is Kf, fixed capital stock, 
which represents the productive capacity of the economy; the larger the 
productive capacity of the economy the higher the capacity fl)r expl)rt 
producti,)n as well. Ali (1984) used capital-output ratio as the capacity variable 
in the estimation oC export supply function for India on the grounds that it 
represents the capital-deepening process of industrialization which in turn 
implies the possibility of producing and exporting more sophisticated goods. 
Other proxies of capacity include trend in real national income (see Goldstein 
and Khan, 1978; and Moran, 1989), trend in industrial production (see Gupta, 
1980), deviations from trend of real domestic output (see Coes, 1981: and Bond, 
1985). The criticism against these proxies of capacity in an export supply 
function which are employed in the absence of data on capital stock is that, 
they do not fit well with an approach consistent ,..-ith production function 
which we have ad')pted following Holly and Wade. 
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Finally, the exchange risk variable R. appears with a negative coefficient 
as exchange risk constitute an additional cost to the international firm, In an 
earlier chapter we did explain the exchange risk effect on export supply 
diagrammatically through a backward shift of supply curve .. 
Following the discussion above we rewrite the general export supply 
function by excluding the domestic cost variable as: 
The above supply function assumes that export supply responds to changes 
in all explanatory variables within a single time period which is a year in our 
study. This is unrealistic. There are different ways in which disequilibrium 
behaviour can be introduced such as through the partial adjustment mechanism 
employing the 'Koyck' transformation or by assuming a polynomial (Almon) lag 
structure. In fact, the modelling of the length and pattern of lags in eCl>nomic 
relationships is one of the unsettled issues in econometrics, 
The partial adjustment model although simple is criticised for its highly 
restrictive nature in assuming a uniform length and pattern (geometrically 
declining) of lag for all the exogenous variables in the equation. FI)r example, 
it is highly improbable that the pattern and length of lag in respl>nse of 
exports to a change in relative price is the same as for a change in capacity 
variable. Although polynomial lags are more flexible than the Koyck lags. the' 
resulting dynamics of the system depends on the degree of the pl)lynl)mial. on 
whether end-point constraints are imposed and. if so. in what way, and on the 
number of lags introduced (see Goldstein and Khan. 1985. p, 1(68), The 
application of Almon lag structure involves considerable searching and some 
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element of arbitrariness in arriving at the final dynamic specification "hich 
becomes sometimes very difficult to justify on theoretical grounds, 
A new methodology in econometrics is "cointegration",9 The advantage (If 
thi, technique b that it provides a systematic way of estimating both the Jong-
run and short-run relationships among economic variables. However. we 
decided against the use of the cointegration technique for two reasons, firstly. 
this approach has so far been employed in single equation models. Ours is a 
demand and supply model in .... hich export volumes and prices are jointly 
determined by a given set of eJogenous variables subject to cr(ISS equati(ln 
restrictions of the structural equations. The precise meaning of co-integration 
is not yet clear in a demand and supply system (Holly and Wade. J9S6. p. 20), 
Secondly. there is a limitation imposed by the availability (If data. We have Ie" 
than 20 observations and at least five to sil explanatory variables for each 
equation, The discovering of the long-run and short-run relationship' 
through the application of cointegration in this contelt is almost meaningle!l!l. 
In the light of limitations (If the commonly employed meth(lds of 
introducing dynamic adjustment and abo due to the inapplicability (If the C(I-
integration technique ..... e follow a simple procedure in our export supply 
equation to make it more realistic. We assume that tlport supply adjusb to 
changes in relative price and exchange risk variables with a lag (If one year 
whereas it adjusts to changes in capacity and domc:;tic demand pressure within 
the same year. With these assumptions the export supply function changes to: 
. . 
There (XP-HPtl and R-l are the lagged values of(XP~ HP) and R respectively; 
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1351 and 13s2 are the elasticities with respect to current and previous rears' 
relative prices respectively; Est and Es2 are the coefficients vt'ith respect t.) 
exchange risk in the current and previous years' respectively, The signs of the 
new parameters are expected to be: 
1351 ) 0: ~s2) 0: 'V s) 0: ~ s < 0: Es1 (0; and Es2 dJ 
Now we bring the demand and supply equations together, SI)lving the 
equations (1) and (of) together for equilibrium we get two reduced form 
equations. one for export volume (XO) and the other for exp(Jrt price UP): 
(5) 10· C< 0 • ~ 1 (E· HP - Fp·) • ~ 2 WY • ~ 3 KF· J3 4 HA • ~ ~ • J3 (, R-l • 
137 (XP-HP) - 1 
(6) Xp·~t +'Vt (fP*-E)·'V2 WY • 'V3HP+ 'V4 Kf +-"5HA+ 'V6R. 
'V7 R-l ·'VS (XP-HPL 1 
where ~sl (c<s - O(d) 
- 0(5 - t<d 
t( 0 • t(s· ()( 1 • 
~d-~s J3 d - f3,J 
- ~sJ ~d J3d 
~1 • (0 'VI • >0 
f3d-~sl ~d - {lsl 
- ~slY d -Yd 
~2 • )0 Y Z • >0 
~d - ~sl ~d - ~sl 
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~d 8s 
____ <0 <0 
<0 >0 
_____ <0 ____ ~o 
~d - ~sl 
. E~Z 
____ )0 )0 
~d - ~sl 
~s2 
---- <0 
~d - ~sl 
One advantage of the reduced form approach is that ,\\'e are able tl) get an 
-' . 
export quantity equation with rea.leffective exchange rate tRIER) as one of the. 
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explanllt.>ry variables (second term in eQ.uation ~) and an export price equation 
with foreign price in domestic currency (FP) as one of the explanatory 
variables (second term in eQ.uation 6). The former enables us to straight away 
estimate the export volume impact of an exchange rate depreciation. The laUer, 
together with the former, enables us to estimate the full export value effect of 
an exchange rate depreciation. 
The derivation of the export price equation in the above manner has 
another major advantage. We note that the equation has foreign price in 
domestic currency (fP) and domestic price (HP) as two exogenous variables. The 
estimation of this equation for both manufacturing and primary' product 
exports will enable us to comment on the comparative power of India's exporters 
over the export price of these two groups of products. 
Next. let us examine. the coefficients of the focus variable, exchange risk, in 
both volume and price equations. In the volume equation (equation 5) the sign 
of exchange risk elasticity is negative in both current and previous years, 
reflecting the unidirectionally negative effect of exchange risk from both 
demand and supply sides. However, with regard to the price equation (equation 
6) t.he ~dgn of the risk elasticity is indeterminate f(lr the current year and 
positive for the previous year. It can be seen that the sign of tbe current year 
elasticity of exchange risk in the price equation depends (In the c(lmparative 
jmportance of suppJy and demand influences: if the supply effect dominates the 
demand effect. the sign of the risk elasticity will be p(lsitive and jf the demand 
effect dominates the supply effect the sign will be negative. This is explained 
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further below. 
Exchange rate uncertainty imposes additional cost on the supplier and 
disutility on the demander leading to a decline in both supply and demand. This 
in turn implies a higher supply price and lower demand price for elpl)rts in 
comparison with azeco or low exchange risk situation. If the supplier bears a 
larger share of the burden of exchange risk than the demander. then the export 
price will rise. If. on the other hand. demander bears a larger proportion of the 
risk burden. then export price will fall. For a given level of exchange rate 
instability between the currency of the demander and the supplier. the burden 
of elchange risk borne by each depends I)n the currency invoicing of tC'clde. If 
exports are invoiced in exporter's currency, then the exporter completely 
escapes the exchange risk as there is no uncertainty of export proceeds in terms 
of exporter's domestic currency and, therefore. the exchange risk falls 
completely on the importer. Instead, if exports are denominated in importer's 
currency then the importer is completely free from exchange risk and the risk 
burden falls entirely on the exporter. In the formea' case, the eXpl)ft pl'it:e is 
bound to decline and in the laUer export price is bound to rise. 
Turning to the lag effect of exchange risk on export price, ,'hy is it. 
positive? We had earlier stipulated that the demand effect is felt only in the 
current year but supply effect would linger on into the second year. If this 
assumption is correct, then the coefficient of the lagged risk variable in the 
export price equation will be positive. 
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Finally, we need to note the significance of the lagged difference between 
export price and domestic price, (IP - HPLt, in both expl)rt volume and price 
equations. To the eltent that we expect a positive lagged response of export 
supply to relative price (see equation -t) the coefficient of (IP-HP)-l is expected 
to have a positive sign in the volume equation (equation 5) and a negative ~ign 
in the price equation (equation 6). The coefficient (If thjs variable has t(t be 
taken into account in order to compute the long-run effect (If real elchange 
rate on export volume. Similarly, the coefficients of (XP-HPt I has to be taken 
into account in order to compute the long-run effect of domestic price (In exp(lrt 
price. It may also be noted that the price equation could be a partiaJ adjustment 
model "fIilh the lagged dependent variable appearing on the right hand ~ide. 
9.4 Data Construction 
The World Tables 1987 of World Bank (fourth £d~tion) is the basic source of 
data on export volume (IQ), export price (IP) and real domestic absorptil)n (HAl. 
We have from the World Tables India's aggregate exports, manufacturing 
product exports and non -fuel primary product exports in curre nt 1].s. dollars as 
well as their corresponding export price indices. We estimated export volume 
indices by deflating the dollar value exports by their respective dollar-based 
export price indices. We thus arrived at export volume numbers f,)r the 
aggregate (IQn, manufacturing products (IQM) and non-fuel primary prl)ducts 
(IQP). 
We generated domestic currency export price indices for aggregate elpl)rts 
(XPT), manufacturing exports (XPM) and for non-fuel primary products (XPP) 
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by adjusting the U.S. dQllar-based indices by the annual exchange rate 
conversion factor also supplied in the World Tables. 
A limitation of data is that,whereas trade data are on calender year basis. 
domestic absorption (HA) data are on fiscal year (April-March) basis. Thus ,'e 
had to treat the HA figure for 1968-69 fiscal year as pertaining to calender l"ear 
1968, and so Otl. 
Fixed capital stock u:n is also cl)nstructed on a fiscal year basis (end I)f the 
yead. We have the fixed capital ~to~~ as on 31st March. 1971 on 1970-71 rupee 
prices prepared by the Central Statistical Organi~til)n. Government of India 
[Report of the Working Group of Savings. 1982. p. 1141. This is taken tl) b~ for 
1970 calender year and the series is constructed backward till1%8 and fonvard 
up to 1986 by subtracting and adding respectively the net real fixed capital 
formatil)n for the corresponding years. 
While construction of the total fixed capital stock series is easy, "hat "e 
really need is the capital stock series for the primary sector. manufacturing 
sector. and the aggregate for these t",·o sectors combined. F')rtunately. 
disaggregated capital stock figures are available for the bench mark period 
ending 31 March 1971 from the same source quoted above. The disaggregated 
depreciati')n rates are estimated for the bench mark year again by the Centicll 
Statistical Organization and given in the same document. We applied these reltes 
(Z.37 per cent and 4.57 per cent of fixed capital stock for primary and 
manufacturing sectors respectively) throughout the sample period (In the gross 
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capital formation figures of the disaggregated groups available from Natit)nal 
Accounts Statistics, Central Statistical Organization, Government of India, and 
built up the fixed capital stock series for the· primary sector (KfP) and the 
manufacturing sector (KFM). The capital stock for· both primary and 
manufacturing sectors combined are computed as the weighted aver-age of KfP 
and KFM with weights given by the average share of primary prl)ducts and 
manufactured products in India's total exports during 1979-81. Their ,·eights 
worked out to be .359 for KFP and .641 for KFM. 
The procedure for the construction of the real effective exchange rate 
indices (REER)..,as laid down in Chapter 7. However, for this study we estimated 
an ll-country export-weighted real effective exchange rate series against the 
ll-country modified trade-weighted index in Chapter 7. These eleven countries, 
which are the same used for the index in that chapter accounted for ab,)ut ~8 
per cent of India's exports to convertible currency area during 1979-81.10 The 
elport-weighting system is estimated on the basis of the share of the eleven 
countries in India's aggregate elports during 1979-81 which are (,btained 
from IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearb(l(,k, 1986. The c(,untries 
included in the weighting system . along with their respective weights are 
given below in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 Export Weighting in Computation or the Real Efrective 
Exchan«e Rate of Rupee 
Country Export Weights 
1. U.S. .Z4j 
Z. Japan .ZOO 
3. U.K. .145 
4. Germany .115 
5. Italy .055 
6. Netherlands .057 
7. France .053 
. 8. Belgium .O<t6 
9. Australia ,fJ3Z 
10. Canada .020 
11. Switzerland JJ32 
Iotal 1.000 
The computation of the REER involves computation of nominaJ effective 
exchange rate (E), domestic price CHP) and foreign price (fP·). We computed £ 
and Fp· separately as ll-counlry export-weighted indices. The former 
., 
required eleven bilateral rates and the latter the wholesale price indices (If the 
eleven countries. The eleven rupee rates are generated from dollar rates given 
in Ifylf's International financial Statistics (IfS), the detaiJed pr(lcedure of 
WcH , 
which· explained 1n Chapter 7. HP is taken as the wholesale price inwces of A . . 
India. Fp· and HP are both culled out from IMf's IfS, Supplement (In Price 
Statistics, 1981 and 1986, . as well as some past and recent individuaJ monthly 
issues of IfS, 
In fact, the REER series compute~ in the above-mentioned way is relevant 
only for estimating the aggregate export equation. The series has to be 
different for the two disaggregated export functions. However, as explained in 
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Sectil)n 9.3. foreign prices of competing final goods or intermediate products 
could be represented by the foreign whl)lesale price indices irrespective of the 
export group. But regarding the domestic price ,Fe used the whl>lesule price 
indices for manufactured products group (RPM) in the constructil)n of the Nat 
effective exchange rate relevant fl>r manufactured product exp')rts (REtRM,) 
and the wholesale price indices for primary comml)dity group (RPP) in the 
cl)nstruction of real effective exchange rate relevant to l'1'imilt'Y pfl)duct 
exports (R£ERP). The wholesale price indices for the disllggregated groups are 
obtained from Economic Survey • Government of India. various issues. One 
limitation of this data. is that they are on financial year basis. 
Foreign price in domestic currency (FP) involves both foreign price (FP.) 
and nominal effective exchange rate (E). The separate computation of bl>th 
were explained earlier. 
The construction of real exchange risk proxies appropriate f')r India's 
exports constitutes a major task. We did compute eight different measures of 
exchange risk. consisting of both nominal and real measures for the analysis in 
Chapter 7. For the purpose of the study in this chapter we constructed four red 
exchange risk proxies. Here we used export ,,'eighling instead of ml)dified trade 
weighting used in Chapter 7. The export weights are the same indicated in Table 
9.1. The four alternative real exchange risk proxies are (1) real effective 
variation based on standard deviation of percentage changes (REV 1), (Z) Nal 
effective variation based on mean of absolute percentage changes (REVZ). (3.) 
variation of real effective exchange rate based on standard deviatil>n of 
percentage changes (VR£ERl). and (o() variation of real effective exchange 
based on mean of absolute percentage changes (VRITRZ). REVI is the most. 
preferred exchange risk measure for India because firstly. it is cl>nsistent. vt"ith 
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the geographically undiversified nature of India's individual exporters and 
secondly, it is based on a more realistic expectation hypothesis. VRlIRI is the' 
conventional measure employed in a number of previous studies I)n both 
developed and developing countries. We insist that while this measure could be 
a reasonable proxy for exchange risk in developed countries where individual 
traders could be well diversified, it cannot capture the exchange risk situatil)n 
in deveil>ping countries in a satisfactory way. Please recall from Chapter 7 that 
the exchange risk measures are computed for each month on a moving basis 
making use of observations of the past 12 months and averaged for the calender 
11 years, 1%8-87. 
One limitation of the various exchange risk measures we constructed is that. 
they do not distinguish between the two disaggregated export sectors. This is 
due ,to the fact' that we did not have a consistent monthly series on 
manufacturing and primary commodity prices for the entire period of our 
study. Therefore we had to apply the same overall real exchange risk proxies 
for the estimation of export functions of the disaggregated groups as ,,'eU. 
World real income (WY) is estimated as an export-weighted real 
income index of three groups of countries: (1) developed market economies, (2) 
developing market economies and (3) centrally planned economies. The 
weights are the share of the three sets of countries in India's aggregate elp'>rts 
over tho period 1979-81 and is based on data. from IMf's Directil)Q o( Trade 
Statistics, Yearbook 1986. They are .494 for the first country group, .318 for the 
second, and .188 for the last. Real income for these separate country groups are 
obtained from the U,N. National Accounts Statistics, various issues. HI),,'ever. it 
may be noted that whereas for the first two groups real GDP numbers are used 
Cor the third group Net Material Product (NMP) alone is available. 
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We. in fact. wanted to extend the study backwards SI) as to benefit from a 
large sample. but could not undertake that mainly because of the massive 
devaluation of the rupee that occurred in June 1966. Although our sample starts 
in 1968. in the computation of exchange risk proxies we use the previous lZ-
month observations and thereby making 1967 the start of the basic peri,>d we 
used. We are aware that the use of data before 1967 would create bias in the 
exchange risk measures based on standard deviation due to the large discrete 
exchange rate change that took place in 1966. 
9.5 Analysis of Exchange Risk 
Fig. 9.1 maps out the annual average trends in rupee's export-weighted real 
effective variation during 1968-87 based on two measures. viz. the standard 
deviation of percentage changes (REVt) and the mean of absolute percentage 
changes (REVZ). Fig. 9.2 gives similar trends in variation "f export-"A'eighted 
real effective exchange rate of the rupee (VRllRl and VREERZ). 
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FIG. 9.1 EXPORT-WEIGHTED REAL 
EJTECTIVE VARIATIOH OF RUPEE, 1968-87 
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FIG. 9.2 VARIATION OF EXPORT-WEIGHTED 
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Table 9.2 brings out the correlation among the four real exchange risk 
values. It indicates a fairly high correlation (R : .90) between the tWI) effe(tive 
variation measures, REVl and REVZ and a slightly lower correlation (R· ,80 
Table 9.Z Correlation Matrb of EIport-yeiKhtcd Real EIchan,e Risk. 
REV 1 
REVZ 
VREERI 
VR£ER2 
Mea3ures. 1968-873 
REV! 
1.000 
.901 
.813 
.816 
REVZ 
1.000 
.695 
.886 
VREER I VREER2 
1.000 
.814 1.000 
a. Each measure is calculated m(lnthly (In a moving basis taking int(1 
account observations for the previous 12 months. The correJati(ln matrh 
is, however, based on annual averages. 
between the measures of variation of effective elChange rate, VRlIRJ and 
VREERZ. The correlation between measures of effective variation and the 
corresponding measures of variation of effective exchange rate is lower for 
those based on standard deviation of percentage changes (i.e. R •. 81 between 
REV] and VREERJ) than those ba..~d on mean of absolute percentage changes 
(l.e. R • .89 between REV2 and VREERZ). 
Table 9.3 brings out more statistical details of the four exchange risk 
measures. As expected, rupee's effective variation is higher than variation of 
effective elchange rate indicating negative covariance between bilateral rates. 
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Table 9.3 Mean, Standard DeTiation and Coefficient of Variation of 
Real Exc:haDle Risk Proxies, 1968-8711. 
Measure of Mean Standard r.(Jeffidenl (If 
Elchange Risk Deviation (SD) Variation (~) (CV) 
1. REVl 2.176 .518 23.8 
Z.REVZ 1.734 .390 22.S 
3. VREERI . 1.672 .365 21.8 
4. VREER2 1.376 .287 20.9 
a. Each measure is computed monthly on a moving basis taking into account 
observations for the previous lZ months. The mean, S.D. and C.\'. are, 
however, for the annual averages. 
However, the coefficient of variation of exchange risk exhibit only marginal 
differences among the four measures with a slightly higher value f(lr effective 
variation (23-24 per cent) than for variation of effective exchange rate (.2J-22 
per cent). 
It may be recalled that the exchange risk variable relevant for India's 
exports are the effective variation measures rather than the variation of 
effective exchange rate measures. The latter assume that there is ample scope 
Cor traders to substitute markets of low exchange risk for markets of high 
exchange risk. But in actual practice traders particularly in LDes have ,"ery 
HmHed possibility to constantly shift between markets del'ending on the 
comparative currency risk .. Nevertheless, we have retained the measures (If 
. . 
variation of effective exchange rate, first because they are the conventional 
measures and second to see whether they make much difference to the results 
provided by the effective variation measure~ .. 
9.6. Estimation and Results 
9.6.1 Estimation Procedure 
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Using OLS method, we estimated the quantity and price equatil>ns (Equatil>n 
~ and 6) for India's exports in the aggregate and also separatel}' fl>r the 
manufacturing and non-fuel product groups. The estimation proceeded in the 
following way. Each equation was estimated with the first exchange risk 
variable, REVI and all other non-risk variables. Follovdng the procedure of 
eliminating variables with low t-ratios one after anl>ther we arrived at the final 
specification. Then each of the other three risk variables was substituted in 
turn into the resulting specification for each equation. The final specificatil>n 
was tested against the general specification by empll>ying F-lest fl>r jt>int 
restriction. The result of the final specification are also subject tt> parameter 
constancy tests. They were carried out for the last seven years of the sample by 
empll)ying the Chow-test and a15l) the forecast Chi2_test. Depending upl)n the 
availability of degrees of freedom, additional tests for serial correlalil)n by 
employing Box-Pierce (BP) statistic and Langrange-MultipliertLM) statistic in 
their F-form were also done. We used PC-Give Dynamic Modelling Package rl)r 
estimation and diagnostic tests. The results of the variQus di~gnl)~tic t~gtg ar~ 
reported along with each final specification. 
9.6.2 Estimation Results 
I.nd. 9·10 
Tables 9.-t to 9.7 a.nd also Tables9.9"give the regression results involving our 
preferred exchange risk variable REV!. In each table, results from the general 
equation along with results from the final specification obtained by omitting 
variables with low t-ratios (generally below unity) are given. The results 
obtained by substituting other risk variables are, however, rep')rted in 
Appendix Tables A9.1 to A9.6. We shall, first of all, examine the results of 
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equations incorporating the first risk variable. Here 'We shall give aUentil)n to 
the coefficients of both exchange risk and non-risk variables. Later on 'Wo 
shall make a comparative analysis of exchange risk. effects by bringing 
together results based on all risk. measures. 
a) Results from Aggregate Export Equations 
Tables 9.« and 9.~ report results from the estimation of aggregate expl)rt 
equations for volume and price 'respectively.' The final specification o( the 
aggregate volume equation indicates that real effective exchange rate (REER) 
'World in'come (WY), domestic absorption (HA) and real exchange risk (REVt) 
significantly affect India's exports, 'Whereas the price equation indicates that 
'World price in domestic currency (FP), domestic price (HP) and fixed capital 
stock. (If) and real exchange risk. (REVt) are important in determining 
domestic currency export price. All non-risk. variables have the expected signs 
except for WY. WY appears with an unexpected negative sign in vl)lume 
equ'ion and that needs explanation. These final specifications fit the data well 
and alSt) pass the diagnostic tests relating to serial correlatil)n and parameter 
constancy. They also satisfy the test against the unrestricted modeL The results 
indicate that the elasticity of export quantity 'With respect to REER is slightly 
AJtho().9h " ' 
above unity. A the export price is, _ ,positively influenced by bl)th 
foreign and domestic prices, the elasticity with respect to the latter is unity 
'While the elasticity with respect to the (ormer is about half. 
Table 9 . .( Resressioll Results for Volume of ASlrelate EKPOl'ts 
(Sample Period: 1969-86) 
General Equation: 
IQT -11.306 - 1.153*H REER - 1.226* WY • 1.717** IF 
(3.6-{) (--{.10 (-2.08) (2.36) 
- .839 HA· .015 REVI - .127· REV1-1 • .23·t(IPT-HP) - 1 
(-1.25) (,18) (-1.89) (.57) 
RZ •. 958 SEE - .056 RSS •. 0315 DW - 1.668 
Final Specificalit>n: 
lQT -lZJJ59 - 1.2094 .. REm - 1.090· WY • 1.8-{6·" Y.F 
<-t.79) (-5.03) (-2.17) (3.13) 
- .987* HA - .143" REVl_l 
.. (- 2.05) 
R2 •. 956 SEE· .052· RSS - .0326 DW -1.622 
Cbow (7,5). .63 forecast CbiZ (7) -11.93 
Test against unrestricted specification: (f2. 10) • .17 
...... significant at one per centlevel 
•• .. five .. 
.. .. ten .. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values .. 
2ji 
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Table 9.l Re,ression Results for Price oC A"re,ate Elports 
General Equation (Sample Period: 1969-86): 
XPT· -.817.. .479* fP .. .~31 Wy.. .809*" HP .. .l6Z 1:F 
(-.42) (2.01 ) (1.06) (4.28) (,32) 
- .559 HA -197··· REVI • .038 REVI_ 1- .361 (XPT - HPtl 
(-1.36) (-3.82) (.69) (-1.47) 
R2 - .998 SEE - .033 RSS - .0099 DW -2.M4 
Final Specification (Sample Period: 1%8-86): 
1FT - -.619 • 534 ... • FP • 1.016·" HP - 492" f:F - .151"· REVl 
(-1.59) (4.0,0 (6.00) (-2.37) (-3.50 
R2 •. 997 SEE· .037 : RSS· .0194 DW. 2.220· 
BP (2,15) -3.50 LM (1,13) • 1.02 Chow (7,7) - .43 Forecast Chi2 (7):.9.~O 
Test against unrestricted specification: F (<{,9) • 2.16 
••• significant at one per cent level 
•• H five H 
• H ten H 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
Turning to the perverse sign of foreign real income elasticity or India.'s 
export volume, one explanation stems from Johnson's (1967) analysis of trclde 
and economic growth. The point is that, the foreign export demand constitutes 
the balance between foreign production and foreign consumption and it is 
possible that changes in former can exceed changes in latter. (See Magee, 19n, 
pp. 188-190 for a ~athematical illustration). This, however. assumes that. the 
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r~ in world pl'oduction is import-substituting. If the exll'a world pl"oducti.)n is 
export-oriented, then the world income coefficent could still be positive. The 
second explanation is, of course, offered by demand theory in relati.)n t.) 
inferior goods. In spite of these theoretical possibilities, empirical evidence of o. 
negative income elasticity of export demand has been scanty. One of the 
reaSl)ns for this, according to Magee (op. cit. p. (91), is the lack of candour 
among researchers to report such findings. Khan's (t97<{) study of devel')ping 
country exports, however, did report a negative income elasticity of clp')rt 
demand for Indian aggregate exports but the coefficient was statistically 
insignificant. 
Whatever be the theoretical reaSl>ns, we do not believe that there is a 
significant negative world income elasticity for India's elports. We SUSPC(t that 
our results are affected by multicollinearity.12 In the present case, KF. WYand 
HA are highly collinear and we believe that this is instrumental in giving the 
perverse sign for the world income coefficient. By omitting KF from the elp')rt 
volume equation, the coefficient for WY become positive though insignificant .. 
but that changes the sign and significance of HA. Omission of both KF and HA 
leads to a positively significant coefficient for WY. but that. results in 
considerable decline in DW value implying the omission of relevant. variables. 
By omitting HA alone. the coefficient of Wy· becomes negative though 
insignificant. The drastic step of drt)pping WY from the equation did not 
produce good results either, as this leads to the insignificance of HA though 
with the correct negatiVe sign and to a low DW value. The results from these 
alternative specifications are reported in Appendix Table A9.7. 
In the light of the defects of alternative specifications, in spite I)f the 
perverse sign of 'World income elasticity that specification has been retained. 
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Besides. the results from that specification satisfy the criteria of goodness of fit. 
absence of serial correlation. and parameter stability tests. finally. the interval 
estimates for the income elasticity in the quantity equation at 95 per 'cent 
confidence le~el suggested the probability of positive values for the coefficient. 
One result which remained consistent all through the estimation procedure 
for the aggregate export' equations has been relating to the exchange risk. 
There is strong evidence of a negative impact of exchange risk on b.)th the 
volume and price oC India's aggregate exports. the former occurring vdth a. 
one-year lag and the latter occurring within a year. This result does not appear 
to suffer from the problem of multi-coUinearity as the exchange risk proxy is 
least correlated with other explanatory variables in the equation. In the final 
specification. exchange risk is significant at five per cent level in the quantity 
equation whereas it is significant at one per cent level in the price equation. 
The negative influence oC exchange risk in the current year in the price 
equation indicates the dominance of demand influence over supply. This is 
elaborated in Section 9.3. Basically. the effect of exchange risk is tl) reduce 
both demand and supply. If the demand effect predominates. the exp'>rt price 
will decline; if the supply effect predominates, export price will rise. Bef.>re 
making a detailed analysis of these results, let us examine whether they are 
corroborated by the results from the disaggregated equations. 
b) Results from Manufacturing Export Equations 
Table 9.6 gives the estimation results of manufacturing export quantity 
equation and Table 9.7 gives those of the correspondiong price equation. The 
final specification of the volume equation has two alternatives. The first one 
reports that manufacturing product exports are determined by real effective 
elc.hange rate(REERM). fixed capital stock (KFM) and real exchange (,"clte 
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uncertainty with a lag (REVl-l). and second one reports that the significant 
variables in determining manufactured exports are RITRM. WYand REV!. I. 
Once. again we. confront the multicollinearity problem; the high 
intercorrelation between KFM and WY makes both appear insignificant if tri~d 
together. with a negative coeffjdent for the latter. but the omission (If anyone 
makes the other significant with the elpected sign. Whereas KFM and WY are 
significant (at 10 per cent level) in separate specifiC'atil)Qs. REERM and REVI-l 
are strongly significant in all alternative specifications. The elasticity of 
volume of manufactured product exports with respect to REERM is v{ell abl)ve 
unity_ We have no reason in preferring one to the other of the t~'I) alternative 
specifications and. therefore. keep both. Either specificatil)ns give equaU)r good 
results including parameter stability and the satisfaction of F -test for parameter 
restriction. 
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Table '.6 Relression Results for Volu.e of Manuf.durin« Product 
Esports (S •• ple, Period: 1969-16) , 
General Equat.ion: 
lQM • 10.8% - 1.394** REERM - .181 WY + .869 KfM 
0.84) (-2.82) (-.17) (A3) 
- .289 HA + .075 REV 1 - .374· REV1-l- .293 (XPM-HPM) - 1 
(-.17). (.32) (-2.03) (:'.40 
RZ •. 862 SEE· .131 RSS • .1723 DW· 2.105 
final Specification: 
(1) lQM'; '9.842 - 1.405··· REERM + .321· KfM - .302** REVI - 1 
(3.99) (-3.61) 0.90) ~ (-2.:)4) 
R2 •. 848 SEE • .117 RSS· .190S DW" 1.923 
BP (2,14) • .75 LM 0,13) • 4.67 ChoW' (7,7)· .80 forecast Chi2 (7). ".n 
Test against unrestricted specification: F (4.10) ... 26 
(Z) lQM· 8.319 - 1.339**· REERM + .521 • WY - .. 297** REV!-l 
(2.49) (-3.09) 0.82) (-2.48) 
RZ •. 84S ' SEE· .118 RSS· .1939 DW ·1.745 ' 
, '. 
SP (Z.H) ·.33 LM (1.13)· .03 ChoW' (7,7), • .83 ForecastChi2 (7) • 3.lS 
Test against unrestricted specification: f (-4.10) •. 31 
••• Significant at one per cent level 
** "five .. 
* " ten " 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
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Table 9.7 Regression Results for Price of MaDuCacturinl Product 
(sports (Sa.ple Period: .969-86) 
General equation; 
XPM- -.ot95 ~ 
(-.11 ) 
.273 FP - .602 WY + 1.01~** RPM + 1.275 KFM 
(.58) . (-.51) (Z.85) OJ)5) 
- .ot'lO HA - .255* REVl + .103 REVl-l -.38-t (XPM-HPML 1 . 
(-.-t7) (-1.93) (.815) (-.%) 
R2 •. 99ot SEE· .073 RSS • .047-t DW· 2.175 
Final Specification: 
. XPM· -ot.13ot + 1.214"" RPM + .597* HA - .143* REVl 
(-6.10) (7.60) (Z.O,t) (-1.77) 
+ .197** REVLl 
(2.62) 
R2 • .992 SEE & .067 RSS • .0580 DW .. 2.495 
BP (2.H) • 54 ChoW' (7.6) ~ .90 b)r~casl ChiZ (7) .. 1.04 
Test against unrestricted specification: F (4. 9) • .50 
...... significant at one per cent level 
.... .. five 
.. 
.. ten 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
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The price equation pertaining to manufactured product exports prodlJCes 
ml)re conclusive results. As seen from Table 9.7. they indicate the dominance of 
domestic price (HPM) and domestic absorptil)n (HA) and real exchange risk of 
the current year (REV!) and also previous year (REV1-tJ. We h,\Ye mit been 
able to find evidence of the influence (If foreign pdces (FP) (In India's 
manufacturing export pdce which js an extreme result which needs to be 
examined more closely. Regarding the effect of exchange risk. we get. a 
negative coefficient for the current year and a positive one for the previs)us 
year. This points to the fact that demand forces prevail over supply in the first 
year and a strong supply influence in the second year. These results alsc) 
require more detailed explanation. 
NoW' let us. first of all. examine the effects of non-risk variables in the 
export price equation. FP is foreign price in terms of domestic currenc)' and. 
therefore. has two components (1) average foreign pdce jn terms of foreign 
currencies and (2) nominal effective exchange rale. The non-significance of 
FP in export price equation indicates that. nominal exchange rate changes have 
no effect on export price (in domestic currency). But 'We saw from the results (If 
. .. 
manufacturing export volume equation that exchange rate changes do affect 
export quantity strongly. There appears to be a dich(ltomy between export 
quantity and export pdce here. The question can be posed this way: suppose 
there is a devaluation. Then. c3n it stimulate manufactured product exports 
without raising the domestic currency price of elp(lrts? This can occur if three 
conditions are satisfied simultanel)usly: (a) the foreign currency price of 
. '. . 
exports are reduced by the same extent of devaluation. (b) a down~ard sloping 
demand curve for exports. and (c) constant returns to scale in export. 
production. This is illustrated in Fig. 9.3. beloW': 
FiS· '.3. 
Market for Mallufactured [sports 
D D', 
Domestic: Currency Price of 
, 
\ , 
Manufactured Exports " 
XPMo ~s ____________ ~ ___ \~ ____ ~s 
, 
, 
, 
, 
D 'D\ 
XQMo XQMI 
Volume of Manufactured Exports 
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The diagram above presents the market for India's manufactured expe,rts 
under certain extreme assumptions Hsted in the preceding paragraph. DD is the 
demand curve. It is downward sloping which means that given the exchange 
rate, India can export more by lowering the export price. 55 is the export 
supply curve. This is a horizontal Hne which indicates constant returns to 
scale. The initial eQ.uilibrium Q.uantity and price of exports are given by IQMo 
and XPMo respectively. A devaluation of the exchange rate is indicated by a 
rightward shift of the demand curve from DD to D'D'. As a re~u1t,·v.)lume of 
exports increases from XQMO to XQM I while export price remains at. XPM.) , . 
The illustration above of the export price behaviour, as throv.'n up by the 
regression results, depends crucially upon the assumption of infinite elasticity 
of export supply in manufacturing sector which is hard to believe in the 
context of India. We suspect that the regression results of the exp.)rt price 
equation do not indicate a significant exchange rate effect because that effect. is 
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captured by the manufacturing domestic price (RPM) which is another 
; 
argument in that equation. This is quite possible as there is lik.ely to have a, 
causal relationship between exchange r'ate and domestic manufacturing price. 
In order to have an idea of the 5eparate effect of exchange rate on elpl)rt 
price of manufactured products, which is believed to be concealed in the 
domestic price of manufactured products, we thought it necessary to specify a 
manufacturing domestic price equation which includes. among other variables, 
an exchange rate variable. We now turn to the task of specifying and 
estimating such an equation in the section below. 
A Domestic Manufacturing Price Equation for India. 
Modelling of manufacturing price behaviour in India cannot ignl)ce the 
, . 
crucial agriculture-industry linkage that exists in the Indian economy. 
Although declining, agriculture accounts for a considerable share of raw 
materials for the Indian industry.13 MI)re importantly,'agricultural produdil)n 
constitutes over 60 per cent of the industrial ~orkers' family budget.14 Because 
of these factors. the variable cost in the Indian manufacturing sector is 
significantly dependent on the agricultural supply situation. An adver~ 
supply shock in agriculture, for example, triggen off inflationary expectations 
in the economy which encourages hoarding and thereby pushes up raw 
material price, for the ago-based manufacturing sector and also wage C(ISts in 
the entire manufacturing sector. The Indian manufacturing sector also 
depends heavily on imports for meeting the requirements of raw materials. 
components and machinery. Therefore, manufacturing costs are a.lso 
influenced by import price. Based on these considerations we can specify the 
d(lmestic manufacturing price equation as follow,: 
In HPM. a .. bl In AS, .. bZ In AS-I" cI In IP .. c2 In IP-I .. d T 
where HPM. manufacturing domestic price (wholesale price index) 
AS • agricultural production index l5 
IP ' , . 'd (' d '" )16 • Import price In ex In omes"lc currency 
T • trend 
26" 
It might seem that we have followed a pure supply-side approach to pri.ce 
determination here, A number of empirical studies on inflation in India have 
not been' able to detect a significant role for demand i.ncluding money supply. 
(e.g .• Aktar. 1975; Rana and DoWling. 1983; Saini. 1982 and 1984; and ChaUerji, 
1985). A recent study by Madhur and Roy (1986). however. demonstrated the 
influence of demand factor (capacity utilization) in determining industrial 
prices in India within the framework of a 'mark-up' model. In our model. the T-
variable. while statistically justified by the existence of trends for all variables 
in the model (see Maddala. 1988. p. 104). vdll inevitably pick up the trend 
component of aU influences on manufacturing price which are not indul.led in 
the equation. particularly the demand variables like the money suppl}". 
The manufacturing price equation has been estimated fl)r the sample period 
1968-86 (annual data) and the results are given in Table 9.8 on the nt'xt page. 
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Table 9.8 Re8ression Results of ManuCacturin, Price Equation 
(Sample Period: 1963-36) 
In HPM -6.548 - .292 In AS - .389* In AS-I + .265"· In IP 
(4AS) (-1.58) (-.2.04) <3.63) 
- .152*· In IP -1 4 .084"·r 
(-2.18) (7.S") 
R2 - .995 SEE - .036 RSS - .017 DW -1.666 
BP (2.15) -1.03 Cbovd7,6) • .44 f(lrecast Cbi2 (7) • 2.18 
••• Significant at one per cent level of significance 
... .. five" 
11 " ten" 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
The results are satisfactory and in tune with the theory 'We explained 
earlier. Specifically, the import price elasticity indicates that a 10 per cent 
devaluation 'Would lead to only 1.1 per cent rise in manufacturing prices within 
two years. The impact is much larger at 2.6 pet cent in the first year but 
declines in the second year, possibly due to the additional import-substituting 
domestic production induced by devaluation. 
. The purpose of estimating the manufacturing price equatiion has been to 
establish the possibility of exchange rate changes affecting the domestic 
currency price of export price of India's manufactured product exports. We 
. 'Were unable to disentangle that effect from the effect of dl)mestic 
manufacturing price because of the strong causal relationship betvfeen 
exchange rate and manufacturing price in India. By substituting the results of 
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HPM equation in XPM equation results in Table 9.7. we get the l,)ng-run expl)rt 
price elasticity with respect to FP as .137 with a much higher shl)rt-run 
elasticity of .322. This removes the dichotomy between export price and export 
quantity we noted in the regression results of manufacturing expl)rt equatil)ns. 
Nevertheless. the results lead us to believe that Indian manufactured 
product exporters have substantial power over the export price. They are 
mostly price-setters rather than price-takers. There is thus evidence tl) state 
that India's manufactured exports are differentiated products rather than 
standardized products for which there exist perfect international substitutes. 
Domestic cost and price and. to some extent. domestic demand pressure influence 
the export price of India's manufactured exports. The foreign price including 
exchange rate do have some influence on India's export price particularly in 
the short run. but that effect is marginal in the long run. 
c) Results from Non-fuel Primary Product Export Equation: 
Table 9.9 reports the details of the results from primary export volume 
equation. Here too. we have two alternative final specifications: the first one 
with WY. and the second with capital stock (KFP) instead of WY, The results 
fl"l)m the general equation indicate that. WYand KfP have expected p')sitive 
coefficients but are both insignificant whereas they are significant if tried 
alone in separate equations. We again suspect multicollinearity to be 
responsible for this situation. We keep either specifications as they are equaUy 
good in all other respects. 
One striking result from the primary product. export quantity equation is 
that. the real effective exchange rate(REERP) while strongly significant in the 
first year with the expected sign. has that effect partially nullified in the 
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second year by an unexpected negative sign on the lagged value of the 
wfference between export price and domestic price, (XPP - IIPP)- J .17 Thhc may 
be explained as a 'stock-holding' effect. Although primary ~ctor, particularly 
agriculture, is characterized by low price elasticity of production, there can be 
, . 
a large short run export response from this sector through drawing do'Wn of 
stocks. However, partic\llarly with the dominance of tree crops in primary 
exports where the production response takes several years, a decline in exports 
~ , . 
can be expected in the second year as in response to an export price rise exports 
rise sharply in the first year by depleting inventories. Taking into account 
this typical behaviour of primary commodity exports, the long-r\ln ela~cjty (.f 
exports with respect to real effective exchange rate works ('ut to be Ie" than 
unity. (.6 and .9 by the final specification' alternatives one and two 
re~pectively, ignoring the sign). This compares 'With the larger ela.~icity (If 
more than unity for man\lfact\lred product exports (1.3 and 1.<f respectively f(lr 
the two alternative final specifications). 
Another important result from the primary product export volume equation 
is that it gives evidence of a strong negative domestic absorption effect on 
primary product elp~rts. This is indicated by each of the two final alternative 
specifications, although the val\le of the coefficient is strikingly different 
which may be attributed to multicollinearity. We could not detect any 
significant domestic absorption effect in' the man\lfacturing export sect(lt 
\ . , 
through the'volume equation although some indirect eviden'ce (.f it was noted 
through the manufacturing' export price equation (see Table 9.7). As against 
~, " . -
this, it appears ,true to state that the Indian primary c(Immodity expom art 
constrained by the fast growth in domestic absorption of exportables. 
Table 9.9 ResressioD Results Cor Volume oC NOD-Cuei Priaary 
Product E.ports 
General Equation (Sample Period: 1969-86): 
IQP • 15.244 - 1 -"57**· REERP •. 558 WY • .876 KFP 
(H)6) (-3.99) (,70) (,70) 
" - 1.688 HA - .010 REVI • .0)9 REVL 1 - .669* (IPP - HPPL J 
" (-1.71) (-.It) (.47) (-2.11) 
RZ •. 881 SEE· .073 RSS •. 0527 DW • 2.310 
Final Specification (Sample Period: 1968-86): 
(1) IQP· 14.317 - l.H9 ... • REERP. 1.1Z0··· WY - 1.l0~·** HA 
(5.1Z) (-'1.8') H.02) (-4.34) 
- .818 ... • (XPP- HPP)-I 
(-3.65) 
R2 •. 884 SEE· .064 " RSS· .0574 DW .. 2.163 
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BP (2.15)·.49 LM (J,13) .. .15 Chow (7,7) or 2.09 Forec~~ Chj2 (7) .. 5.62 
Test against unrestricted specification: f 0,10) ·".30 
(2) IQP .. 16.283 - 1.510·" REERP. 1.622"· KFP - 2.079· ... HA 
(5.49) (-4.71) (3.44) (-3.75) 
- .563** (IPP - HPP) -I 
(-2.33) 
R2 •. 865 SEE • .069 RSS • .0671 DW • 1.800 
BP (2.15)·.39 LM (1.13) • .00 Chow (7,7) • 1.75 Forecast Chi2 (7).11.62 " 
Test against unrestricted specification: F 0,10) •. 91 " 
" , 
••• Significant at one per cent level 
•• It five " 
It H ten " 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. " 
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Why is is that tho domestic absorption effect is evident more in the case oC 
India's primary product exports than for her manufactured product exports? 
We feel that. for manufactured products the domestic absorption effect. on 
exports is picked up by the domestic price which is included in the Rll'RM; the 
higher the domestic price the higher the REERM and. thereCore. lower the 
manuCactured product exports. In the case oC primary products, the domestic 
absorption efCect is more direct without the intermediate channel I)C rising 
domestic price. This is quite possible. Firstly. primary commodities are used up 
internally through rise in domestic investment as firms become more a,'are oC 
the larger potential profits from domestic manufacturing than from expl)rting 
primary raw materials (e.g., animal skin and raw leather. raw cott')n, tobaccl) 
and iron ore). Secondly. rises in overall domestic consumption imply larger 
domestic market for consumable items including exportable, (e.g., tea, cl)ffee. 
sugar and spices). In both these cases. the firms find the domestic. market ml)te 
secure and certain than the world market and hence prefer the fl)rmer to the 
latter even without a positive price differential. This is more so in the case of 
primary commodities than for manufactured products which is consi~ent with 
the empirical findings of high short-term fluctuations and long-term decline in 
the terms of trade of primary commodities. 
Another interesting finding relating to India's primary exports is that there 
is no evidence of a negative exchange risk effect on the volume of exports. This 
is in sharp contrast to the results in the manufacturing sector "here ,'e found 
evidence oC a strong negative effect taking plll(e with aillg. This, hl),·evt:t'. is 
in tune with the low price-elasticity of supply we noticed in the primary sector 
in comparison with the manufacturing sector. 
Let us now turn to the primary commodity export price equation, the results 
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of which are shown in Table 9.10. These results are cl)herent with the quantity 
equation results. First of all, we find a short-run fl)reign price effect which 
becomes stronger in the long run; the elasticity cl)efficient rises from .~~ in 
the short run to 1.09 in the long run. On the other hand, the elasticity of Clpl)rt 
price with respect to domestic price of primary products is near unity in the 
short run and remains almost at that even in the long run. Thus, ..,.'e find that. 
primary commodity export prices are influenced by both domestic and fl)reign 
prices although in the short run the domestic price is more dominant than the 
foreign price. Consequently, we cannot believe that even for primary 
commodities, India is a price-taker. 
The importance of domestic factors in determining the export price of 
India's primary product exports is also demonstrated by the significant 
elasticity coefficient of capital stock in the export price equatil)n (Table 9. Un. It 
implies that the rise in productive capatity of the Indian primary commodity 
sector has a large depressing effect on the export price that can be realized. 
The high negative export price effector cap~tal stock growth in the primary 
commodity sector is an important result. Bhagwati (1958) and Johnson (1955) 
first noted the paradox of "immiserizing growlh~ in which an expansion of 
domestic productive capacity leads to an external terms of trade loss ,,·hich 
outweigh the initial gain from increased production. Our results are pointing tl) 
such a possibility in the context of India's primary commodity exports. 
Table 9,10 Relression Results for Price of Ron-J'uel Priaary 
Product Exports 
General Equation (Sample Period: 1969-86); 
IPP. 1.080 + .687 FP - .328 WY + 1.049** HPP - 1.127 Y.FP . 
(,29) . (1.50) ( - .30 ) (2.49) : (-.81) 
- .029HA - .193* REV! - .070 REV!.I + .4S0(XPP-HPP)-1 
(-,03) (-2.00 (-.65) (1.61) 
R2 • ,988 SEE. ,068 RSS s .0418· DW • 2.156 
final Specification (Sample Period: 1968-86): 
IPP • - .352 + .546· FP + .980"· HPP - 1.022 **. KFP 
(- .24) (1.96) <3.13) (-3.13) 
- .184·· REVI + ,498·· (XPP - HPP>-1 
(-2.55)· (2.37) 
R2 • ,990 SEE • .058 RSS • .OHO DW· 1.969 
BP(2.1,)·.29 Chow (7,6) • 1.63 .ForecastChj2(7)~2.03 
Test against. unrestricted specification: F (3,9) • .16 
l Long-run Results: 
xpp· .701 + 1.088 FP + .960 HPP - 2.036 KFP - .367 REVI 
..... significant at one 'per cent level 
it. .. five .. 
.. .. ten .. 
NI>te: figures in parentheses are t-values 
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Finally. we turn to the effect of exchange rate uncertaintr on primar}p 
commodity export price. We detect a significantly negative effect "hich 
becomes larger in the long run. As is clear from theoretical discussion. this 
indicates the powerful demand effect gaining over the weak supply effect. A 
similar effect was also noticed in the aggregate export price equation results. 
In the case of manufacturing export price. although we found similar negative 
effect in the short run that ""as more than offset by a positive effect (coming 
from the supply side) in the long run (Table 9.7). We need to examine closely 
tbe excbange risk effect on export price. Before doing tbat. let us see wbetber 
the excbange risk results obtained by employing a single measure of eJCbange 
risk, i.e. REV)' are robust across the other alternative measures. To this task we 
, turn next. 
d) Exchange Risk Results - Alternative Measures Compared 
Table 9.11 allows examination of the specific risk eflects as revealed through 
the different exchange risk measures within the framev.'ork of separclte 
aggregate 'and disaggregated export equations. All four risk measures indicate 
more or less similar results. i.e .. a depressing effect of exchange risk on export 
volume. both for the aggregate and manufactured products v(hich occur v."ith a 
lag; and a depressing effect on export price. both for the aggregate and primary 
products. the Cormer occurring within a year and the latter extending over 
more than a year. and a long-run positive effect on export price of 
manuCactured products. In addition. all four measures indicate that primary 
commodity export volume is virtually free from any exchange risk effect. It 
ran also be seen from Table 9.11 that whereas the risk results indicated above 
are significant or nearly significant by the first three measures. they are not 
, 
significant through the last measure. namely. VRITRZ. 
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Table 9.11 EKchance Risk Elasticities and t-Ratios 
Risk. 
Export Volume Export Price 
Variable 
Aggre- Manu- Primary Aggre- Manu- Primarya 
gate facturing gate facturing 
1. REVl 
Current 
. -.151111111 -.143 « 
-.1841111 
(-3.:H) (-1.n) (-Z.~l) 
Lagged -.H3 u -.302" .197'- -.IS) 
(-2.48) (-2.5-4) (2.62) 
2. REV2 
Current -.153*11 -.071 
-.188" 
( -2.68) (-.73) (Z.20) 
Lagged -.127 -·307·· .212·· 
-.121 
(- 1.77> (-2.3-4> (2.30) 
3.\1U1:Rl 
Current -.106" -.079- -.1«611 
(-2.24) (-.89) (-1.98) 
Lagged -.141" 
-.31'" .140 -.132 
(-2.2l) (-2.42) (1.60) 
-t. VREER2 
Current -.090 -,( .. 24 
-.109 
( -1.5·() (-.22) (-1.Z9) 
Lagged -.093 -.236 
.137 -.069 
(-1.27) (-1.68) (1.24) 
••• Significant at one per cent level 
••• five " 
• • ten .. 
a.. The lagged effect oC eIChange risk on the export price in the primary sector 
is computed by subtracting the short-run effect from the l.)ng-run effect. 
These cases imply a partial adjustment system. with the lag~ed dependent 
variable appearing on the right hand side of the equation. 
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Considering the results only from the first three risk measures, v.'e perceive 
.J ; 
a difference which distinguishes the first measure from the other hm That is, 
although all three measures indicate a negative effect on manufacturing exp')rt . 
price in the current year, that effect is signifkant onl}' v.'ith regard to the first 
measure. H.)v.'ever. as implied from earlier discussion, all three measures agree 
with regard to the significant or nearly significant positive effect "'hieh the 
exchange risk has on manufacturing export price in the second year. "hich 
outweighs the negative effect in the first year. 
In short. although REV 1 and REV2 are theoretically superi.)r to VRIER1 and 
VREER2 as measures of exchange risk the overall conclusion. of the eCCed of 
exchange risk on India's export volume and price is not much affected b)r the 
use of anyone of these measures. The results are robust across atteast three of 
the four measures we have constructed. 
e) Exchange Risk Results - Further Analysis 
From the discussion so far there has emerged a pattern in the export 
quantity and price effects of exchange risk in India. Is this pattern consistent 
with economic theory? We would like to highlight particularly the asymmetry 
in the effects as between manufacturing and primary sectors. The table bel.)w 
summarizes the quantity and price responses of a change in exchange risk 
separately from India's manufacturing and primary product exports: 
Table 9.12 Exchanle Risk E{fects on India's Exports of 
Manuracturinl and Primary Products 
Export Grou p 
Manufacturing 
Products 
Primary 
Products 
Volume 
Lagged 
Nil 
Price 
Quick 
demand effect 
lagged supply 
effect 
Prolonged 
demand effect 
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Table 9.12 makes qualitative statements on the impact of exchange risk on 
the volume and price of India's manufacturing and non-fuel primarr product 
exports as thrown up by the econometric estimation detailed earlier. In the 
manufacturing sector. we note a lagged negative quantity response to exchange 
risk. an immediate negative effect on price which reflects the dominance of 
demand response. and a lagged positive price effect ~rhich is consistent with the 
lagged supply response. Turning to the primary sector. we see no significant 
volume response to exchange risk. and a negative prolonged price effect ,-hich 
also arises from the predominance of demand effect. We attempt to explain 
these effects below. 
In fact. the above results are similar tl) those found in the pioneering '-ort 
by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978). These authors examined the exchange rist 
effects on trade between industrial countries within a short time-framework of 
two quarters and detected significant price effects but no significant quantity 
effects. Irrespective of whether the market is monopolistic or competitive. they 
demonstrated that the Jack of quantity effect in the presence of a strong pdce 
effect is due to short-run price inelastic export supply (see Hooper and 
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Kohlhagen. op.cit. pp. 501-2). Our short-run results in the manufacturing 
sector and both short-run and l!)ng-run results in the primary cl)mml)dity 
sector are similar to those of Hooper and Kohlhagen. In the long run. ho"rever. 
the supply of manufacturing exports responds to exchange risk. This is 
indicated by a fall in supply which in turn raises the up!)rt priCI!1 of 
manufacuring exports. 
Another major question is with regard to the sign of the export price effect. 
We found that it is negative for the manufacturing product exports in the short-
run and negative both in the short and long run for the primary comm,)dity 
exports. The negative price elasticity coefficient of exchange risk is 
corroborated by the aggregate price equation results (see Table 9.1 O. The 
explanation of the negative coefficient for exchange risk in the exp.>rt price 
equation constitutes an important task to which we turn below. 
Here too it was Hooper and Kohlhagen "'ho for the first time s)'stematicaUy 
examined the sign of exchange risk coefficient in a trade price equation. They 
showed that the effect of exchange risk on trade price depends on the currency 
. . . 
denomination of trade contracts. The analysis was done by these auth')N in thl!1 
context of bilateral triWe flows among industrial countries. They found 
significantly negative elchange risk coefficients in the price equations of U.S. 
exports and German exports and imports, and significantly positive coefficients 
in U.S. import equations. In the former case the explanation offered lIras that 
trade was invoiced predominantly in exporters' currency and theref.)re the 
exchange risk was largely on the importers' side which in turn llepressed 
demand and thereby the price. In the latter case of U.S. imports. the trade "ras 
invoiced mostly in U.S. dl)l1ars implying larger risk on exporters "'hich CIlIJsed a 
rise in price. This was particularly noted in the caSe of U.S. imp'>rts from Japan 
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which are predominantly dollar denominated. 
Our study, unlike that of Hooper and Kohlhagen, is based on multilateral 
trade in which case several currencies are involved. Nevertheless. an 
examination of the invoicing pattern of India's exports should throw light (In 
the issue. We give the average invoicin8 pattern of India's merchandise 
exports during 1979-80 to 1981-82 in the table on nelt page. 
According to Table 9.13, first of all, 39.' per cent of India's exports are 
tht. 
designated in" Indian rupee. for this portion of India's exports. foreign 
importers bear fully the exchan8e risk. Indian exporters are free fr(lm 
exchange risk relating to this part of exports as their export recejpts in 
domestic currency are unaffected by currency fluctuations. Another .. 4 per 
cent of the country's elports are invoiced jn U.s. doJJar. A part of this export. 
however, goes to the U.S. for which Indian exporters face (ulJ exchange rist. 
But as indicated in Table 9.13. India's exportstc the U.s. denominated in dollar 
constitute only 9A per cent of her global exports during 1979-80 tel J~J-8Z. 
Therefore, for the balance, i.e., 34.6 per cent of India's total exports that are 
invoiced in dolJar. exchange rjsk is partly borne by Indian exporters and 
partly by non-U.S. importers of Indian exports. But who bears more risk for 
this portion of India's exports? 
Table 9.13 Avera«e Currency Invoicin« Paltern of India's 
Merchandise Exports dUriDI 1979-80 to 1911-12 
Currency Share in Total Exports (,. ) 
Indian rupee . 39.~ 
U.S. dollar. H.O 
(9.-{)1 
Pound sterling 12.2 
(4.1 )2 
Deutsche mark 2.2 
French franc 0.4 
Swiss franc 0.2 
Others 1.5 
Total 100.0 
I, India's dollar-denominated exports to U.s. a.~ percent (If India's 
global exports . 
2. India's pound-denominated exports to U.K. as per cent of India's 
global exports 
Source: Computed from Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, January 1988. 
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To determine that, one has to compute the exchange risk involving the non-
dollar currencies vis-a-vis the dollar and the exchange risk inv,)lving the 
rupee vis-a-vis the doUar. If the former is larger than the latter. then 
obviously the non-U.S. importers of dollar-invoiced Indian exports bear 
proportionately larger exchange risk than the Indian exporters; if the (I)rmer 
is lower than the latter. then vice versa. 
We computed. therefore. the average real effective variation of ten major 
foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar based on the measure of standard 
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deviation of percentage changes. The procedure is similar to the one v.e 
employed for the calculation of real effective variation of the lJ.I.D.tt. i.e., REVl. 
The currencies and the v.-eighting system are similar except that the ,,-eights of 
ten non-dollar major currencies are normalized to equal unity as the dollar 
weight drops out. Table 9.14 compares the real effective variatil)n of the non-
dollar foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar with real variation I)f the rupee 
against the U.S. dollar for the period, 1968-86. 
As can be seen from Table 9.14, although the risk relating to rupee vis-a-vis 
the dollar had been higher than that involving the 10 major non-dollar 
currencies vis-a-vis the dollar in the initial years up to 1972. in the subsequent 
years the rupee exchange risk had been generally lower .. For the period as a 
whole. the risk involving the non-dollar currencies against the dollar had 
i' 
been about 18 per cent higher than that for the rupee .. This gives evidence 
that for the bulk of India's dollar-denominated export trade.' foreign impl)cters 
bore a larger exchange risk than Indian exporters during the period under 
study. 
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. Table 9.1« Real [xchaale Risk lavolvial Rupee aad NOIl-
dollar Maior Currencies a,ainst U.S. Dollar. 1961-16 
(Averale of Months)a 
Year Rupee Non-dollar 
vis-a-vis Currencies vis-a-vis 
Dollar DoUarh 
1%8 1.75~ 1.326 
1%9 2.288 0.867 
1970 1.292 0.866 
1971 0.983 0.634 
1972 1.621 1.132 
1973 2.354 2.379 
1974 3 ... 98 3.762 
1975 2.165 2.613 
1976 1.864 1.766 
1977 1.126 1.50~ 
1978 2.058 1.790 
1979 2.555 2.787 
1980 2.205 4.068 
1981 1.892 2.636 
1982 0.912 2.777 
1983 0.977 2.599 
1984 1.020 2.075 
1985 2.213 2.861 
1986 2.044 2.600 
Average 0%8-86) 1.833 2.161 
a. Based on 12-month moving ~t.andard deviation (If m('nthly percentage 
changes 
b. '10-country real effective variation with weights based on the share of 
India's exports to the respective countries. 
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The nelt major invoicing currency for India's exports is the pound sterling 
constituting on the average 12.2 per cent of total exports during 1979-80 tl) 1981-
82 <Table 9.13). However, one-third of this portion pertains to India's expI>rts to 
U.K. for which Indian exporters bear the full exchange risk. The balance, i.e., 
8.1 per cent, relates to India's exports to non-U.K, countries f,)r 'VI'hich the 
exchange risk is distributed between Indian exporters nnd importers, 
The point that can be made from the above analysis of cu~rency-inv')icing 
pattern of India's exports is that nearly two-thirds18 (If the currency ri~k of 
India's export trade faUs on importers and the Indian exporter, bear ('nly ('ne-
third of that risk. Thb quite dearly explains the negative exchange risk 
coefficient in India's export price equations. That is. exchange risk on 
importers of India's products depresses the demand for India's exports thereby 
forcing a cut in price. This is illustrated diagrammatically (IQ next page. 
figs. 9.<f (a) and 9 .. f(b) demonstrate the elChange ri~k effect on export price 
in t'frO contra!lting cases of invoicing pattern: (a) invoicing of exports m(l~ly in 
importers' currency and (b) export-invoicing m(lstly in d(lmestic currency. In 
the former Ca!le, as depicted in fig. 9.4 (a). the backward shift in suppJy curve 
due to the rise in exchange risk is larger than the backward shift in demand 
curve because the rise in risk faJJs proportionately more on exporter!' than (.n 
importers. The result is a rise in price. In the laUer case, as seen in fig. 9.4 (b). 
the backward shift in demand is larger than the backward shift in ~tppJy as 
exchange risk rises. This is so because importers bear a Jarger prop<,rtion (If 
the rise in exchange risk than exporters. The result is a decline in price. It is 
this laUer case that illustrates the Indian situation. 
TiS. '.4. E:uhanle Risk Effect 00. Export Price: All Illustratioll 
Export. 
,-
./ 
/ 
,5. 
/ 
Export Volume 
(0) 
Export invoicing dominated by 
importers' currency 
, 
\ 
\ 
\ J)I Dc) 
Export Volume 
(b) 
Expl)rt invoicing dominated by 
exporters' currency 
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HI)wever. one should not. overemphasize the importance of currency 
invoicing in determining the exchange risk effect. It appears that the ri.\tttrn 
oC currency invoicing strongly influences the distribution of exchange risk as 
between the demand and supply sides in the case of India's non-fuel primary 
product exporu. But iu influence on manufacturing product exports is limited 
to the short run; in the long run. we have noted a positive export price eflect of 
exchange risk in the manufacturing export sector "hich implies the 
outweighing of the short run negative effect arising from the currency 
inv~ing pattern, This result. however, is consistent "dth our argument in 
" 
Chapter 6 that the cost of exchange risk could exist even in the presence I)f fu11-
1I'I~,'et 
fledged forward facilities. 
A 
f) Average Exchange Risk Cost on India's Exports 
After having examined the general nature of the effect of exchange risk on 
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India's exports, volume and price, it is nov." time for quantifying the effect ml>re 
predstly. If v.'e multipl}" the negative of the value of risk elasticity by 100, that 
gives the percentage change in export volume/price that could have occurred 
during the entire period of study if exchange risk had dropped to zert> (rom its 
average value (see Cushman. 1988). Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect a 100 per 
cent decline in exchange risk. A more reasonable line of enquiry v.rould be to 
look for the percentage change in export volume/price that v."ould have 
occurred if the average level of exchange risk had remained at the minimum 
value obtained during the period under review. l9 Let u~ caU the former 
measure, exchange risk cost I and the latter, exchange risk cost. II. We 
tabulate these two types of average cost of exchange risk based on three 
1 . . k 20 a ternahve rIS measures in Tables 9.15 and 9.16 respectively for 
manufactured pro\iuct exports and primllry product exports. 
Tables 9.15 and 9.16 indicate that. the average cost of exc.hange risk. as 
worked out through the three exchange risk measures. is more or tess equal 
with respect to export volume but it varies somewhat with respect tI> export 
price Cor the different measures. As explained earlier, we prefer the first 
measure, REVl. as it is more realistic in the context of India. Therefore, "e 
confine our discussion based on the results from that measure only. AccI>rding 
t.) that measure. as we find from Table 9.15. the volume of India's Clpl>rts of 
manufactured products would have risen by 30 per cent and their price fallen 
by 5 per cent during 1%8-86 had there been no exchange risk in this period. 
Adding the volume and price effects together, we would have got an average 
increase of 25 per cent in the rupee export earnings from manufactured 
products in the absence of exchange risk during the period 1968-86. Taking a. 
more realistic assumption. the rupee value of Indian manufactured exports 
would have been higher by nearly 12 per cent had the authorities k~Pt the 
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exchange risk to the minimum level obtained during 1%8-86. This is not a small 
cost for India's manufactured exports. 
Table 9.15 Average Exchange Risk Cost durin8 1961-16: 
Manufacluring Product Exports (Per Cent) 
Risk Volume Price Value 
Variable Cost I Cost II c.ost I r.ost I I c.ost I r.(lst II 
REVl 30.2 14.8 -5.4 - 2.6 24.8 12.2 
REV2 30.7 1~.2 -14.1 - 7.0 16.6 . 8.2 
VREERI 31.~ lZ.~ -6.1 -2.4 25.4 10.1 . 
Table 9.16 Average Exchange Risk Cost during 1968-86: Primary 
Product Exports (Per Cent) 
Risk Volume Price Value 
Variable Cost! Cost 11 Cost I Cost 11 Cost 1 CI)st II 
REVl 36.7 17.9 36.7 17.9 
REV2 30.9 15.3 30.9 15.3 
VREERl 27.S 11.0 27.8 11.0 
As far as the primary exports are concerned, as "e saw earlier, there have 
been no volume effect of exchange risk. But there has been a large price effect. 
By our preferred measure, as can be seen from Table 9.16, export prh:e or the 
value of India's non-fuel primary products would have risen by nearly 37 per 
cent during 1%8-86 had there been no exchange risk. On the other band, if tbe 
exchange risk had been restricted to the average minimum level achieved 
during the period, the rise in export export price/value would have been nearly 
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18 per cent. Thi, indeed i, quite ,ubstantial. 
9.6.3 Comparison With Other Studie, 
There are two important previous ,tudie!l on the impact (If exchan ge ri,k (In 
India's ellport" both of .... hich are bC\!led on quarterly data. Gupta's UC)SO, ~\ldy" 
covers 1%0-78 but omitted 1971 II - 1973 II through the dummy variable 
technique whereas Bauti!lta's (1981) .... ork cover!l a shorter period (If 197+79. A 
problem .... ith Gupta's study is that it j, bC\!led on only nominal exchange risk. 
This would not have been much of a problem had the study been confined to the 
floating rate period alone as Bautista's. Thi!l i!l so because, during almost two-
third!l of the period of Gupta's study nominal exchange rate virtually remained 
unchanged, and this .... ould have introduced a downward bia!l in risk 
coefficien"'. Secondly. Gupta u,ed the SDR value (If Indian rupee a!l the relevant 
exchange rate and thereby measured, at the most, variation of effective 
eschange rate and did not con!lider effective variation. Thirdly, Gupta relied 
mainly on two statistical me~ure!l of exchan8c risk. one, the mean ab~llute 
error and two, the root mean ~quarc error, both (If "hich arc ba~(:d (In !llaHc 
expectatiQnsZ land ruled out the consideration of standard deviatil)n measures. 
fourthly, Gupta did not incorporate any dynamics in the export function "hich 
implied instantaneous adjustment of exports to changes in all explanatory 
variables which is quite unrealistic particularly with quarterly observations. 
Bautista considered both nominal and real exchange risk but his final 
equation for India's exports had variation of only real effective exchange "jth a 
12-country export-weighting system. It is to be noted, hov.'ever, that the author 
used the standard deviation of real effective exchange rate as the exchange risk 
measure. and not the standard deviation of percentage changes in ,real effective 
exchange rate, which could have captured not only the short-term v,>latility 
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but, unintentionally. a part of the long-term trend in exchange rate as ,,·ell. 
Secondly. Bautista's study is based on dollar value of exports and. therefore, it 
does not separate out the quantity and price effects as we did. Besides. the 
specification of an export function in value terms rather than quantity can be 
questioned on the grounds that the elasticity coefficients of exports volume and 
price 'vt'ith respect to each exogenous variable could very well be different. 
The two studies mentioned above can also be challenged for their functional 
forms. Gupta employed a supply function and hence ignored the imp')rtancc of 
demand factors. He alternatively estimated the supply function using 
simultaneous equation method which gave very similar results. But as '-as 
pointed out earlier, simultaneous equation methods yield consistent estimntes 
but they could stilt be biased. Bautista's basic export function ignored all non-
exchange rate variables on the assumption that the omitted variables determine 
only the long-term trend of export growth and decided to represent them by a 
single time trend variable. 
Table 9.17 compares the exchange rate and exchange risk elasticities for 
India's exports from our study with those implied from the two studies discussed 
above. It can be seen that Gupta's work implied a very lo'\l' negative risk 
elasticity (-.02 to -.03) which probably could be attributed to the fact. '\l'e noted 
earlier. i.e.. during the bulk of the sample period exchange risk remained 
nearly constant. Bautista's study distinguished between aggregate and 
manufactured product exports but unfortunately the risk elasticities th,)ugh 
negative were only marginally significant in both equations. The value of the 
risk elasticities are. however. larger than that in Gupta's study. i.e .. -J.l66 for 
aggregate exports and ~Hghtly higher - .074 for manufact\lred exports.ZZ . It is, 
however. important to note that the~e elasticities are ~hort-run estimates. 
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Table '.17 Exchanle Rate and Exchanle Risk Elasticities lor India's 
Exports: Coaparison with Previous Studies 
Author Sample Type of Exchange Rate ElthaD.e~ Risk Elastitit! 
period Export Flows Elasticitya Volume Price Value 
Guptab 1960-78 Aggregate -.027 - -.020 
(1980) (quarterly) -.03I c -.033 
Bautista 1974-79 Aggregate -1.288 -.066 
(1981) (quarterly) (-2.074>d . (-.l06)d 
Manufact- -1.696 
-.074 
ured products 
Present 1968-86 Manufact- -1.33ge- -.302 •. O~H -.2«8 
study (annual) ured products - 1.-405 
Non-fuel -.631e -
-.367 -.367 
Primary -.9-47 
Products 
a. Exchange rate is defined in terms of foreign currencies per unit of domestic 
currency. 
b. For this study, exchange risk is not specified in logarithms in export 
equations and elasticity estimates are computed from mean value of 
exchange risk. 
c. Gupta's export function is specified as a supply function where export price 
and domestic price enter as separate variables. These values are the 
negative of export price elasticities (domestic price elasticities are 
insignificant) in the two alternative equations estimated. 
d. Long run estimates 
e. Values of two alternative specifications. The risk elasticities are almost 
equal in the two specifications and, therefore, only one value is given in 
this case. 
Bautista employed the partial adjustment model. At the estimation stage he 
observed higb. collinearity between time trend and the lagged dependent 
variable and. therefore. omitted the former from the aggregate export equation 
and the latter Crom the manuCacturing export equation. The long run exchange 
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risk elasticity worked out at -.106 for aggregate exports. 
Our ~tudy distingui~hed between manufactured and non-fuel pnmary 
product exports and estimated both volume and price elasticities. for 
manufactured exports, we found a highly significant negative volume 
\ 
elasticity of eJChange risk and a positive price elasticity "hich "hen added 
together yielded a value elasticity of -.2of8, much higher than t.hat e~timated 
before. There has been no previous estimate of risk elasticity for elp(lrt price 
for India. With regard to primary pr(lduct exports of India, there has been no 
previous estimate of risk elasticity, either of volume or of price. We f(lund that I 
India', volume of primary pr(lduct exports are unaffected by exchange risk but 
there is a very large negative risk elasticity for primary product exp(lrt price 
amounting to -.367. 
It 'Would appear that our estimates of risk elasticities are too high, It ~'l)lJld 
be 'Worth comparing our estimates 'vdth those from some important studies in 
developed countries. Cushman (1988) estimated an average volume elasticity of 
-.03 for U.S. exports to. and -.09 fl)r U.S. imports from. six industrial cl)untries. 
An earlier vork by Akhtar and Hilton (198<{) computed volume risk elasticity of 
-.05 for U.S. exports to. and -.06 for U.S, imports from Germany. Kenen Ilnd 
Rodrik's (198<f) study implied. surprisingly. a large positive risk elasticity of .19 
for U.S. exports to ten industrial countries. In sharp contrast. the impl)rt. 
elasticity of exchange risk for the U.S. vorked out to -,21 according t.) a more 
recent study by Kenen and Rodrik (1986). This i, so far the largest negative 
risk elasticity reported for developed countries. We have explained in earlier 
chapters (Chapters () and 8) in great detail vhy the exchange risk effect 
should be larger in developing countries than in developed countries. Our 
results. therefore. are realistic when compared to the Kenen-Rodrik 1%6 study. 
, 
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Compared to earlier studies on the impact of exchange risk on India's 
exports, our study represents a majl)!' advance. It uses alternative measures of 
eIChange risk with emphasis on real effective variation. It takes into account 
all major demand and supply variables in the export function. There is separute 
estimates for price an.d quantity effects. Disaggregation of India's elports into 
manufacturing and primary products is undertaken which gave highly 
meaningful results. The role of currency invoicing is brought in to explain the 
price effects of exchange risk. Finally. the cost of exchange risk on India's 
exports is computed with the help of alternative elasticity measures. 
9.7 Summary and Conclusion 
We examined in this chapter the impact of exchange rate and exchange risk 
on India's exports ,,·ith the help of separate volume and price equations derived 
from a fully specified supply-demand model in the tradition of Uooper and 
Kohlhagen but incorporating the special features of the Indian econl)my. One 
advantage of such a formulation is that we could do away ,,·ilh the extreme 
assumption of either an infinitely elastic demand or perfectly elastic suppb~ 
curve as is usually done in empirical studies. Such an approach clwld enable. 
apart from estimating straightaway the impact of exchange rate change I>n 
price and quantity of exports, to assess the nature of the export market. i.e .. h> 
determine the power of exporters over export price. We used this general 
model in estimating the volume and price for aggregate exports on the one 
hand. and separately for manufactured and primary product exports. on the 
other. 
The results of the aggregate equations gave a slightly higher than unit 
elasticity for export volume with respect. to real effective exchange mte and 
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indicated that Indian exporters have a large influence on export price although 
that influence is not absolute as foreign price also. to some extent. affects expl)rt 
price. Regarding the exchange risk. there is evidence that the volume of 
exports is adversely affected by it but there is a time lag in the operation of that 
impact ,-hich implies 11 lagged supply response. In contrast. the impact of 
exchl111ge dsk r)11 expr)!"t price is felt within the SIlme year which is negative 
implying a larger demand than supply effect. We explained the negative price 
effect of exchange risk in terms of currency-invoicing of India', exports 
which are predominantly in those currendes which expose the buyers of 
India's goods to exchange risk much more than the sellers. We SIl"VI- that 
aggregate volume results are vitiated by multicollinearity which is suspected as 
responsible for giving a negative world income elastidty for India's export 
volume. However. it is believed that the exchange rate and exchange risk 
elasticities are unaffected by multicollinearity as they remain more or le~ the 
same throughout the different stages of the estimation procedure. 
Manufacturing export volume equation results indicated a real elC'hange 
rate elasticity larger than unity and also a virtually complete p')"I\'er in the 
determination of export price by the Indian exporters, The latter "e felt b) be 
somewhat exaggerated, With the help of a domestic manufacturing price 
equation we estimated a significant role for import price in the determination 
of India's domestic manufacturing price which implied a role ror foreign price 
in the determination of export price operating via Indian domestic price. This 
dilutes somewhat India's influence on her manufacturing export pri(e. Still. it 
is not very unrealistic to slale that India's manufacturing exports are largely 
differentiated products and exporters do really wield a large po"\\-er over the 
price. 
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Like in the case of aggregate exporu. manufacturing export volume result~ 
alsl) indicated a lagged negative response to exchange risk. llo'A'cvcr. fl)r 
manufacturing export price. although it did have a negative exchange risk 
effect in the initial year. that was more than offset by a positive effect due to 
supply response in the second year. The negative first-year impact of exchange 
risk on India's manufacturing export price is supported by the pattern of 
denomination of India's export contracts which are lilted against importers of 
Indian goods as regards the exposure to exchange risk. The positive effect of 
exchange risk on manufacturing export price in the second year. on the other 
hand. once again indicates the ability of Indian exporters of manufactured 
products in influencing prices. 
Primary product export equations threw up more interesting results. Export 
volume results indicated low responsiveness of the primary product sector v.-ith 
a real exchange rate elasticity of less than unity. But. more impl)rtantly. a 
'stock-holding' effect was detected in this sector. That is, we nl)ted a slightly 
larger quantity response from primary exports in the first year than from 
manufactured exporu which vas. however, offset to a certain extent in the next 
year by a negative response implying the exhaustion of inventories and the 
slow production response. Consistent with this type of behaviour in quantity, 
we uncovered a slow but large long-run price effect vdth respect to an 
exchange rate change. Nevertheless. we noted a significant. effect I>f domestic: 
price on export price of primary products which implies that India is not a 
price-taker even for her primary product exports. This is alsl) confirmed by a 
very strong negative elasticity coefficient of capital stock in the primary 
product export price equation. This latter result has far-reaching implications 
for the continued specialization by India in a number of primary commodity 
products. 
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We did not find any significant exchange risk effect on the volume of 
primary product exports but found a strong negative risk efCect on their price. 
This is plausible in the context of price-inelastic supply in this ~ctt)r as 
demonstrated by Hooper and Kohlhagan (1978). The negative exchange risk 
effect on export price of India's primary commodity elPorts. like that. fl)r the 
manufacturing product elPorts. is substantiated by the invoicing pattern of 
India's exports which are weighted against importers of India', products. 
However. in the case of manufactured products. the negative effect on tlpl)rt 
price was a short-run impact and in the long run India's exporters could raise 
prices to compensate for the exchange risk. There is no evidence of that sort of 
effect for the primary products and, in contrast. they have a short run negative 
price effect of exchange risk which becomes even larger in the long run. This 
is consistent with the absence of any volume effect of exchange risk in this 
sector. coupled with the large demand effect of exchange risk. 
It is for the first time that the estimation of the impact of exchange risk on 
India's exports is conducted in a systematic fashion. The existing studies on 
India. can be criticized on various grounds. We surveyed the impl)rtant. studies 
in the area which revealed an entirely unsatisfactory situation. They suffer 
from. a number of problems connected with the proper specification of the 
export function and the exchange risk prolY and also the selection of the period 
of study. We believe that we have remedied to a great extent those deCects and 
produced results which are on firmer foundations. 
Last. the contrast. in exchange risk effect 8'j between manufl1('tured and 
primary product exports noted in the Indian case has profound implications 
Cor other LDCs which specialize in primary product elPorts. In many cases the 
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exporting countries do not enjoy any monopoly pO~'er in the determination 
of export price and trade contracts are invl)iced generally in the U.S. dollar. A 
large number of these countries follow a fixed peg with the dollar which 
implies large instability of their domestic currencies vis-a-vis nl)n-dl)l1ar 
currencies. Hence there is likely to be a. strong significant negative effect. of 
exchange risk on their export prices if exports are predominantly' directed 
towards countries other than the U.S. This is an area. where future work would 
be rewarding. 
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[ootnotes: Chapler 9 
1. Although exchange rate instability (volatility) and exchange rate risk 
(uncertainty) are conceptually different as explained in Chapter 6, they 
are used alternatively in this chapter to denote the latter. The basic 
difference between the two is that the exchange risk constitutes only that 
portion oC exchange rate instability which is unanticipated. 
Z. This is based on World Bank data which the author has used for this study. 
3. See the latest survey on trade studies by G.)ldstein and Khan (198l) 
4. Here we rule out third-country competition and assume that India's exports 
compete with the final goods or inputs DC the foreign country to "'hich 
India exports. This assumption is also implied in Khan (1974) 
,. A number of econometric studies on exchange risk have specified the 
exchange risk in trade equation in original form whereas the non-risk 
variables have been specified in logarithms. Apart Crom the Cactthat such a 
procedure ,'ould involve additional ,·ort in indirectlr de-riving the ri~k 
elasticities, there appears to be no theoretical justification Cor this 
asymmetric treatment oC the risk variable in a trade equation. As Car as I)ur 
final results are concerned, we find that whereas it dl)es not make much 
difference to the coefficients oC non-risk variables whether the risk 
variable is included in original or log form. the risk elasticity estimates 
indirectly derived from the former procedure are invariably larger than 
those obtained from the latter procedure. 
6. There has been a suggestion in the literature that ,,·orld trade. instead I)C 
world income, would capture the impact of trade restrictions (Polak, 19)3, 
p.47-,O. We have not opted for this alternative on account of tWI) reasons: 
(1) data is not available for the full sample period by the relevant countr}' 
groupings for world trade as in world income, (2) it is also not pl)ssible to 
get. disaggregated world trade into manufacturing and non-fuel primary 
products for each country groupings we are interested in. (See under 
Section 9.4 for details of computing world income). 
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7. There has been a number of studies, governmental and non-governmental. 
which have examined the Indian export incentive system in detaiL These 
include Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975), Nayyar (1976), Joshi (1978), 
Alexander Committee (1978), Dagli Committee (1979), Bagchi (11}80, Sen 
(1982), Wolf (1982), and Abid Hussain Committee (1984). 
8. The manufacturing unit labour cost for India (uLC) is constructed from 
World Bank. data (World Tables, 1987) which gives separately indices oC 
manufacturing real wage per employee (W r) and manufacturing reall)ut-
put. per employee (0) and also data from IMf Yearbook of InternatiQnal 
Financial Statistics (987) which gives consumer price index (CPO. The 
formula applied is 
ULC· 
o 
9. There is a growing literature on the new econometric methodol'>gy. See 
the articles which appeared in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
Vol. 48, No.3, 1986, particularly Hendry (1986). Also see Engle and Granger 
(1987). 
10. About 19 per cent oC India's global exports during 1979-81 was with the 
'bilateral group' countries. See Chapter 7, Footnote 4, fl)r the details I)C the 
bilateral group countries. 
11. For more details of the constructil)n of real exchange risk pfI>Iies refer 
to Sectil)n 7.3 in Chapter 7. 
12. There has been quite a few writings linking multic,)llinearity 'i'ith 
unexpected signs of explanatory variables, e.g., leamer (1975). Visel) 0978, 
1988), and Oksanen (1987) 
Z% 
13. The share of agriculture in the supply of raw materials tl) Indian industry 
vas as high as 63 per cent. in 1951 which declined tl) 3S per tent in N70, See 
ChatterH (t9S~), p. 38. 
H. family Incl)me and Expenditure Surve)~, Indian Labour Statisti(!. I'm. 
n. The agricultural productil)n index is on base triennium ending 1%9-70 
obtained from Economic Survey, Government of India. 
16. The impl)rt price index is on a calender year basis cl)mputed from W I)rld 
Brul.k..World Tables 1987. The dollar based index has been converted inti) 
rupee b83Ls by using the exchange rate conversion factor ab) given in 
World Bank data. 
17. See the discussion of the structure of the model in Sectit)n 9.3 for an 
elabl)ration of this point. 
IS. This is an approximate calculation based on tbe f,)ll,)",-ing additil)nal 
assumptions: 
(t) for that portit>n of India's sterling-den')minated exports tl) non-
U.K. countries, the risk is distributed equally bet",-een oxpI)rten 
and imp,>rteN; and 
(Z.) fl)r all expl)rts designated in currencies other than the rupee, 
the d.)Uar and sterling, the entire risk is borne by Indian expl)rters. 
19. By all f.)ur alternative measures the average elChange risk ",-as 
minimum in 1971. See figs 9.1 and 9.2 
ZOo The~ are the risk proxies vhh:h gave significent coefficients 
for export volume and price. 
Z1. See Chapter 8 for more details of the exchange risk measures used by 
Gupta. 
ZZ. NI)te that the exchange risk measures empl')yed by Gupta and Baustista 
are quite different., and hence the risk elasticities from these studies are 
not. strictly comparable. 
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APP[NDIX 
Table A9.1 Results froa Alternative Risk. Measures - Voluae or 
A'lrclate Exports 
(Sample Period: 1969-~6) 
1 2 3 <f 
Constant 12.059 12.~13 11.364 11.201 
(<{.79) H.<{<{) ( <{,39) <3.S8) 
-1.209 ..... -1.28'1'" Ie -1.113«1011 -1.18.~"1C· 
( -5.03) (-4.83) (-4.39) (-4.24) 
WY -1.090· -1.076· -1.072· -.851 
(-2.17) (-1.95) (-2.06) (-1.<{7) 
Kf 1.846··· 1.863· ... 1.717·· J.<f96 .... 
(3.13) (Z.76) (Z.88) (Z.30) 
HA -.987· -1.051 * -.835 -.765 
( -2.0~» ( -1.8<{) (-1.73) (-1.<{O) 
REV1-1 -.H3u 
(-2.45 ) 
REV2_1 -.127 
( -1.77) 
VR[[RLI 
-.141** 
(-2.20 
VR£ERZ-l -.093 
(-1.27) 
R2 .956 .9<f8 .953 
.94Z 
DW 1.622 J .,80 1.657 I.M2 
"" •• Significant at one per cent level 
.... five 
• ten 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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Table A9.Z Results from AlternaU.,-e Risk Measures - Price of 
Allrelate [.ports 
(Sample Period: 1%8-89) 
1 2 3 « 
I 
Constant -.619 -.'f90 -1.034 . -.87J 
(-1.59) ( -1.03) (-2.45) (-1.76) 
FP .534·" .614"· .448·· .545··· 
(.c.04 ) <3.88) (2.95) 0.(16) 
HP 1.016"· .979"· .937·· .878··· 
(6.00) (5.21 ) (4.77) (·u:» 
[P -A9Z" -.572" -.242 -.322 
( -2.37) (-2.23) (-1.09) (-126) 
REVl -.151"· 
(-3.51) 
REV2 -.153" 
(-2.68) 
VREERJ -.106 H 
( -2.21) 
VREER2 -.090 
(-1.54) 
R2 .997 .997 .996 
.996 
DW 2.220 2.259 1.958 1.850 
••• Significant at one per cent level 
aa .. five " 
• ten 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
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APPENDIX 
Table A9.3 Results from AlternatiYe Risk Measures - Voluae or 
Manuraeluriol Product Exports (1) 
(Sample Period: 1 %9-86) 
1 Z 3 .. 
Constant 9.842 10.885 8.366 9.875 
(3.99) (4.1S) (3.30) 0.62) 
REERM -lA05"· -1.591 ... -1.139"· -1.39) .... 
(-3.61 ) (-3.83) (-2.84) (-3.24) 
KfM .321 • .266 .357· .26& 
0.90) (1.55) (2.0~» (J .4,) 
REV!.l -.302** 
(-2.54) 
REV2_l -.307" 
(-2.34) 
VREER-l -.315·· 
(-2.'f2) 
VREfRZ- t -.236 
(-1.68) 
R2 .845 .840 .843 
.815 
DW 1.923 2.J22 1.754 2.042 
...... Significant atone per cent level 
... .. five .. 
• 
.. ten 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
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Table 9A.<{ Results from. AlternaliTe Risk Measures - Voluae of 
Manuracturin, Product EIports (2) 
(Sample Perj(ld; 1%~86) 
1 2 3 -{ 
Constant 8.319 9.38 6.921 8,r)57 
(2.«9) (2.7«) (Z.OO (2.2-{) 
REERM -1.339**· -1.510**· -1.0%** -1.279·· 
(-3.09) (-3.35) ( -2.«6) (-2.75) 
WY .521· .«56 Sj9* .«88 
(1.82) (1.58) (1.89) (1.58) 
REVl-l .297** 
(-2,48) 
REV2-l -.310** 
( -2.38) 
VREER1_l -.299*· 
(-2.28) 
VREER2_1 
-252· 
(-1.82) 
R2 .845 .841 .837 .819 
DW 1.745 1.991 1.572 1.934 
...... Significant at one per cent level; 
•• 
.. five II 
.. ten 
Note: Figures in parentheses are I-values 
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Table A9.5 Results from Alternalive Risk Measures - Price of 
Manufadurin, Product Exports 
(Sample Period: 1969-86) 
1 2 3 1 
Constant -4.134 -4.558 -4.238 -4.5<f6 
(-6.10) (-5.90) (-5.7S) (-4.89) 
HPM 1.2H"· 1.089*·· 1.200"· 1 .12Y"· 
(7.60) (5.52) (7.85) .(531) 
HA .597· .813 u .637· .7M* 
(Z.04) (Z.32) (Z.12) (J .9-4) 
REVl -.!<f3· 
(-1.77) 
REVl-l .197** 
(2.62) 
REVZ -.071 
(- .73) 
REV2_1 
.212" 
(2.30) 
VREERI -.079 
(-.S9) 
VR£.ERl-l .140 
(J .60) 
VREERZ 
- .024 
(- .. 22) 
VRE£RZ-l .137 
(1.2") 
R2 .992 .990 .989 
.988 
DW 2.'(95 Z.330 2.266 Z.21)~~ 
••• Significant at one per cent level 
.." five .. 
• 
.. ten .. 
Note: Fjgures jn parentheses are t-values 
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Table A9.6 Results from Allernalive Risk Measures - Price or 
Pri •• ry Product Exports 
(Sample Period: 1%8-86) 
1 Z 3 « 
Constant -.352 .516 -.655 .106 
(-.2-0 (.33) (-A2) (.06) 
FP .:>46· .749" .479 .695· 
(1.96) (2.5") (1.57) (2.15) 
HPP .980*** .838** .89:;** .707· 
0.13) (2.70) (2.71) (2.J J) 
KFP -1.022**· -1.175*** -.788** -.901" 
(-3.13) (-3.05) (-2.+f) (-2.34) 
REVI -.184·-
(-Z.,,) 
REV2 -.188" 
(-2.20) 
VREERI -.146-
(-1.98) 
VREER2 -.109 
(-1.29) 
(XPP-HPPtJ .498-* .392* ."7,* .387 
(2.37) (1.82' (2.10 (J .62) 
R2 .990 .989 .988 
.986 
DW 1.969 1.686 1.813 1.~n 
..... Significant at one per cent level 
** .. five .. 
it .. ten .. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
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Table A'.7 Results from AlternaliTe Specifications of Allcclate 
Export Volume Equation 
1 2 
Con!lwt 12.059 6.124 
(4.79) (2.85) 
REER -1.209·" -.918"'· 
(-:;'03) (-3.19) 
VlY -1.090· .209 
(-2.17) (.57) 
KF 1.846·" 
0.13) 
HA -.987- .378 
(-2.05) (1.iO) 
REVI-J -.1H·· -.082 
(-2.48 ) (-1.16) 
R2 .956 .921 
SEE .052 .068 
RSS .0326 .0593 
DW 1.622 1.446 
4t4t4t Significant at one per cent level 
4t if ' .. 
.. 
five 
ten " 
.. 
.. 
Note: figures in parentheses are t-values. 
(Sample Period: 1%9-86) 
3 « 5 
4.856 9.174 7.173 
(2.41 ) 0.94) (5.MH 
-.785*· -1.102*" -.87,.*1 .. 
(-2.80) (-·4.2J) (-4.18) 
.677·" -.550 
(4.25 ) (-US) 
.758··· .799· 
(Z.68) (Z.10J 
-.437 
(-.94) 
- .101 -.097 
- .128-
( -1.42) ( -1.64) (- J.97J 
.909 .9il .939 
.070 .058 .059 
.0683 .0440 ' .045 
1.031 1.540 1.100 
, . 
10.1 Introduction 
Chapter 10 
Policy Implications 
30 .. 
We examined in previous chapters the evolution of the Indian exchange 
rate system and. in some detail. the mechanics and features of the present 
basket system. We also studied the impact of the basket peg on exchange rate 
stability. Finally. we estimated the impact of the exchange rate and exchange 
rate volatility on India's exports. In this chapter we attempt to examine the 
policy implications of our study on the Indian exchange rate system. 
10.2 Macroeconomic Policy Implications 
10.2.1 Objectives under the Basket System 
We saw in Chapter ~ that the Indian authorities appeared to have directed 
the exchange rate policy since the basket peg towards alternative objectives 
other than the one which prompted the original move from a sterling peg to a 
basket peg. namely. the stability of the exchange rate. Among the different 
alternative objectives that might have influenced the Indian exchange rate 
management. three need close examination. They are (I) anti-speculation 
objective. (2) anti-inflation objective. and (3) the objective of shadowing the 
dollar. We analyse each of these below .. 
(1) Anti-speculation Objective: 
The role of private speculation in free foreign exchange markets is in fact 
controversial: it could very well be stabilizing as it could be destabilizing.1 
However. in an administered exchange rate regime. the central bank 
determines the exchange rate and private speCUlation is unnecessary for the 
stabilization purpose. On the other hand. private speculation could be rather 
destabilizing in times of balance of payments crises by offering a one-way bet 
to the speculators. Moreover. in the contelt of an overall scarcity of foreign 
exchange. the authorities are naturally concerned that every foreign exchange 
transaction should correspond to a genuine commercial transaction. 
In order to prevent speculation in Indian exchange market. the foreign 
exchange control regulation currently prescribes that the bank.s should keep 
square or near square positions in each foreign currency at the end of each 
day. This is. in fact. a relaxation made since 1978 prior to which banks were 
required to maintain square or near square positions in foreign currencies at 
alJ times (see Rangarajan. 1985. p. 10 .. 8). Therefore. foreign exchange dealers 
in India do have some limited leverage for speculative activities without 
violating the exchange control regulation. In that context. if exchange rate 
changes are made unpredictable by making the functional relationship 
between domestic and foreign currencies somewhat imprecise. foreign 
elchange dealers could further be dissuaded from indulging in speculation. 
We noted in Chapter ~ that the very purpose of the confidentiality of the 
official currency basket has been to discourage speculation in foreign 
elchange markets and that the flelible operation of the wider margins in the 
system further promotes this objective. 
(2) Anti-inflation Objective: 
The employment of the exchange rate for anti-inflationary purposes' 
usuaUy means an elchange rate appreciation with a view to hold down price 
rise. (See Stevenson and Vines. 1989). We may. however. extend it also to a case 
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where the authorities refuse to depreciate the exchange rate in the event of a 
clear balance of payments need for fear that such an action should undermine 
anti-inflationary considerations. 
fig. 10.1 gives the graph of the rupee's ll-country export-weighted 
nominal and real effective elchange rate for the period 19~ to 198 .. and Fig. 
10.2 that of India's current account balance as a per cent of GDP for the 
corresponding financial years.2 As can be seen from Fig. 10.2. following the 
second oil shock in 1979-80, India's current account changed from a 
comfortable surplus to a considerable deficit. However, as can be noted from 
Fig. 10.1, the rupee's nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) appreciated 
slightly during 1979-82. With inflation faster in India than abroad during 1980 
and 1981. that led to a substantial rise in the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). We feel that during a period when the REER should have been 
I 
depreciated for correcting elternal imbalance. authorities did not do so lest it 
'. 
should worsen the inflationary situation. Instead. they pushed the NEER 
upwards somewhat. 
We had occasion in Chapter 2 of referring to the experience oC a number 
of LDCs erraticaHy shifting their elchange rate· regimes for the sake of 
relieving inflatioinary pressures. In Chapter" we noted that the abandoning 
of the sterHng peg by India in favour of a basket peg in 1975 could partly be 
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FIG. 10. 1 EXPORT-WEIGHTED NOMINAL AND 
REAL EFfECTIVE EXCHANGE RAlE, 1975-84 
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triggered off by anti-inflationary considerations. India. however. did not 
change the exchange rate regime afterwards although the authorities altered 
the style of administering it since 1978. The entry of anti-inflation motive in 
exchange rate management could explain partly the change in the modus 
Qperluuii of the exchange rate regime. 
(3) Shadowing the Dollar: 
Yet another aspect of India's elchange rate management appears to be the 
shadowing of the U.S. dollar by the rupee. fig. 10.3 gives separately the 
instability of eleven major nominal rupee rates including the rupee-dollar rate 
averaged through export weights (effective variation), as well as the instability 
of the rupee-doUar rate during 1968-87. The measure of instability is the 
standard deviation of percentage changes in elchange rates calculated each 
month on a moving basis for the previous 12-month observations and averaged 
for each year (see Chapter 7 for details of construction methodology). Fig. to ... 
shows the similar picture in real terms. The most striking point that emerges 
from these graphs. particularly fig. 10.3. is that. whereas the rupee's variability 
vis-a-vis the dollar had been larger than its average variability against the 
eleven currencies (effective variation) during the sterling peg. 1972-75. the 
position' got reversed ever since the adoption of the basket peg. More 
importantly, during the famous period of "dollar overvaluation" of 1980-8", the 
instability of the rupee-doUar rate declined steadily and substantially relative to 
rupee's average instability vis-a-vis all the eleven currencies (including the 
doUat>. 
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We have already noted in earlier chapters that the dollar accounts for 
the invoicing of a substantial portion of India's merchandise (on the average. 
"''' per cent of India's merchandise elPorts and 6.f per cent of merchandise 
imports during 1979-80 to 1981-82) and that this invoicing share is considerably 
larger than the share of the U.S. in India's trade (an equa,113 per cent of India's 
merchandise elPorts and imports during 1979-80 to 1981-82). Though estimates 
are not available. it is expected that the dollar occupies a key position 'With 
regard to the denomination of India's invisibles trade including private 
remittances as also with regard to her capital transactions. Hence the 
authorities concern for the stability of the rupee-dollar rate. 
10.2.2. Analysis of the Objectives 
Two questions arise from the above discussion. First. are the above-
mentioned objectives desirable in themselves? Second, if they are desirable. is 
exchange rate poHcy the best way to achieve them? 
We saw that the elimination of private speculation is desirable in the 
Indian context as it does not serve the stabilization function as in a floating 
exchange rate system but instead, it could very well be destabilizing. 
Nevertheless, we may state that if speCUlation is undesirable. the creation of 
exchange risk by making exchange rates unpredictable, is stiU more 
undesirable given the evidence of the high cost of such a poticy on the 
economy. Our econometric study provides evidence of a strong depressing 
effect of exchange risk on Indi~'s exports. We may therefore suggest that a 
better way to tackle speculation in Indian foreign exchange markets is through 
a more strict administration of the existing elchange control regulations. 
rather than through the elchange rate policy. 
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As regards the anti-inflation objective. there is no doubt that every 
government should pursue it. But the rise of the exchange rate for· holding 
down inflation could have sometimes disastrous consequences on the country's 
balance of payments. Let us revert to the instance when the authorities 
appeared to have aimed to bring down the rate of inflation through exchange 
rate management. During 1979-82. the Indian authorities maintained a roughly 
stable or slightly rising trend in nominal effective exchange rate. During 
1979-81 the Indian inflatiion was high due partly to the oil shock of 1979 and 
partJy also due to a major crop failure during the financial year. 1979-80. Is it 
not sensible to maintain a stable nominal exchange rate when there occurs a 
domestic supply shock? As we argued in Chapter 3. provided that the country 
had been planning to deflect the domestic supply shock through large food 
imports. the policy of maintaining a stable nominal effective exchange rate 
would have been justified. But it may be noted that India had a comfortable 
buffer stock of foodgrains when the harvest failure occurred in 1979 and also 
that the net imports of foodgrains durin g all the three years 1978 to 1980 by the 
country had in fact been negativel (See Government of India Economic Survey 
1988-89. p. S2~). Under these circumstances. keeping the nominal effective 
exchange rate steady was not necessary. On the other hand. the permanent 
terJDS of trade shock arising from the more than doubling of world oil prices 
would have required a depreciation of the real. not just the nominal. effective 
exchange rate for boosting non-agricultural exports. Moreover. in the event of 
a JDore rapid inflation at home than abroad. a stable or nearly stable nominal 
elchange rate meant an unstable real exchange rate further depressing 
elPorts. 
Now let us eumine the desirability of keeping a stable rupee-dollar rate 
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which appears to be yet another important consideration in India's exchange 
rate management. The major argument for following the dollar stems from the 
predominance of that currency in the invoicing of India's foreig~ transactions. 
Currency invoicing no doubt influences the very short-run effects of exchange 
rate fluctuations on the domestic currency value of payments and receipts. 
However. what is much more important for trade in goods and services is the 
competitive position of the home country vis-a-vis its trading partners. The 
weight for relative competitiveness in turn is to be on the basis of the trade 
share of countries and not the currency share of trade invoicing. As regards 
the private remittances which constitute a major item under India's invisibles 
account. they are anyway largely independent of exchange rate movements. A 
large part of India's capital transactions is also elogenous. The recent 
importance of commercial borrowing which are perhaps mostly denominated in 
doUar is also not a sufficient reason for keeping the dollar-rupee rate relatively 
more stable. 
In the contelt of India's geographically diversified international 
transactions. the stability of the rupee-dollar rate alone while not having any 
special significance. could very well be harmful to India's exports. Exports are 
determined by both demand and supply factors. With a stable doUar-rupee rate. 
it is true that the short-run currency risk is eliminated for India's exporters 
- . 
whose contracts are invoiced in dollars. but is not eliminated for the demanders 
of India's exports whose currencies are fluctuating against the dollar. That 
would depress the foreign demand for India's products resulting in a cut in 
prke. Our empirical study in the last chapter showed that for manufactured 
exports such negative price effect is evident in the short run. and is quite high 
in the case of India's primary commodity exports. both in the short and long 
.' , . 
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run. 
To sum up the discussion so far: elchange rate policy in the past has been 
directed towards alternative objectives such as the minimization of speculation 
and the rate of inflation, and the stabilization of the rupee-dollar rate. This 
came in conflict with elchange rate stability in real terms which in turn 
adversely affected India's exports. 
\ 10.2.2 Implications for India's Current Account 
Now let us see the implications of our analysis Cor the emerging current 
account situation in the country. In perspective, the country had been having 
persistent balance of payments problem ever since the mid-fifties, except for a 
brief period of 19n-7~. The government has initiated a gradual trade 
liberalization programme3 since 1985. Trade liberalization, although likely to 
improve the current account in the long run, could worsen it in the short 
and the medium term. (See Ray, 1987; and Mussa, 1987). In order to project 
India's current accoun t for the nelt five years, 1989-90 to 1983-84, we use the 
results of our elPort equations in Chapter 9 as well as the following 
assumptions: 
(n the trend in rupee's annual real effective exchange rate would 
remain at the existing level with the real exchange rate 
instability also remaining at the existing average level; 
(ii) world real income would grow at 3 per cent per annum;" 
(iii) India's GNP/GDP/domestic absorption would grow in real terms 
by 6 per cent per annum;' 
(iv) domestic price/GDP deflator would rise by' per cent per annum 
in the absence of any exchange rate adjustment;6 
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(v) inflation in the economies of India's trading 
partners/competitors 'Would be at the rate of 3 per cent per 
annum? 
(vi) the rupee value of India's imports 'Would gro'W in such a way as to 
raise its share in nominal GDP steadily from 8 per cent in 1989-90 
to 8.-4 per cent in 1993-9-4; there is no impact on imports from 
changes in exchange rate and elchange rate instability; 
(vii) elports would get an additional boost due to liberalization to the 
ntent of 2 per cent in 1989-90 which will gradually rise every 
year to reach -t per cent in 1993-9-t; and 
(viii) the net inflow of invisibles in rupee terms would remain at the 
estimated 1988-89 level of Rs. 3600 crores8 in each of the five successive years. 
The details of computation are shown in Appendix Table AIO.1. The 
summary of the results are given in Table 10.1 below. 
Table 10.1· Projection of Esports and Current Account 
Balance (CAB) .. ith Constant lEER and Edstinl 
ATerale LeTe! of Real Eschanle Rate Instability. 
1989-9. (Per Ceat of GDP) 
Year Elports CAB 
1988-89 ~.~ - 1.95 
1989-90 ~.-4 -1.73 
1990-91 ~.-4 -1.90 
1991-92 ~ . .f - 2.05 
1992-93 ~.~ - 2.16 
1993-9.f ~.6 - 2.2-4 
Table 10.1 indicates that given the existing level of the REER and real 
eschange rate instability and under other assumptions listed earlier. the share 
~~u"t 
of elports would remain nearly constant at ,., A of the GDP and the current 
account deficit would further deteriorate. from nearly 2 per cent of the GDP in 
1988-89 to 2.2 per cent in 1993-9-4. Such a current account outcome may not 
be sustainable for the country with an already precarious elteenal debt 
• • <) 
s.tuatlOn. 
A further simulation with our export equation estimates shows that a 
depreciation of the rupee's REER by 8 per cent per annum could turn the huge 
current account deficit gradually into a comfortable surplus in Lhe terminal 
year. as illustrated in Table 10.2 on next page. (See Appendix Table AIO.l for 
details). 
I 
Table 10.2 Projec:tion of Esports and Current Ac:c:ount 
Balanc:e (CAB) yith Depreciation of REER at 8 Per Cent 
pel' Annu. and Edstin. Ayera.o Loyel of Real 
IKchanle Rate Instability. 1989-9-« (Per Cent of GDP) 
Year Exports CAB 
1988-89 ,., -1.95 
1989-90 6.1 -0.99 
1990-91 6.7 - 0.50 
1991-92 7.5 ·O.H 
1992-93 8.of • 0.91 
1993-9of 9.4 • 1.83 
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Thus Table 10.2 indicates that the share of India's exports would rise 
sharply from 5.' per cent in 1988-89 to 9.of in 1993-9of and tho current account 
'Would be converted from a deficit of 2 per cent of GDP to a reasonably high 
surplus of 1.8 per cent over the same period. if the REER were· to depreciate at 8 
per cent per annum with no change in real exchange rate instability over the 
past average leve1.10 
In the above tva scenarios of India's current account. we assumed the 
existence of real exchange rate instability at the previous average level. . NoW' 
let us see what would a reduction in real elchange rate instability imply. Recall 
from Chapter 9 one of the concepts of average cost of exchange risk, 'namely, 
the increase in exports that would have resulted if the exchange risk were the 
minimum that was achieved duri.ng the period of study. i.e. 1968-86. Applying 
that definition we have worked out to see what would be the implication for 
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India's elports and current account balance during the next five years jf 
exchange rate instability in real terms were brought down to the minimum that 
is feasible ,11 The results are summarized in Table 10.3 (see Appendix AIO.! for 
details). 
Table 10.3 Projection of [sports and Current Account Balance (CAB) 
"ith Constant REER and Real ExchaDle Rate Instability 
Reduced to the Past ATerale Minimum. 19S9-9oC 
(Per Cent of GDP) 
Year Exports CAB 
1988-89 5.5 
- 1.9' 
1989-90 5.8 -1.35 
1990-91 6.6 - 0.79 
1991-92 7.4 
- 0.10 
1992-93 8.~ +o.n 
1993-9~ 9.6 + 1.78 
Table 10.3 shows that by retaining the REER at the existing level but by 
lowering real euhange rate instability to the minimum of the previous period, 
i.e. by about ~O per cent of the elisting average level. India's elports would 
grow sharply from 5.5 per cent of GDP in 1988-89 to 9.6 per cent of GDP in 1993-
9,( and the current account improve from a deficit of about 2.0 per cent of GDP to 
a comfortable surplus of 1.8 per cent during the same period.12 This, by 
strange coincidence, is almost what it would be if the REER were brought down 
by 8 per cent per annum over the period with the retention of elchange rate 
instability at the past average level. 
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A point of clarification needs to be made here. The system of basket peg 
serves in stabilizing the effective exchange rate which is consistent with 
instability in all bilateral rates. In the context of India's elPorts, as explained in 
the last chapter, the proper concept oC exchange rate instability is the average 
variability of bilateral rates (effective variation) rather than the variability oC 
effective exchange rate. But we have also noted the close positive correlation 
between the two measures in India meaning that. a reduction in variability of 
the effective exchange rate would lead to a reduction in the average variability 
of bilateral rates as well. . 
To sum up: the exercise above brings out clearly the crucial importance 
that has to be attached to a policy of minimization of real elchange rate 
instability in the context of India in order to improve the export performance 
and the current account situation in the country. The pursuance oC extraneous 
goals at the expense of exchange rate stability has been highly costly for the 
country's exports in particular and balance of payments in general. 
10.3 Microeconomic Policy Implications 
The argument for exchange rate stability as developed above is also an 
argument for the desirability of a basket peg for India. The basket system is 
weU suited for the purpose of minimization of exchange rate instability. An 
alternative to basket peg is independent floating which would imply the 
opening up of the capital account of the balance of payments as we saw in 
Chapter 3. But there is .DOW theoretical and empirical evidence to show that 
liberation of the capital flows during a process oC liberation of the trade flows 
would be destabilizing (see e.g., McKinnon. 1982; Edwards. 198-t and 1987; and 
Bruno. 1985). 
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In the context of India with chronic current account deficits. freeing of 
capital controls would encourage destabilizing capital outflows. In order to 
prevent massive outflow of capital. the domstic interest rates may have to be 
raised so high that it would induce domestic recession and jeopardize growth in 
the exportable sector. Issues arise here concerning the reform of the domestic 
financial markets through freeing the administered interest rates and the 
lowering of levels of fiscal deficit as a prerequisite for such a reform (see 
McKinnon and Mathieson. 1981; and McKinnon. 1981). A full discussion of 
these issues is not pertinent here. The main point is that in the medium term. 
with a gradual trade liberalization process that is being undertaken within the 
country, a multi-currency peg seems to be the optimal exchange rate regime to 
serve the interest of both internal and external balance. 
Although a basket peg is suited to Indian conditions. our analysis does not 
indicate that the present basket peg is the optimum one. Our arguments on this 
aspect of India's exchange rate regime is based on (a) the role of sterling in the 
basket system and (bl. the composition of the currency basket. These are 
explained below .. 
10.3.1. The Role of Sterling in the Basket System 
Our detailed study of the evolution of the Indian exchange rate system in 
Chapter 4 revealed that the present importance of sterling in India's exchange 
. • . t 
rate system is 8xplaineld by historical and political reasons and cannot be 
explained fuHy on pure economic grounds such as the role of sterling in India's 
. . 
external transactions. Sterling is the intervention •. valuation and designation 
currency of the Indian exchange rate system. 
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We noted a partial dilution of the role of,sterling as intervention currency 
since February 1987 as the Reserve Bank started selling of the U.S. dollar in 
addition 10 sterling. This reform 'Would reduce the addilionaltransaction cosu 
on the part of banks in first buying the pound from the Bank and later 
converting them into dollars to meet the dollar requirements. This in turn 
would result in better exchange rate quotalions for the bulk of customer 
transactions. 
With regard 10 the role of sterling as the valuation currency, i.e. the 
numeraire in the basket system. the point raised by Varghese (1979) is quite 
valid. That is, sterling rates of currencies in international markets are indirect 
rates derived from dollar quotations, and therefore, contain distortions due 10 
conversion costs. Hence the dollar is more appropriate than sterling a~ the unit 
of account for the Indian basket system. 
Once the dollar becomes the major intervention currency and also the unit 
of account in the basket system, then by logic it should also be the designation 
currency, i.e., the medium through 'Which exchange rate adjustments are 
announced by the Bank. The only objection one could envisage in not making 
the dollar the designation currency is that, in the basket-managed system, the 
domestic currency value of the designation currency undergoes frequent 
changes in order to maintain stability of the domestic currency with the basket. 
In other words. in such a system, targeting of the dollar-rupee rate would be 
very difficult. But as 'We argued earlier. the policy of targeting dollar-rupeo 
rate at the expense of other rupee rates does not appear desirable in the context 
of India's geographically well diversified Olternaltransactions. 
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10.3.2 The Composition of India's Currency Basket 
The confidentiality of India's official currency basket precludes a 
conclusive statement on the optimality of the present Indian basket system. 
However. it may be slated that a narrow basket with just four currencies, if that 
is what the present system consists of, cannot constitute an optimum currency 
basket for the country. This could be illustrated through a comparison of the 
movements of different indices of rupee's nominal and real effective exchange 
rates as well as their variability based on alternative assumptions of what 
constitutes an optimal basket. 
We have three indices on rupee's effective elchange rate which were 
constructed and employed in previous chapters. They are. (1) .. -country trade-
weighted index with weights based on 1972-7<f trade share; (2) ll-country 
modified trade-weighted index with weights based on modified trade shares 
during 1979-81; and (3) ll-country export-weighted index with weights based 
on export shares during 1979-81. Fig. 10.~ plots the corresponding nominal 
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effective exchange rate indices: NEER ( .. -TW), NEER (MTW), and NEER (EW), for 
the period 197"-88. Fig. 10.6 gives the graph of the respective real effective 
exchange rate indices: REER ("-TW), REER (MTW) and REER (EW), also for 197"-
88. These graphs indicate that although the three nominal and real exchange 
rate indices generally move in the same direction, the eltent of their 
" " 
movements varied considerably since 1978. 
Turning to alternative measures of instability of effective elchange rate 
indices, we employ the measures based on moving standard deviation of 
percentage changes of the above-mentioned effective exchange rate indices. 
Fig. 10.7 gives the annual trends in variability of nominal effective exchange 
rates based on .. -country trade-weighted index", VN ("-Ti); ll-country modified 
trade weighted index, VN (MTW); and It-country export-weighted index, VN 
(EW), all for the period 197"-87. Fig. 10.8 plots the corresponding instability 
measures in real terms, VR ("-Ti); VR (MfW); and VR (EW). These graphs 
indicate large divergence among alternative nominal instability measures since 
1980 and among alternative real instlability measures since 1979. 
The analysis above illustrates the importance of getting the proper 
currency basket right for India. One should ideally have in the Indian 
currency basket also currencies of developing countries (e.g., Brazil. China. 
Hongkong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan) which are 
increasingly competing with India's manufactured products in third markets. 
But the weights of these currencies in the basket should not be based merely on 
the shares of these countries in India's trade. which anyway are not much, but 
~ .~ 
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FIG.10.7 MEASURES OF VARIATION OF NOM7" 
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should also take into account the shares of these countries in markets to which 
India elports. The basic criticism against all trade-weighted baskets is that they 
ignore (a) third-country competition and (b) the differences in domestic 
country's trade elasticities as among various trading partners. In order to 
eliminate these drawbacks, the currency basket has to be firstly, very broad and 
secondly. based 0.0 elasticity weights. Therefore, it is worth consideration 
whether to construct a multilateral elchange rate model for India 0.0 the lines 
of the IMF model for the OEeD countries and generate currency weights 
depending on balance of trade elasticities. 
10." Conclusion 
A proper conduct of exchange rate policy requires an optimal eIchange 
rate regime which determines the nominal exchange rate, and adjustments in 
the nominal exchange rate in order to preserve elternal balance. The basket 
peg provides the eJchange rate regime for India but the present basket system 
does not appear to be optimal. One reason for the suboptimaHty of the Indian 
basket system arises from the role assigned in it to the pound sterling which 
involve costs which can be reduced by shifting that role to the doUar. More 
importantly. a large currency basket which should also include some of India's 
developing country competitors and which should be based on multilateral 
elasticity weights is preferable to a narrow currency basket based on bilateral 
trade weights. 
Given the optimal elChange rate regime, it has to be operated with a view 
to preserving the country's elternal balance. That requires consideration for 
the medium-term trends in real elchange rate as weU as the short-term 
fluctuations in that rate. In the emerging balance of payments situation in the 
\ 
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country, with the existing level of short-term elchange rate instability in real 
terms, would necessitate a substantial real ex.change rate depreciation to attain a 
sustainable current account balance in the medium term. However, the extent 
of depreciation of the exchange rate can be reduced with large gains on the 
current account by minimizing the short-run fluctuations in the real elchange 
rate. The policy of lowering of instability in the real elchange rate is possible 
if only extraneous considerations such as the minimization of speCUlation and 
inClation, and the stabilization of the dollar-rupee rate do not enter into India's 
elchange rate management in future. 
foolooles' [hagter 10 
J. See the discussion in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. 
2. For the source of data in the construction of nominal and real effective 
elchange rate. see Chapter 9. The current account balance data is from 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. GDP data is from Government oC India 
[co nomic Survey. 
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3. The rationale of trade liberalization Cor India can be seen from a number 
of studies on India's trade regime (see for enmple. Bhagwati and Desai. 
1970; Bhagwali and Srinivasan. 1975; and Wolf. 1982). The Jines on which 
India's trade liberalization is taking place can be understood from the 
Report of the Official Committee on Trade Policies (Abid Hussain Committee. 
198«) and the government's statement on long-term fiscal policy (llTP. 
198~) 
<t. World real income increased at an average annual rate oC 3.7 per cent 
during 198«-88 (Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1989. 
p. 10). Our assumption oC 3 per cent growth in world economy for the nelt 
five years is consistent with the IMF projection oC world output growth at 
3.3 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively for 1989 and 1990 (World 
Economic Outlook. April 1989. p. 4). 
5. India's real GNP grew by an average 5.1 per cent per annum during the 
financial years, 1980(-5 to 1988-9 (Government oC India Economic Survey. 
1988-89, p. 2). We assume a step up in the average growth rate in the nelt 
, 
five years to 6 per cent per annum. The Approach Paper for the 8th five 
Year Plan (1990-9~) also envisages an annual growth rate of 6.0 per cent. 
6. The wholesale price indel recorded a rise of 6.5 per cent per annum 
during 1984-5 to 1988-89 (Government oC India Economic Survey, 1988-89. 
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p. 2). We assume a lower rate of inflation at 5 per cent per annum during 
the next five years which is reasonable in the conlelt of a larger output 
growth rate envis~ged. 
7. Industrial countries experienced an average rise of l.~ per cent in 
wholesale price index during 198"-88 (International Financial Statistics, 
Yearbook 1988 and OECD Economic Outlook, April 1989). The assumption of 
doubling of this rate in the nelt five years at 3 per cent per annum is 
consistent with the IMF projection oC accelerating inflation in industrial 
countries during 1989 and 1990 at 3.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent 
respectively (World Economic Outlook 1989, p ... ). 
8. Based on the assessment in Government oC India Economic Survey 1988-89. 
9. According to official estimates, the total debt service HabiliUes of India 
have risen from 8.5 per cent of current earnings (merchandise exports 
plus gross invisible receipts) in 1979-80 to 12.1 per cent in 198"-85 and 
further to 2 .. per cent in 1987-88 (Government of India Economic Survey 
1988-89, p. 122'> 
10. We have not made allowance for growth in GDP through the export 
multiplier. This is, however. justiCiable in the contelt of a very low (but 
nearly stable) share oC exports in India's GDP at about 5 per cent in the last 
ten years. 
11. Note that the measure oC exchange rate instabiHty we employ here. 
because of its inherent superiority over other measures in the contelt oC 
India. is the real effective variation based on moving standard deviation. 
i.e .• REVI. The minimum annual value for REVI was observed in 1971 and 
that was about "8.9 per cent below the average for the period 1968-86. 1971 
vas a year oC considerable uncertainty in the international monetary 
system culminating in the colJapse of the Brettan Woods par value system 
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and the initial floatinl of major currencies which had implications for 
rupee's exchanle rate stability. In spite of these developments, 1971 
constituted the year of lowest real exchanle rate instability' for the 
country . 
.12. g~(! Foo~VI()t<t iO. 
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APPENDJI 
Table AIO.J Projectioa or latHa', Curreat Account .919-94: Tlaree 
Sceaariol 
I. Estimated EJport Equations 
A. Manufacturing Products 
(I) 10M. 8.319 - 1.339 REERM •. ~21 WY - .297 REVLt 
(2) IPM· -4.134. 1.214 HPM •. 597 HA -.143 REV 1 • .197 REVLt 
.. . 
(3) HPM· 6.548 - .292 AS - .389 AS-I • .265 IP - .152 IP-l + .084 T 
B. Non-fuel Primary Products 
(4) lOP· H.347 - 1. .... 9 RIIRP. 1.120 WY - J .l05HA - .818 (IPP - HPPLJ 
(5) IPP· -.3~2 + .546 FP + .980 HPP -1.022 JeFP - ,184 REVI 
• .498 (IPP- HPPLJ 
where all terms stand for the logarithms of the variables: 10M· quantity of 
manufactured exports. RIIRM • eJport-weighted real effective eJchange rate 
relevant for manufactured eJports. WY • world real income (elport-weighted). 
, 
XPM • domestic currency export price of manufactured products. HPM • domestic 
price of manufactures. AS • agricultural production. AS_J • AS of the previous 
year, IP • domestic currency import price. IP_) • IP of previous year, T • time 
trend. lOP. quantity of non-fuel primary eJp0rts. REERP· export-weighted real 
effective exchange rate relevant for primary exports. HA • real domestic 
absorption. IPP· domestic currency eJport price of non-fuel primary 
products. HPP • domestic price of primary products. CIPP-HPPL) • the gap 
between IPP and HPP in the previous year. FP • export-weighted foreign price 
(FP*) in domestic currency. JeFP • filed capital stock in the primary sector. 
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REVI • annual average real effective variation measured through moving 
standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in exchange rates, ud 
REV1.1 • REVI of the previous year. 
2. Impact ofElchange Rate Changes on Domestic Price 
Equation (3) above estimates the impact of nominal exchange rate changes 
on domestic price of manufactured products through domestic currency import 
price UP). We mate a restrictive assumption that the impact of nominal 
exchange rate changes on domestic primary product prices are so negHgible 
that it can be ignored. Therefore, the impact of exchange rate changes on the 
general price level (wholesale price index) is given by the former's effect on 
domestic manufacturing price multiplied by its weight in the aU-commodity 
wholesale price index (HP), i.e., .~83 (inclusive of the group, 'fuel, power, light 
and lubricants'). We further assume that the impact of exchange rate changes 
on the wholesale price index and that on the GDP deflator is the same. Applying 
these assumptions on equation (3) yields the result that a one per cent 
depreciation of nominal exchange rate would raise the domestic wholesale price 
index as well as the GDP deflator by .1~<f per cent in the first year but reduce it 
by .089 per cent in the second year. so that the long run effect is only .065 per 
cent. 
3. Basic Assumptions Underlying the Projections 
The annual growth rates in various elplanatory variables during 1989-90 
10 1993-9<f are assumed to be: 
EIplanatory 
Variable 
WY 
Fp· 
real GNP/GDP/HA 
HPM/HPP/HP/GDP deflator 
Annual Growth 
Rates (~) Assumed 
3 
3 
6 
~ (excluding 
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exchange rate effect) 
In addition. we assume the following relating to the Indian current 
accounl in lhe nell five years: 
a) As a result of import liberalization. the rupee value of imports would 
grow in such a way as to raise its share in nominal GDP from 8 per cenl in 
1989-90 to 8.1 per cenl in 1990-91. 8.2 per cent in 1991-92.8.3 per cenlin 
1992-93. and to 8.4 per cenl in 1993-CH. Exchange rate and its instability 
are assumod to have no impact on imports. 
b) The rupee value of elports would get an additional boost due to 
liberalization to the eltenl of 2 per cent in 1989-90. 2.~ per cent in 1990-
91. 3.0 per cent in 1991-92. 3.~ per cenl in 1992-93. and <f per cent in 1993-
9<f. 
c) The net inflow of invisibles in rupee terms would remain at the 
estimated 1988-89 level of Rs. 3600 era res in each of the nelt five years. 
•. Projection Results 
Scenario 1 
" , 
Under this sconario. the NEER is depreciated just to compensate for the 
differential between home and foreign inflation. The inflation differential ~ 2 
per cent which requires slightly higher than 2 per cent annual depreciation of 
'" 
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the NEER tating into account the domestic price effect of the NEER depredation. 
The required NEER depreciation under Scenario 1 is given below. 
NITR depreciation 
W 
1989-90 2.36 
1990-91 2.12 
1991-92 2.B 
1992-93 2.1.f 
1993-9<C 2.B 
The volume of nports under this scenario would respond only to WYand 
HA and the export price to HPM (including the NEER effect). HA. HPP and NEER 
Uhrouah FP). We do not take into account any effect on elports that would 
occur through changes in filed capital stock in this or any other alternative 
scenarios. Under this scenario we also do not envisage any nport growth due 
to reduction of real nchanae rate instability as we assume that the level of 
instability remains the same. 
We worted out the ann,ual growth in nport value (nport volume growth 
plus export price arowth) separately for the manufactured products and the 
primary products and combine them to get the aggregale export growth using 
the 1979-81 nport share weights (,641 Cor manufactured products and .359 for 
primary products). To the resulting growth rates we add the additional growth 
due to liberalization and finally obtain the {oUowing domestic currencyelport 
arowth rates durina the projected period. 
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Projected Annual 
Export Groyth (%) 
1989-90 10.72 
1990-91 11.30 
1991-92 11.79 
1992-93 12.29 
1993-94 12.79 
The projection of India's current account in the nelt five years under 
Scenario 1 is given below on the nelt page. 
33) 
, 
Scenario 1: Projection of Current Account. 1919-'" (Rs. Crores) 
Items 1988-89a 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-CH 
(Base) 
Elports 20939 23184 2)803 28846 32391 36)34 
().) ().4) (:;.4) ().) ().:;) ". ().6) 
Imports 32023 341,1 3M23 "3230 .. 8632 :)4701 
(S ... )b (8.0) (S.1 ) (S.2) (8.3) (8.4) 
Trade Balance -1108'1 -10967 -12620 -"'381 -162'11 -18167 
(-2.9) (-2.6) (-2.7) (-2.7) (-2.8) (-2.8) 
Invisibles (net) 3600 3600 . 3600 3600 3600 3600 
(0.9) (0.8) (0,8) (0.7) (0,6) (0.6) 
Current Account -7-lS-l -7367 -9020 -1078-l -126-41 
-1")67 
Balance (-1.9) (-1.73) (-1.90) (-2.0) (-2.16) (-2.24) 
a. Estimated actuals based on provisional figures for merchandise trade and 
indications for GDP and net invisibles given in Government oC India 
Economic Survey, 1988-89. 
b. The high import-GDP ratio in 1988-89 is due to elceptional causes such as 
the unusually high international prices oC metals and edible oils and the 
large imports oC essential commodities such as foodgrains to build up 
stocks depleted by the previous year's unprecedented drought. 
~ Figures in parentheses are percentages to GDP at current market prices. 
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Scenario 2 
Under Scenario 2. which assumes an annual 8 per cent REER depreciation. 
the NEER depreciation required is given below: 
MIR depreciation 
W 
1989-90 11.82 
1990-91 10.~8 
1991-92 10.71 
1992-93 10.70 
1993-94 10.70 
The aggregate export growth under Scenario 2 has been worked out as 
under: 
Projected Annual 
Export Growth (%) 
1989-90 2SS~ 
1990-91 23.34 
1991·92 24.56 
1992-93 25.07 
1993-94 25.S7 
The current account projections under Scenario 2 would be as: 
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Scenario Z: Current Account Projections. 1989-94 (Rs. crores) 
Items 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-9,( 
(Base) 
Exports 20939 26289 32"2~ .. 0388 ~05'" 63"30 
(~.') (6.1) (6.7) (7.~) (s.·n (9.") 
Imports&' 32023 3"1'1 3M23 "3230 .. 8632 ~H701 
(8.") . (7.9) (S.O) (8.0) (S.1) (S.1) 
Trade BalaJlce -1108" -7862 -~998 
-28"2 1882 8729 
(-2.9) (-1.8) ( -1.2) (-O.~) (0.3) (1.3) 
Invisible (net) 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 
(0.9) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (O.~) 
Current Account -7 .. 8 .. -"262 -2398 • 7~8 +~-f82 +12329 
Balance (-1.95) (-0.99) ( -O.~O) (+0."') (.0.91) (.1.S3) . 
a. The import-GDP ratio is slightly different from Scenario 1 due to the price 
effect of larger NEER changes on nominal GDP 
~: figures in parentheses are percentages of GDP at current market prices. 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 envisages. besides the Scenario 1 assumption of constant REER 
throughout the projection period. a lowering of real exchange rate instability 
by "8.9 per cent in order to attain the minimum elchange rate instability of the 
past period. The reduction of real exchange rate instability alone would bring 
about an additional export growth. The eltra growth in exports due to lowering 
of exchange rate instability to the prescribed level is indicated below for the 
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aggregate exports as well as Cor the two disaggregated sectors separately: 
Year AddiUQQl1 EI~Qd QCQwlb !lith LQI Enbilni~ Rbk 
MAnyfa~ll.l[~d ~dmAa Aiiruate 
Products PrQdycts Exports 
1989-90 6.99 9.00 7.71 
1990-91 11.88 17.9' H.06 
1991-92 11.88 17.95 ".06 
. 1992-93 11.88 17.95 11.06 
1993-91 11.88 17.9' 11.06 
Taking into account the above additional export growth through the 
reduction in exchange risk. the current account projections for the next five 
years under Scenario 3 would look like as in the table given below. 
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Scenario 3: Projection of Current Account, 1919-94 
Items 
Exports 
Imports 
Trade Balance 
Invisible, (net) 
Current Account 
Balance 
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-c)'( 
(Base) 
20939 2-f798 31087 39123 -f9-f32 6270-f 
(~.~n (~.8) (6.6) (7.·f) (8.") (9.6) 
32023 3<{1,1 38"Z3 -f3Z30 -f863Z ,1701 
(S.-f) (8.0) (S.1 ) (S.2) (8.3) (S.-f) 
-1l08-f -93~3 -7336 --fl07 ·800 ·8003 \ 
(-2.9) (2.2) ( -1.') (-O.S) (·0.1 ) (. 1.2) 
3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 
(0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) 
-7-f8-f -~n3 -3736 -,07 +HOO + 11603 
(-1.9,) (-1.3') (-0.79) (-0.10) (.0.7,) (.1.78) 
~: Figures in parentheses are percentages to GDP at current market prices 
Chapter 11 
COD e1uSiOD 
Tbe mainstream tbeoretical and empirical literature on LDC elcbange rate 
., 
regimes. although voluminous. bave failed to bighHgbt the specific features of 
the new exchange rate regimes that have emerged since the demise of the 
universal -adjustable pe," system. Tbe thesis could provide considerable 
insight into the Indian post-Bretton Woods exchange rate regime. 
A proper conduct of excbange rate policy importantly requires an exchange 
rate regime which has to be established on "internal balance" considerations. 
i.e .• witb a view to shield tbe domestic economy from disturbances imp(lsed by 
the day-to-day third country currency fluctuations. While it is true that a 
basket peg is weU suited to the Indian situation, our study casts doubts on the 
optimaHty of India's present basket system. A broad currency basket jncJudinl 
also currencies of some of India's LDC competitors jn third mulets. with a 
.eilbtin, system based on balance-of-trade elasticities derived from an 
appropriately constructed multilateral exchange rate model. constitutes the 
optimal currency basket for India. Besides, in an optimal peg for the country. it 
is the dollar. instead of sterling. that should be the currency of valuation. 
designation and intervention. 
The elchange rate regime determines the day-to-day nominal elchange 
cates. However. what is important for external balance is the medium-term 
3«0 
t.rend as well as the short-term volatility in the 00 euhanle rate. For 
instance, one can achieve a targeted improvement in current account either by 
a decline in the medium-term trend in the real elchange rate (real 
depreciation) or by a decline in the short-run fluctuations in the real eschange 
rate or a combination between the two. Therefore. while adjusting the nominal 
eschanle rate for the ellernal balance purpose, authorities have options with 
resard to both medium-term trend and short-term fluctuations. An important 
contribution of our study lies in highlighUnl the option involving the latter 
",hich has been largely ignored in the literature on LDC exchange rate policy. 
In the contelt of India, the operation of exchange rate policy in the past has 
led to high elchange rate instability in real terms which involved hilh 
eschange risk for economic alents. Our study could demonstrate the high cost 
of euhange risk for India in terms of lost elports, disalgrelat.ed into 
manufactured and non-fuel primary products. The high exchange rate 
instability associated with the Indian elchange rate manalement has been 
shown to be a case of the authorities' attempts to achieve far too many thinss 
through the elchange rate policy endinl up with achieving far too little. The 
balance of payments situation in India remained uncomfortable throughout the 
1980, and appears to worsen In the 199Os. 
In every discussion of LDCs subject to chronic balance of payments deficit, 
concern is mostly raised about the overvaluation of the home currency and the 
need to depredate the currency to an appropriate level. Very seldom the 
question is asked about the short-term instability of the euhange rate and the 
30{1 
large gains on current account that can be had by lovering the short-term 
exchange rate instability. Our study on India shows dearly that the equilibrium 
exchange rate cannot be divorced from the short-term stability of the nchange 
rate. This. in fact. opens up an area for future research in the conteJt of other 
LDCs subject to chronic balance of payments problems. 
3<fZ 
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